Airline Command

Cabin Crew Communication – Flight 1549

2010-02-21T08:54:00.015+10:00

We are probably all aware of the circumstances and the outcome of the birdstrike and double engine failure that happened to US Airways Flight 1549.

What you probably are NOT aware of, is what was going through the minds of the Cabin Attendants (and passengers) in that brief flight.

Watch this interview between David Learmount (Operationally Speaking blog) and two of the Cabin Attendants, Donna Dent and Sheila Dail, as they recount their experience.

Note the restricted cockpit-cabin communication that took place. The first indication that something was amiss was that it was so quiet. The Captain making a PA to “Brace” was the main form of cockpit-cabin communication that took place airborne. (I would hazard a guess that the two cockpit crew were pretty busy during the three and half minutes after the birdstrike!)

Would you have had the presence of mind to make that PA? How would you have communicated your intentions and plan to the Cabin Crew and the passengers? Would you have included the word “ditching” somewhere to give the Cabin Crew pre-warning? How would you have managed your time and workload during this stressful event?

One of the commonly neglected forms of communication that Captains/cockpit crew make is between the cockpit and the cabin (and passengers). Think about it now, in the safety and comfort of your home/study/computer terminal/coffee shop. How would you exchange the maximum amount of essential, concise, succinct and neccessary information to the rest of your crew in a limited time frame?

The crew had only 208 seconds to analyse, decide and act. I think they (both cockpit and cabin crew) did an extremely fantastic job.

Have look at Captain Sullenberger's interview as well.

Remember the age old agage of "Aviate, Navigate, Communicate, Manage"?

Remember Rule ONE of aviation ALWAYS FLY THE AIRCRAFT?

Good Captain, Bad Captain

2010-02-20T07:07:00.005+10:00

Here are two interesting links from Sam (a Captain for a small regional airline based in the Midwest of USA), who posts regularly at Blogging At FL250 (Rants and Reflections from a Regional Airline Pilot).

The first post is Good Captain, Bad Captain. This first post was written as a First Officer. Here he explains six of his personal criteria for the requirements to a Good Captain and details some attributes of a Bad Captain.

In the second post Good Captain, Bad Captain Revisited, he looks again at the same theme, but this time from the point of view as a Captain.

It’s interesting the slightly different take he has between being a First Officer and as a Captain. You really do see the world slightly differently (something some First Officers don’t get).

I also particularly like the way Sam reviews his Command performance, identifies weak areas in his operation and then tries to eliminate them. Once you get your four bars it’s easy to slacken off – nobody is watching or assessing you anymore. Self improvement is the only way you will ever improve as a Captain.

Make sure you read the comments at the bottom of the posts as well. Some good insights there as well.

I like the way Sam and some of his readers categorise Command skills into two broad types; either Good Captain qualities or Bad Captain qualities. You should be watching, modelling and learning from your current Captains. Use the good qualities and reject the bad stuff. Don’t waste your apprenticeship.

Both posts are very good reading and should give you some food for thought as you progress towards your own four bars.

Visual Approaches (Part 4)

2010-02-11T12:17:00.009+10:00

This is Part 4 of this Visual Approach saga.

In Part 1 we asked the question “Are Visual Approaches A Threat?” My own conclusion is that visual approaches as an approach type are safe and appropriate in most conditions; they are NOT a threat.

In Part 2 we looked at what the threat really is - it is us, the pilots.

In Part 3 we looked at What To Do About It (regaining our visual approach skills and aviation brain).

Read this final instalment to get a quick summary and overview of Visual Approaches.

Summary

Are Visual Approaches a threat?

I contend that they are not; visual approaches are a safe approach type – provided common sense, airmanship, good manual handling skills and sound pilot judgement is used.

It is we pilots who potentially are the threat.

In some cases, we have allowed our manual handling skills and our aviation brain and thinking skills to atrophy and deteriorate through a lack of practise and under-confidence. This leads to a circular self-fulfilling prophesy that reinforces (incorrectly) that Visual Approaches are a threat.

Have I got it completely wrong? Are Visual Approaches really a threat in our airline operation?

In some specific instances, yes they are. This is part of your job as a pilot to assess the potential risk and then make a sound judgement and decision about whether or not you will execute the Visual Approach. Risk versus reward. Cost versus benefit.

Try telling a GA pilot that we (supposedly higher experienced) airline pilots won’t fly a Visual Approach because of the increased threat they pose and he will probably fall to the ground in a apoplexic fit of laughter or stare at you confused and disbelieving.

At the end of the day we are still pilots and (supposedly) in the man/machine interface we are still in charge.

You pull back, the trees get smaller.

Master your instrument. Master the music. And then forget all that bullshit and just play. Charlie-Parker

Making the simple complicated is commonplace; making the complicated awesomely simple...that’s creativity. Charles Mingus

Perhaps if you can’t fly a Visual Approach you should trade in your wings and go sit in the passenger cabin.

Think about how you would respond to the question "Are visual approaches a threat?" (maybe I've got it completely wrong!) Let the COMMENTS begin!

North Pole Approach Plates

2009-12-30T18:22:00.004+10:00

After having flown over the North Pole a few times to and from JFK, I never realised that my route preparation was lacking by missing this essential bit of enroute airfield info and approach plates for the North Pole (click on the image to go to the web page and read the notes carefully).

Seasons Greetings

2009-12-25T13:12:00.001+10:00

Seasons Greetings from Airline Command.

I hope you’re lucky enough to be spending this holiday season with your families and loved ones.

If you’re working or are spending a night away at an Outport or down route (like me), enjoy yourself.

Cheers, Jack.

Visual Approaches (Part 3)

2009-12-22T16:20:00.023+10:00

This is Part 3 of this Visual Approach article.

In Part 1 we asked the question “Are Visual Approaches A Threat?” My own conclusion is that visual approaches as an approach type are safe and appropriate in most conditions; they are NOT a threat.

In Part 2 we looked at what the threat really is - it is us, the pilots.

Read on to find out what to do about it.

What To Do About It?

If your own personal opinion is that visual approaches are indeed a threat, then you just have to always refuse or decline any offer of a visual approach. Pretty easy really. (I just hope that I’m never a passenger on one of your flights – especially if you attempt a visual approach when something bad has happened, you need to get on the ground in a hurry and you cock it up when it really counts.)

But what about those pilots who would like to re-acquire, improve and refine their manual handling skills? What can they do about it?

Things To Consider BEFORE Your Visual Approach

Request A Visual Approach

Most places that international airlines operate into, the local ATC will NEVER voluntarily offer a visual approach. Sometimes they legally are not permitted to offer visual approaches.

However, you can always request a visual approach, even if ATC is not permitted to offer you one. ATC will either deny the request (nothing lost) or approve it (great, some manual handling skills practise). You might be surprised at the number of airfields that you can actually execute a visual approach.

Sometimes a visual approach does not even occur to ATC as a possible approach option. ATC sometimes falls into the same narrow mind-set (and never think outside the box) that we pilots slip into.

Generally, if you never ask for it, you will never get it.

Choose Your Battles Wisely

Just because a visual approach is available does not mean that you should always execute one.

Some visual approaches are easy, simple and have a wide margin for error. Others are hard, complex, require above average handling skills and have little margin for error. If you haven’t done a visual approach for some time or are not totally confident in your handling skills, then perhaps you should decline the hard visual approach and bide your time and wait for a better day when an easier visual approach presents itself.

If you, or your crew, are fatigued perhaps a visual approach is not a smart idea.

If you are a First Officer make sure you have a good working rapport with your Captain before you blurt out that you want to do a visual approach. Some Captains are...how do I put this diplomatically?...dinosaurs, old farts, only worried about their pension/retirement/Ferrari/fourth marriage. For this type of Captain a visual approach is too hard, too risky or just not worth the hassle. Ensure that you scope out the Captain if you’ve never flown with him before and try to work out if he is keen/motivated or bored/indifferent before bringing up the subject of a visual approach. If your Captain declines your request for a visual approach – well just get on with your job and don’t rock the boat (too much).

If the airfield has problematic ATC instructions, close parallel runways, significant terrain on the approach path or heavy traffic, then maybe you should consider a visual approach another day.

If the aircraft has significant defects, MEL items or your crew tasks and workload are excessive, then defer to another day.

If the approach is at night or the sun is in your eyes and the windscreen is covered in bugs, the visibility is marginal or you have never operated into this airfield before, then maybe a visual approach is not the best option.

This a risk versus reward decision. If the costs outweigh the benefits, if safety is adversely compromised, then swallow your pride and try again when the aviation gods are on your side.

Make sure that you choose your visual approach battles wisely and only attempt them when things are stacked in your favour; not against you.

Terrain Separation

When cleared for a visual approach you are responsible to maintain adequate terrain separation for the entire approach path from the time you are cleared for the visual approach (which may be during the descent at some distance from the airfield). If terrain is a significant factor at a particular airfield, it may require that you fly a “tight”, curved, modified flight path to avoid the significant terrain or a specific type of circuit (e.g. only right hand circuits).

Each airfield will have different requirements and local knowledge is especially invaluable in these “difficult” airfields.

Only request or accept a visual approach at night if you are 100% certain of where the terrain is located, where it is in relation to your flight path, the visibility is very good and you are very familiar with that particular airfield.

Traffic Separation

If ATC clear you for a visual approach and you accept, you are now totally responsible for your own traffic separation. If you are number two, you are responsible for positively acquiring and maintaining an adequate visual traffic separation and wake turbulence separation with the preceding aircraft.

If you are cleared for a visual approach to a parallel runway you are responsible for ensuring you aim at the correct runway (sometimes a problem at SFO) and not flying through the extended centreline from a base turn position and maintaining finals tracking of the extended centreline.

The “rules” may be slightly different depending on which country you conducting the visual approach in. For example in the USA if preceding traffic is not sighted, ATC may still clear an aircraft for a visual approach. In this case, ATC retain responsibility for traffic and wake vortex separation. If preceding traffic is sighted, and a call to ATC made to that effect, the crew are then responsible for traffic and wake vortex separation.

At some airports ATC may "expect" or desire that you execute a visual approach so that they can reduce the traffic separation and so squeeze more aircraft onto the runway in a given time. SYD does this (although you are expected to follow the ILS pretty closely) and LAX does this also (I haven't operated into LAX for a number of years, but from what I recall you'd better be looking out and actively scanning and aquiring the preceding traffic and at the same time ensuring you line up on the correct of four runways). Are you ready for this?

Missed Approach

For whatever reason if you ever have to execute a missed approach from a visual approach, how would you do it? What lateral flight path would you take? What altitude would you climb to?

This is always a perennial problem. Everybody (pilots and ATC) seem to have different, conflicting interpretations about this.

Some pilots (and possibly ATC) just assume that the published ILS or instrument approach missed approach is the correct missed approach procedure to follow for a visual approach. But you’re not flying the published approach.

What you assume and what ATC assume may be entirely different. Perhaps there is some local ATC procedure. If you’re not sure ask – before you have to do a missed approach.

If you can't think of what to do and you have to execute a missed approach, climb ahead on runway heading to 1,500 AAL and contact the Tower ASAP. Be prepared for a left visual circuit (or as dictated by the particular terrain, airspace and local procedures) or a specific track and altitude to slot you back into the approach stream. Realise that the Tower will probably working quite hard at this stage as they have to contact Approach/Departures and arrange something non standard and unexpected.

Local knowledge is important, so maybe you should contact ATC (remember that thing called a telephone?) well before the approach and find out.

Stabilised Approach Criteria

Just because you are executing a visual approach doesn’t mean that you fly the aircraft wherever or however you want to. Most airlines these days have very strict Stabilised Approach Criteria, that apply to both instrument and visual approaches.

Ensure that you are extremely aware of these Stabilised Approach Criteria and configure and fly the aircraft to comply with them.

Airspace Requirements

Some airfields have tight or oddly shaped Control Zones. Sometimes their Control Zone does not extend vertically very high. All these things limit where you can manoeuvre the aircraft while doing your visual approach (both laterally and vertically). For example Taipei has parallel runways and just to the East another military runway. Imagine the chaos you would cause if you elected to fly over this other close by airfield on a downwind or base leg!

Others will have the approach path overflying the departures path.

To find some guidance have a look on the published instrument approach charts. If there is a circling approach restriction (i.e. no circling to the East, or outside of 4 nm), then that is something to consider when planning your flight path for the visual approach. It might not apply to your visual approach, but consider why that circling restriction is in there and use some common sense and airmanship.

Again local knowledge and prior planning is required.

Plan it – Brief It

Plan how you’re going to fly this visual approach.

Will you do a straight in approach, join on a left/right base, a left/right downwind, upwind? Is there other traffic that you need to follow or be aware of? When will I start to configure, slow down, turn base? Will I initially use the autopilot and auto thrust (and if so when will I disconnect them) or will I adopt the Rambo visual approach and do everything manually (remember to choose your battles wisely)?

What actions are required by the PF and PM as laid down in your company’s SOPs, NPs, FCTM, FCOMs. When was the last time you read about the procedures required to fly a visual approach?

Spend a bit of time briefing how you will fly the visual approach (e.g. left downwind, with such and such a flap set, at XXX airspeed at 1,500 feet). You are sharing your mental model and communicating your intent with the other crew members. They are not mind readers.

The other pilot can now more effectively monitor you and the progress of the visual approach.

Even if you don’t intend to conduct a visual approach, practise thinking to yourself how you would manoeuvre the aircraft if you were cleared for a visual approach on every approach that you conduct. Start exercising your visual approach brain muscle and get it into shape for the time you actually complete a visual approach.

This is one of my pet peeves – pilots who have forgotten to think like pilots. Pilots who can’t fly aircraft. Are you one of them?

Excess Energy

Most visual approaches (in an international airline environment) are granted during the descent after you have everything set up for an instrument approach. The first thing that pops into my head when I hear “Cleared for a visual approach” or ask for a visual approach is EXCESS ENERGY.

Generally a visual approach will chop off a whole bunch of track miles (sometimes up to 15 nm which is an excess of 4,500 feet on a 3 degree profile). You will now very likely be both too high on the vertical profile and be too fast – both are an excess of energy – energy that you have to now dissipate somehow.

Speedbrake, putting flap out, extending the L/G are all methods of getting rid of this excess energy. Sometimes you may have to configure the aircraft slightly non standard (e.g. extend the L/G early or out of "normal" sequence).

You may have to build some extra track miles into your flight path by extending downwind or flying a wider than normal downwind.

Remember you are now flying a visual approach and you can manoeuvre the aircraft (within reason) anywhere you like. This excess energy also poses some problems that you will have to solve to comply with the Stabilised Approach Criteria.

This is pure piloting. This is where the art of aviation trumps the science. Looking out the window and using your skill and judgement.

I can’t tell you how to solve this problem as each visual approach has its own unique vertical, lateral and longitudinal flight path characteristics. That’s what pilots sit in front of aircraft for – you do remember how to fly an aircraft don’t you?!! You still have that skill and judgement don’t you?

Stay tuned for Part 4...and think about how you would respond to the question "Are visual approaches a threat?" (maybe I've got it completely wrong!)

New Stuff On Airline Command

2009-12-22T10:28:00.005+10:00

Things have been hectic on the home front lately - hence the lack of new articles in the past few months. Kids leaving school, car prangs, planning a house move; you know how it is?!!!

Two things to keep an eye on though are the new Visual Approach articles (Are Visual Approaches A Threat?) and a continuation of the Monitoring articles.

I think monitoring is so important (it's where everything we do as pilots starts) that it's been given its own section within the index of the Airline Command articles.

Read, learn, adapt, improve and enjoy.

Visual Approaches (Part 2)

2009-12-22T08:56:00.012+10:00

This is Part 2 of this Visual Approach article.

In Part 1 we asked the question “Are Visual Approaches A Threat?” My own conclusion is that visual approaches as an approach type are safe and appropriate in most conditions; they are NOT a threat.

Read Part 1 here. Read on to find out what the threat really is.

We Are The Threat

In Part 1 most pilots that I asked the question “Are visual approaches a threat?” answered with “YES! But...”

The real threat/problem is alluded to in the “YES! But...” part of the answer. The most common qualifier that follows the “But...” part of their answer is currency (or more accurately a lack of currency).

I argue that it is we, the pilots, who are the threat.

Many of us are incapable of flying a competent, safe manually flown visual approach, judging angles, glidepath, rates of closure, centreline tracking, configuration and energy management, selecting (and holding) attitudes. Either that, or they probably actually can do this but are not confident enough to try these basic skills.

Do you recall all these basic aviation skills? Are you able to apply them? When was the last time you applied them?

Visual approaches are Piloting Skills 101. It is what you learn from your very first flight. Being able to fly a visual approach is a basic, fundamental piloting skill – but I think some of us pilots have forgotten how to do it; and do it competently and safely.

We are breeding a generation of pilots who can’t manually fly aircraft. They might be really good Play Station/Nintendo gamers and be able to operate the aircraft slickly using the aircraft’s automatics, FMGS and computers, but ask them to look out of a window and manually fly the aircraft and that’s where the threat, risk and compromised safety occurs.

Sure they sit at the pointy end of the aircraft and have wings pinned to their chests, but they are just along for the ride when they are forced into some form of manual flight.

We have a generation of passengers, not pilots.

We are the threat.
Why Can’t We Fly Visual Approaches Correctly?

In an international airline operation visual approaches are often a rarity (but not as rare you think, as we will see in Part 3).

As a result we don’t get to fly too many visual approaches. With the lack of practise and currency our manual handling skills deteriorate, degenerate, atrophy and erode.

With degraded skills comes the very real increased possibly of making a mistake and by extension decreasing safety. Or you really do make a mistake during an actual visual approach.

We then become under-confident in our abilities to safely execute a visual approach.

The ultimate result is that we don’t even attempt them.

It becomes a circular self-fulfilling prophesy.

And it’s not only the more junior, less experienced pilots. First Officers will occasionally ask to do a visual approach when they are PF and the Captain declines because;

“I don’t get paid for this”,

“I’m too old for this”,

“It’s not worth the risk”,

“I don’t trust you (unlikely that they will say this one out loud)”, or

“...Insert your own lame excuse here...”

First Officers then learn from their Captains that visual approaches really are a “threat”.

“The greater danger for most of us lies not in setting our aim too high and falling short; but in setting our aim too low, and achieving our mark.” – Michelangelo

Do you aspire to self-induced mediocrity?

As I said it becomes a perpetuating self-fulfilling prophesy.

Part 3 is here...and think about how you would respond to the question "Are visual approaches a threat?" (maybe I've got it completely wrong!)

Visual Approaches (Part 1)

2009-12-21T10:52:00.011+10:00

This article is purely my own personal thoughts.

It has been fermenting quietly below the surface since Brad posted this item some time ago on the Airline Command Google Groups Discussion forum (have a read to get the gist of what all this is about).

It has been given further impetus after various “incidents” concerning visual approaches in the airline environment have occurred. It was finally brought to the boil after I discussed visual approaches with various First Officers that I have flown with lately on line flights...many completely divergent to my view of a visual approach.

This article discusses visual approaches primarily from an airline perspective, and in my own particular case, from an international airline, controlled airspace, high traffic, multi-crew, wide-body, glass cockpit aircraft perspective.

It is direct (brutally direct in some parts) and some people may not particularly like some of my opinions or conclusions – tough! It is mean to be in-your-face to knock pilots out of their comfortable complacency and to generate some thoughtful discussion.

And it's something that you as a Commander you need to have a long hard think about.

Be a pilot or a passenger – it’s your choice.

What’s This Rant All About?

The answer to the question “Are Visual Approaches A Threat?” is the main intent of this article.

However the bulk of this article discusses the justifications for my answer. Along the way we will look at other aspects of visual approaches, but the core, fundamental intent of this paper is to determine if visual approaches are indeed a threat and therefore unsafe.

If so, we should not be doing them.

Are Visual Approaches A Threat?

“Are Visual Approaches A Threat?”

I’ve asked this question to numerous F/Os that I’ve been flying with and a few Captains as well recently. Almost unequivocally the answer has been “YES!”

Well if visual approaches are such a threat (i.e. increased risk with commensurate decrease in safety), why do we continue doing them?

Why aren’t visual approaches banned and replaced with full precision or non precision approaches?

If a visual approach is so fraught with danger, why is it the very first type of approach an ab initio pilot learns (visual circuits)? If visual approaches are so dangerous why don’t new pilots start off by flying radar vectored ILS approaches?

Usually the immediate response to the question is “YES!”, followed by an imperceptible pause with a qualifying “But...” added afterwards. The responder then usually goes into a “Yes. But...” clarification and explanation of how they are uncurrent or the crews that they fly with are uncurrent, or they haven’t flown a visual approach for years, or a visual approach is not appropriate in our airline operation.

I contend that visual approaches as an approach type to get the aircraft onto the runway are safe.

“Are Visual Approaches A Threat?” I answer “NO!”

In fact, I consider a visual approach to be safer in most cases than ATC vectoring you all over the sky to intercept a localiser and glideslope.

So if visual approaches are not a threat (as I contend), what’s the problem?

Stay tuned for Part 2...and think about how you would respond to the question "Are visual approaches a threat?" (maybe I've got it completely wrong!)

Why Bother With Monitoring?

2009-07-24T17:39:00.002+10:00

Why should we even bother with monitoring?

What’s the big deal?

I monitor...I monitor OK...I think(?)...I hope(?)...Jeez – I dunno!

In this article we'll examine why YOU should devote a lot of time to refine, develop and improve your monitoring skills; why monitoring is so important - both as a pilot and as a Captain.

Monitoring Is A PRIMARY TASK

There’s no getting around it – monitoring is a PRIMARY TASK for every pilot...for ALL crew.

Monitoring is “Piloting 101”.

Monitoring is a basic, essential, fundamental aviation skill.

You cannot fly without monitoring (well...you can, but only for a short time before you fall out of the sky).

Monitoring provides feedback on the flight parameters; it tells us how the trajectory, configuration and energy management of the aircraft is going (how fast, how high, what heading, what attitude, what power etc.).

Monitoring provides feedback on how your team/crew is going; whether they are functioning correctly or not.

Monitoring provides feedback on your operational situation; how much fuel do you have and is it enough, what’s the weather like, how are the aircraft systems doing, how’s the schedule going.

Let’s reiterate what monitoring provides – FEEDBACK (and through that feedback information, facts, data, numbers and parameters).

Remember Rule 1 of aviation? ALWAYS, ALWAYS fly the aircraft!! To fly the aircraft requires monitoring.

Monitoring Is Where It ALL Starts

When you monitor you gather information, data and parameters through your eyes, ears, fingers/bum, nose and tongue (your senses). You then mentally process that “raw data” so that you RECOGNISE or notice that information. You then understand what that information means and you then REACT (hopefully thinking ahead to be proactive).

Does this seem familiar? Notice, Understand, Think Ahead (NUTA). It’s the three levels of SA.

Monitoring is where your SA starts. And SA drives decision making.

Monitoring provides data for you to formulate TEM and CRM strategies, communicate with your team and crew, manage your workload, provide Leadership, utilise airmanship, drive the commercial task etc.

So you can see that if you monitor poorly, you will fly poorly and you will Command poorly.

This is NOT your goal. Your goal is to aviate and Command to high standard. Therefore you will need to practise and discipline yourself to develop highly refined and efficient monitoring.

Monitoring Is An ACTIVE SKILL

Monitoring doesn’t just happen.

Monitoring is an ACTIVE SKILL that you have to diligently and consciously apply. It’s not easy and you’ve got to be constantly working at it.

Perhaps the best analogy for the ACTIVE SKILL of monitoring is learning to instrument fly for the first time. When your instructor took away that big, real horizon by putting you “under the hood” or “under the bag” you had to essentially learn how to fly again. It didn’t come easily (if it did you’re a freak!) and you had to practise, practise, practise to develop the skill and expertise of instrument flying.

Monitoring is the same. It requires conscious, dedicated, practise to develop the skill and expertise of monitoring.

The more you practise, the better you will get. The better your monitoring the better your piloting and the better your Command.

Summary

Monitoring is a PRIMARY TASK for all crew.

Monitoring is an ACTIVE SKILL.

Monitoring is where it ALL starts.

That’s why we bother with monitoring and why monitoring is such a big deal.

Other Monitoring articles can be found here:

What Is Monitoring?
How To Monitor.
Monitoring – It May Save Your Life
Workload Vs Monitoring

What Is Monitoring?

2009-07-22T19:46:00.009+10:00

The people who read this blog (i.e. you, the intended audience) and the guys I fly with in my day-to-day operation as an airline pilot, I suspect, have a really loose and slippery grip on what actually constitutes MONITORING (a previous monitoring article is here).

I’ve asked the First Officers that I’ve been flying with recently the following questions;

What is monitoring (your definition)?

Who taught you to monitor?

And most important of all;

How do you monitor?

Self-Awareness

Before we go any further, I want you to close your eyes and answer those three important questions in your own words. Even better get a pen and paper and write down your answers.

Don’t skip this section – formulating your own answers is very important to be self-aware of how you accomplish this essential, fundamental piloting skill. If you don’t know what you’re doing wrong, how can you possibly improve that skill of monitoring?

Monitoring is poorly understood by pilots (in my opinion) and most pilots have great difficulty in explaining how they actually monitor. Monitoring, like decision making, for most pilots “just happens”.

A common reply to the question “How do you monitor?”, is the Nike answer, “I don’t know, I just do it”.

What Is Monitoring?

Perhaps the best place to start this monitoring discussion is the answer to the question “What Is Monitoring?” (you can compare your answer with mine). Be aware that like Airmanship, 100 different pilots will likely have 100 different answers.

Monitoring is;

The skill where you notice changes in:
flight parameters

your team, or

the operational situation

ANCM or P⁴

Let’s look at each of these three sub-categories and briefly examine them so that you can cement what monitoring is all about.

To do that we’ll be going back to basics and using Aviate, Navigate, Communicate, Manage as a framework to study these monitoring aspects. Aviate, Navigate, Communicate, Manage (hereafter abbreviated to ANCM) can also be expressed as Plane, Path, People, Parts (abbreviated to P⁴).

Flight Parameters

This is the area that most pilots will immediately and exclusively focus on. They are very important aspects, but as we'll see there are also some other not so obvious aspects that we need to devote to monitoring.

Areas of your aircraft operation that you have to deal with in this area of Flight Parameters are;

Trajectory Management,

Configuration Management, and

Energy Management (which is a subset of Trajectory and Configuration Management.

Aviate

Flight Parameters are the “raw data” of flying, things like Speed (IAS, TAS, Mach No., Groundspeed), Altitude, V/S, Attitude, Power, Heading, Track, FPA and Sideslip.

They are also where the flaps, slats, landing gear, speedbrakes and other things you can dangle in the breeze are actually positioned.

These are the Aviate (Plane) components that you have to monitor.

Navigate

In conjunction with these Aviate components you have to point the aircraft in the right direction (both vertically and horizontally).

Where am I? Where am I going? What am I pointed at? How am I going to get there?

Heading, Track, the TO waypoint, the FMS Flight Plan, NAV or HDG, drift, head or tailwind, “raw data” from DME, VOR, ADF, LOC, G/S or INS, GPS or FM positional information.

These are the Navigate (Path) components that you have to monitor.

Team (Crew)

An often over-looked area of monitoring is the monitoring of your team members. As the Captain the monitoring of your team (crew) is an important Leadership and management requirement.

Communicate

Your team consists not only of your immediate team (yourself and your other crew members – including the cabin crew), but also your “extended team” (passengers, ATC, Operations, Engineering, Traffic, Cargo, Security etc.). As the Captain you have to monitor all these different team players.

What am I doing? What are they doing? Are they coping? Is the workload OK? Can I delegate? Can I help them? Are they (in)experienced? Can I trust them? Can they trust me? What is my (their) mental model? Am I communicating my intent?

Much of this monitoring aspect of your team is just basic CRM (but it’s a bit of a bummer if you’ve got poor CRM!) Good Leadership skills are required to monitor adequately your team members.

These are the Communicate (People) components that you have to monitor.

Operational Situation

The actual task sometimes also gets over-looked – for us in the airline industry this is usually a commercial task (i.e. get the punters from A to B safely, legally, efficiently and commercially, so that our company makes money and the customers are satisfied).

Manage

You need to monitor things like the aircraft systems, fuel, flight time limitations, airport/route requirements (e.g. curfews, RVSM, RNP), ATC restrictions/requirements, NOTAMs, MEL/aircraft serviceability, weather, traffic, terrain, suitable Enroute alternate/diversion airfields, commercial considerations (e.g. schedule keeping, early or late, passenger handling).

These are the Manage (Parts) components that you have to monitor.

Summary (So Far...)

So, you have to monitor the flight parameters (aviate, navigate), your team (communicate) and the operational situation (manage).

Stay tuned for Why Bother With Monitoring and arguably the most important aspect; HOW to monitor.

New Stuff In The Pipeline

2009-07-20T20:06:00.002+10:00

Things have been a bit quiet on the Airline Command scene lately. But all that will change soon.

I've got a few articles bubbling away on the stove as we speak. Have you readers got anything you want to read, discuss or learn about?

SKYbrary – OGHFA

2009-05-19T12:33:00.016+10:00

We’ve already looked at the main SKYbrary web site before.

It just keeps getting better!

While looking around the SKYbrary web site recently I discovered a fairly recent addition – the OGHFA Portal.

The WHAT?! Maybe this SKYbrary extract will explain...

The Operators Guide to Human Factors in Aviation (OGHFA) is a project of the Flight Safety Foundation European Advisory Committee.

OGHFA is an extensive compendium of human factors information focused on further advancing commercial aviation safety.

And in the SKYbrary OGHFA Introduction...

The main objective of the OGHFA is to create a strong bridge between theory and practice that is context-sensitive, concrete, practical and easy to access.

The ultimate goal of the OGHFA is to trigger dynamic interactions between knowledge and experience that will improve problem solving, critical thinking and judgment as a means of preventing errors and their associated accidents, incidents and inefficiencies. With the information in the OGHFA, you can identify human factors “traps” and those situations that make it more likely that you will either fail to perform at your best or contribute to somebody else “having a bad day.” By reading and using this Guide you will:
Improve your understanding of the consequences of your behavior and condition

Appreciate the safety and efficiency benefits of effective interactions among the humans in the aviation system

Better understand the importance to safety and efficiency of effective interactions with your tools, work rules and work environment

Learn techniques to optimize your performance and help maximize the performance of any groups in which you participate, thus enhancing safety

Learn how to spot human factors problems, whether with yourself or someone else, before they result in an incident or accident

Prevent problems before they develop rather than having to react to them and correct them under pressure.

In this particular OGHFA area on the SKYbrary site you will find Briefing Notes on Human Factors areas such as;

Personal Influences
Environmental Influences
Crew Actions and Behaviours
Organisational Influences
Informational Influences

There are Briefing Notes (BNs) on SA, TEM, Workload Management, Error Management, Decision Making...you know all that stuff that we’re interested in for you to become a better Captain.

While the BNs are interesting, the real strength is the section right under them – Situational Examples.

Here situations are outlined and throughout the example you are asked “What would you do now?” as the situation unfolds and develops. These Situational Examples build on the BNs to introduce a practical and operational perspective.

Some of the examples I can recognise as actual accidents/incidents and I guess that these accidents/incidents have been chosen as real-life “lessons to be learnt” and to highlight the operational aspects of aviating.

The SKYbrary site is continually expanding and is well worth regularly visiting to check out the new stuff. And the OGHFA Portal is a great Command resource.

Tactical Or Strategic Command?

2009-05-06T11:35:00.005+10:00

Tactical – More immediate, short-term in the present-time, focussed, “Small Picture”. Tends to be more reactive and Level 1 (Notice) and 2 (Understand) SA.

Strategic – More holistic, longer-term in the future, global, “Big Picture”. Tends to be more proactive and Level 3 (Think Ahead) SA.

Which type of Command do you practise?
Both Tactical and Strategic Command types have a place in your Command toolbox.

Time critical, high risk, immediate threats require a more tactical type of Command and decision making. Often you will just need to get out of the immediate problem area – the longer-term implications can wait until you are safe and can build or buy time.

But, ultimately you should always have an eye on the strategic aspects of your task. This is what Command is really all about. First Officers tend to think more tactically, but you as the Captain need to think more strategically.

“The Fog Of War”

Many Captains and their crews will operate solely tactically.

They are often in a high workload environment under stress, with minimal time available. Information is trickling in, bit by bit, separate, disorganised and disjointed. In these types of situations you may struggle reactively to link the related pieces together, to notice (Level 1 SA), determine and understand (Level 2 SA) the relationship between these separate puzzle pieces. You haven’t got the time or spare brain power to analysis what is occurring; you’re too busy dealing with the pressing problems.

You are operating “in the moment”; in small time scales and reacting to each new piece of information that comes your way. You are “immersed in the action”. Sometimes it can be like you are surrounded by a thick fog which restricts your vision – “the fog of war”.

Clarity

Good Captains ensure that they and their crews operate tactically (when required), but also that they operate strategically.

By thinking strategically you can see the holistic “Big Picture” as you and your crew link all the individual puzzle pieces together, understand their implications and think ahead (Level 3 SA) to project a proactive satisfactory outcome to the problem, situation or task.

You may need to “take a mental step back” and mentally detach yourself from the small scale, immediate hassles so that you can open up your view to observe the “Big Picture”.

Often what is the most obvious, attention-getting information is not the most important thing you should be concentrating on (e.g. an ECAM/EICAS is a powerful way to get your attention as it involves noise, colours, checklists and you are trained to complete the actions – but flying the aircraft may be the most important action to be completed at that time).

Workload

Usually you are reduced to thinking tactically when your workload is high, you are task saturated, fatigued, stressed and time-compressed. In these situations you will try to ease your cognitive workload by load-shedding which can cause tunnel vision and may result in you focussing on the wrong things.

This is when you start to make mistakes and errors, your monitoring and cross checking begins to plummet, risk increases and safety decreases and your SA diminishes (rapidly!)

You need to recognise that your increased workload is affecting your quality of Command and you then need to do something about it by delegating, prioritising or slowing the pace and tempo by “buying” time. Only then can you begin to start considering the strategic “Big Picture”.

How Vs Should

When you think tactically you are in a “HOW can I do this?” mode of thinking.

When you take a mental step back and look strategically at the “Big Picture” you are in a “SHOULD I do this?” mode of thinking.

An Example

You are faced with thunderstorms affecting the destination airfield, with ATC advising you that several windshear warnings have been activated. The runway is wet, with strong, gusty crosswinds. You elect to set the most favourable flap setting for windshear for your aircraft type and increase your approach speed to cater for the gusty winds and review the windshear and predictive windshear warning memory actions if these warnings are activated by your on-board equipment. You request several weather deviations to avoid the most serious weather returns from your on-board weather radar as you get the cabin ready early for the possibly turbulent approach. As you begin your approach, the fast moving thunderstorm’s winds change direction, so you request a runway change to the more into wind runway.

In this not-so-fictious scenario, you are reacting to each separate bit of information as it arrives – get the cabin ready early, set the most favourable flap setting, dodge weather, notice that the wind has changed, request a runway change, prepare for possible windshear on approach.

You are reacting to HOW you will accomplish the landing in the poor weather. You are thinking tactically.

Perhaps you need to be recognising that things are stacking up against you by looking at the “Big Picture” – the winds are changing because the thunderstorm is fast moving, gust fronts and microbursts may be involved, the runway may be slippery and coupled with high crosswind may result in directional control problems (what if you get some lifting shear in the flare and land long?).

This is perhaps when you should be thinking strategically and ask yourself “SHOULD I hold until the thunderstorm passes, or SHOULD I divert to my alternate?”

Thinking tactically has its place in any Command situation, but ensure that you occasionally look at the “Big Picture” so that you can update and think strategically.

Command Jigsaw Puzzle – Putting It All Together

2009-05-02T11:36:00.014+10:00

Life is a Puzzle – Solve it.
A jigsaw puzzle can be a metaphor – a concrete way to explain the abstract concept of putting all the various skills, knowledge, traits and requirements of Command.

In this slightly philosophical discussion of your Command journey we will use this jigsaw puzzle analogy to help you to put all the pieces together as you progress towards your destination of Command.

And all the Command pieces are not separate; they are synergistic and inter-related. Part of your job as the Captain is arrange all the pieces in an eye pleasing manner so that your Command is holistic and effective.

The Puzzle Pieces

We all have the individual pieces of the Command puzzle.

The pieces might be TEM, SA, Communication, Leadership, CRM, Workload Management, Monitoring, Knowledge, Aircraft Handling, Preparation etc.

Your individual pieces might be available or missing, big or small, they might be complete or partly formed, the picture on the pieces may be clear or blurry and out of focus. The individual pieces may fit together perfectly, imperfectly or not at all, they may be polished and well used or dusty and rarely used.

Generally your pieces will become available, big, complete and clear with experience.

Your Command Jigsaw Puzzle might be a 10 piece puzzle of a fuzzy, toy plane, drawn with crayon, with some dusty bits missing that you “force” together with a hammer and someone else who is more experienced might have am immaculate complete 1,000 piece puzzle of a perfect, polished A380/Dreamliner in high resolution photo quality, that fits together effortlessly.

Every piece is linked and relies on everything else. Nothing in Command happens in isolation.

For example, to be an effective Commander;

Requires sound Decision Making.
Decision Making requires effective Risk Management.
Risk Management requires good TEM.
TEM requires superior SA.
SA requires high-quality Monitoring.
Monitoring requires excellent Workload Management.
And all these qualities need to be mixed and blended with an overall level of good Communication, CRM and Leadership.

It is like all the pieces are continuously rotating and spiralling and sometimes their positions and sizes are changing depending on what is your priority and their importance at the time. Some pieces are more relevant at a particular time and at other times the same piece is not very important.

Your individual Command “Style” or the way you do the “business of Command” is how you fit your own individual jigsaw puzzle pieces that you currently possess together to get from A to B safely, legally and efficiently.

The Big Picture

The puzzle is easier to solve if you’ve got the box-top picture - the "Big Picture". It’s like having a map, a plan, a goal to work towards. It guides you and allows comparison to see how close you are getting; going from the unknown to the known. It allows you to see links, the pieces that go together, that are similar coloured or portions of images on the pieces.

You have all these apparently random jumbled pieces and by looking at the box-top picture you can see what you’re working towards. Imagine how much more difficult it would be if you had no completed picture to use. You have to piece it together blind, like life and you never know what is around the corner.

There are a few more surprises built into the concept of how this particular Command Jigsaw Puzzle is designed, which you will only discover as you play on (both with each individual puzzle and the total sum of all your Command experiences). You will eventually get more and more expert, become more and more a better Commander.

Looking at the heap of jumbled pieces is like having your Command spread out before you. Now you’ve got to piece it together as best you can. What will you learn while you put this puzzle together? You don’t know the final picture, there always an element of surprise, and you don’t always know what comes next.

Sometimes you will need to detach yourself from the immediate, "tactical" issues and take a "Mental Step Back" to focus on the broader, more "strategic" issues...to take in the "Big Picture" that sometimes gets lost in the trivia, the lesser important minutiae. You need to open your view out to perceive the sometimes more important peripheral issues.

Like a Jigsaw Puzzle, you don’t know beforehand what you will learn and experience as your life and your Command unfolds.

New information and experiences change the shape, size, pattern and image of your individual pieces and how they inter-connect.

The pieces are dynamic and forever morphing.

But It’s Hard

Nobody ever said Command would be easy.

As you play the great game of Command, the Jigsaw Puzzle, whatever you do with it or not do, has some kind of relevance or significance as to how you project your Command presence at that moment and how you will work out your Command style in the future.

You may be confused and you may find the puzzle very difficult, however the more of the puzzle you complete the easier it becomes. There are less possible choices, holes and spaces and the connection progressively becomes easier to see and make. You may struggle initially with your “place” in the grand scheme of Command, but with each experience gained the puzzle will become easier.

Your Command will become more comfortable, effortless and straightforward.

A small puzzle with a few pieces may be easy, uncomplicated, with little challenge and you may get bored with it, but it is best to start small and gradually work your way up as that is how you gain expertise (with safety and by minimising the risk) – from the small to the large, the simple to the complex, the concrete to the abstract.

This is why you undergo “Command Training”. If you had all the pieces perfectly arranged you would require no training at all.

A larger puzzle provides more complexity, but is more time intensive and interesting and provides a greater sense of achievement when you solve the puzzle.

The bigger puzzle requires more pieces (obviously) which relate to more skills and strategies that you will eventually require. It presents more challenges. You get out of it what you are prepared to put in. If you get overwhelmed or it seems too complicated then maybe you need to simplify and use a smaller puzzle. What did that box-top picture of my Command look like again? What was the “Big Picture”?

Maybe you need to eat smaller pieces rather than choke on the bigger pieces.
Maybe it looks complicated at first, but if you start out by completing small goals (finding the corners and then the edges) then perhaps it will begin to make more sense and become easier.

What’s Your Attitude?

What is your attitude towards the puzzle?

Is it – this is way too complicated; and you therefore don’t even attempt it. Or is it – this is a real challenge, but I can do this; and you get fulfilment when you achieve your goal. Do you enjoy playing and solving the puzzle or do you only enjoy it when the puzzle is finally completed? (Process versus Outcome, Journey versus Destination).

When you finish an easy puzzle you’re probably ready for the next level up; a harder one. Continual improvement is required to be the best you can be. This is why well structured training courses begin with the basics, go onto the intermediate and then progress towards the advanced.

Often you won’t have all the pieces, some may be missing – but that shouldn’t stop you from completing the puzzle as best you can with the pieces available to you. Sometimes you’ve just to play with the hand that has been dealt to you. There’s no point in whinging and whining – that’s just the way Command is.

Sometimes pieces are easy to find and easy to fit together and other times pieces are hard to find in amongst the jumble and are hard to fit together (do you “force” pieces together?)

Look at the whole picture first, then try to piece the individual pieces together (“Big Picture”). Is your “Big Picture” the right one? Have you made assumptions or biases that will make solving the puzzle difficult or possibly even impossible? Do you try to force or manipulate the pieces together to fit your “private hallucination”, your personal assumptions?

You will be confronted with Command puzzle pieces that you have to assemble into the “Big Picture”.

Start with the “Big Picture”, and see where the pieces fit within that framework. You don’t have to change a piece, or fix it, or mask it, you simply have to remove interference to allow that piece to fit more easily and beautifully into the whole. This is harder to do. It requires that you forget your programmed tendencies. The pieces are actually malleable and flexible and provided your mind is malleable and flexible all the pieces will eventually fit together – you’ve just got to allow that to happen. Suspend assumptions, biases, prejudices, pre-conceptions.

You might have pieces that don’t belong in that particular puzzle. You’ve got to recognise and set aside those pieces. Otherwise you’ll never get them to fit in the current puzzle. What has worked before may not necessarily work now.

When you don’t have the box-top picture you have to be creative and rely on intuition. You have to try and find the easy pieces that fit together (and these will usually be the corners and the edges) to make a framework or reference that the rest of the puzzle can fit into. What Command qualities are you comfortable with, areas that you have a high level of confidence in? You can then work inwards to produce glimpses of the unknown picture. And these glimpses will either confirm that you are on the right track or that you will have to start looking for another “picture” to complete this particular puzzle.

But I’ve Got Missing Pieces

The ultimate Command jigsaw puzzle is one where there is no box-top picture and many pieces are missing.

Do you really need all the pieces to infer what the picture looks like? Can you mentally fill in the blanks, deduce what the missing piece looks like from clues in its’ surrounding neighbours? Can you rearrange the pieces to make a sensible picture? Or will there always be too many crucial pieces missing, too many holes?

You may have to radically change your point of view. If the world doesn’t fit into your viewpoint, perhaps it is your viewpoint that needs to alter to suit the world. Maybe you need to simplify the puzzle (KISS). Maybe you need to ask yourself “Am I using the correct puzzle?”

Focus on one small task or area at a time…be that the border, sorting colours, or just putting a recognisable object together. The small to the big.

Make sure that you select the “right” puzzle to suit the particular situation – otherwise you may never solve it.

There IS an overall design and purpose, but there are MANY pieces – hundreds or even thousands – and your Command task is to make sense of seeming chaos. It often looks like chaos, and yet it is not. There are many Command ways of solving the same Command puzzle.

How you choose to solve your Command puzzle is completely up to you as an individual. You get to run the show your way.

Putting It All Together

Everyone is different.

You are an individual.

There are many ways of achieving the same Command outcome.

And you get to display your Command prowess in your own distinctive, individual, unique, inimitable way. You get to run the show your way – with all your strengths and weaknesses, with all your available Command puzzle pieces.

Everything fits together and your effectiveness as a Commander is dependent on how well developed your Command puzzle pieces are and how effectively you are able to arrange the pieces to form a clear coherent Command picture.

So work on developing your Command puzzle pieces and work on fitting all the pieces together proficiently.

Be the best Captain you can be...with the Command jigsaw puzzle pieces that you currently possess.

The Limits Of Expertise

2009-04-04T11:43:00.010+10:00

Have you ever been sitting in your nice comfortable study (at groundspeed zero), reading an accident report and ever wondered “Why did the pilots do that?” Have you ever thought “I wouldn’t do that!” or do you think “That could have been me. I hope that if ever I am in a similar situation that I will perform better (and no accident will result)”?

Often accident investigators apportion accident causes (blame?) to flight crew with the 20/20 benefit of hindsight. They know that an accident has occurred and minutely go through all the CVR, FDR, ATC tapes, conduct interviews and examine reams of paperwork to deconstruct the events leading up to the accident to try to determine why it occurred.

But if an average sample of the airline pilot population (YOU for instance) were placed in exactly the same circumstances, would there be any different result?

Did the pilots in the accident aircraft behave irresponsibly, irrationally or were they incompetent? Of course not! They are human beings, just like you and me, subject to certain cognitive, skill and psychological limitations like every other human.

And that is the premise that the authors (R. Key Dismukes, Benjamin A. Berman and Loukia D. Loukopoulos) of The Limits Of Expertise: Rethinking Pilot Error and the Causes of Airline Accidents put forward.

They want to know “Why do highly skilled professional pilots make errors, with consequences sometimes fatal to themselves and their passengers? How should we think of the role of these errors in accidents when we seek to prevent future accidents?”

Tough questions indeed; questions that the aviation profession have been attempting to answer satisfactorily since the first flight.

In The Limits Of Expertise, 19 major accidents in US air carrier operations from 1991 to 2000 in which crew errors played a central role are examined. Each accident has its own chapter, in which an Introduction serves to summarise the circumstances and the accident, followed by a discussion of Significant Events and Issues (primarily from a Human Factors perspective) and finishing with a Concluding Discussion.

If you are going to read this book (and it’s a very good read) you really need to do so with a mirror handy. There is no way that you can read about the circumstances facing these accident crews without seeing yourself reflected along with your own personal limitations. I was continually thinking to myself “What would I do? Would I perform better or would I have succumbed to the errors and faults of the accident crews?”

Common Accident Themes are reviewed in the final chapter and the authors suggest that there are 6 common threads between all or most of the accidents;

Inadvertent slips and oversights while performing highly practised tasks under normal conditions.

Inadequate execution of highly practised normal or standard operating procedures.

Inadequate execution of non-normal procedures under challenging conditions.

Inadequate response to rare situations.

Judgement in ambiguous situations that hindsight proves wrong.

Deviation from explicit guidance or standard operating procedures.

Usually it is a combination of several factors rather than just a single factor (i.e. thunderstorms, gusty crosswinds, runway change, missed callout, unstable approach) that precipitates the accident.

There are also several challenging demands on the crews’ tasks; typically surprise, high workload, ambiguous and confusing information, stress, limited time and fatigue. All these factors combine to reduce spare mental working capacity and decrease monitoring and crew cross-checking effectiveness.

I found it interesting that they discussed the “tactical” situation and decision making (short-term, immediate, fragmentary information, reactive) with the “strategic” (longer-term, big picture, SA, proactive).

In their discussion you could imagine the crews totally immersed in the action and task being overwhelmed and with rapidly eroded mental capacity resorting to the tactical decision making (Let’s continue with the approach) instead of taking a Mental Step Back and taking a strategic view (Maybe we should hold or divert).

Chapter 19, American 1420 - Pressing the Approach, really rammed home this tactical versus strategic anomaly. I could see myself in the mirror getting sucked into exactly the same circumstances as this accident crew.

The problem is that, under high workload conditions, fatigue, and stress crews may fall into a reactive mode in which they respond only to moment-to-moment demands of the situation and lose sight of the strategic issues.

The incidences of unstable approaches was quite high in these 19 accidents (36%). Is it any wonder that airlines these days are advocating stringent stabilised approach criteria.

The Limits Of Expertise diverges from the norm and attacks the accident problem from a different perspective; not what went wrong but why crews made the errors that they did. And more importantly, what factors influenced those errors.

Read The Limits Of Expertise, take a long hard look at yourself and armed with this knowledge you will become a better and safer pilot.

A definite “must read” book.

My personal feeling is that this book will become an aviation “classic”.

Check also this PDF "The Limits Of Expertise" presentation that examines and summarises some of the books contents.

A Basic Decision Making Model

2009-02-18T16:20:00.013+10:00

If you’ve been a regular reader of Airline Command you’ve endured the long drawn-out unveiling of Judgement & Decision Making with its’ many parts.

Perhaps it’s best to re-cap the whole Judgement & Decision Making process and use a Basic Decision Making Model and which includes a brief overview of the entire problem solving and decision making process. May be all the other Judgement and Decision Making parts will make more sense and you will be able to PRACTICALLY apply decision making and make some higher quality decisions for real.

PROBLEM SOLVING and DECISION MAKING – there are two broad components in the entire decision making process. First you have to recognise that a problem exists and determine what the problem actually is. This recognition then leads to the second component of the process of making a decision and then implementing it through action.

The entire process is circular, cyclical and continuous and after you put your decision into action you must review or evaluate if your decision is actually solving your originally defined problem.

Problem Solving

Before you even make a decision you must first of all recognise that a problem exists. This is accomplished by effective monitoring of the flight, the environment, the team and the instruments in the cockpit which results in you continually updating your Situational Awareness.

Good monitoring and SA results in you recognising that a problem exists, but first you must accurately determine What Is The Problem? The nature of the problem will establish the decision(s) to be made.

Problem solving is the INPUT stage and the start of the decision making process.

Decision Making

After establishing what the problem is you then make a decision to solve that problem to your satisfaction. As part of your judgemental decision making you may have to balance one option against another and assess the risks associated with the options.

Part of making a decision is ensuring that it is enacted. A decision without action is useless.

Decision making is the OUTPUT stage of the entire process.

Review

Once you put your decision into action, you must continually review the outcomes of that decision. Are we achieving our desired outcome?

This feedback loop is where you will pick up errors in your problem solving; “Did I work out what the real problem was?” and also errors in your decision making; “Is my decision actually solving my problem?”. If you cannot answer “Yes” to either of these basic questions you will need to restart the problem solving and/or decision making again.

This diagram illustrates a very basic decision making model and displays the essential steps that you will have to complete as the Command decision maker.

Communication

While communication is not a part of the problem solving and decision making model, it is essential for good decision making and overlays the entire process.

Good communication is required in both the problem solving and the decision making stages. Good communication coupled with effective CRM ensures that everyone in your team knows what the problem is, how you are planning to solve it and is striving to achieve a satisfactory outcome to fix the problem.

Problem Solving. You will need to share your Mental Model in the problem solving stage with the rest of your team. Gathering data and information is important in this stage to ensure that your team agrees with the assessment of what is the problem.

Decision Making. Communication Of Intent is vital in the decision making stage. This is where you implement your decision by initiating action, providing direction or delegating tasks within your team members.

So, if it all becomes too hard when making a decision, think about this simple decision making model and it’s two basic components – What’s the problem? and then Make a decision.

FlightCog.com

2009-02-18T09:20:00.009+10:00

Here’s another great link for you to spend your copious amounts of spare time (?) in preparation for your Command.

FlightCog.com (Flight Cognition) - Where Research Meets Operations - is the personal effort of Captain Brian T. Wilson to further the education of training professionals in the area of applied cognitive psychology.

Now don’t get put off by these big words (applied cognitive psychology – and I know that most pilots go running in the opposite direction, with their fingers in their ears, screaming “Not listening. Not listening...” when confronted by words that begin with “psych...”). If you are prepared to have a positive learning attitude you can gain a lot from web sites such as this.

The primary target audience for the FlightCog web site is the aviation trainer; Captain Wilson is endeavouring to educate the training professionals so they use “how pilots’ think” and “how pilots’ learn” so that the trainer is better at their job of transferring knowledge and the trainee is as a direct result better trained, better educated, more knowledgeable and a better and safer pilot.

But don’t think that you can’t learn from the essays in the FlightCog web site just because you are not the target audience. EVERY aviation professional can learn from these essays.

The focus is heavily on Situational Awareness and Decision Making (important Command subjects that we have touched on previously here at Airline Command).

It is very much an on-going personal project of Captain Wilson (who is freely giving back to the entire aviation community), so check back regularly for new essays and articles (I’ll put it in as a “button” link on the right of the main Airline Command home page for easy access).

So check out FlightCog and learn something new. You know you really want to!

The “Human Element” Of Aviation (And Life)

2009-02-06T10:25:00.007+10:00

This particular article is included with the Judgement & Decision Making section as I believe it has a huge bearing on how you apply your Judgement to arrive at an eventual Decision (and how you interpret and incorporate the feedback and evaluation of your actions).

However, it affects everything that you do as a Captain, as an aviator and as a person.

The “Human Element” is the humanity aspect of the things that we do every single day as an aviator. It’s why sometimes we are illogical and not totally rational. That’s not good or bad – it’s just the way we as humans function. Get used to it. It’s the way we as humans do business.

It influences your Leadership style, how you interact with other people (both face-to-face and via non-personal means such as via radio), your CRM qualities, how you communicate, whether you are having a “good day” or a “bad day”, the quality of your handling skills, your SA, monitoring and TEM – everything.

The “Human Element” overlays everything; it’s like an enveloping cloud shrouding and covering the thoughts, actions and behaviours that we exhibit. And like a cloud it can obscure, reduce visibility and make things less clear, less obvious, less transparent (especially to other people).

The Elements

You already know many of these “Human Elements”, although you may not be fully aware that they affect your Command skills, qualities, actions and behaviours.

Open any CRM book and most of the “Human Elements” will be listed in there.

So what are some of these “Human Elements” of aviation and life? The following is most (but not all) of the major factors that will influence you as a human in aviation (and life);

Preparation
Memory and Recall
Common Sense
Fatigue
Stress (both good and bad stress)
Perception
Personality
Experience
Knowledge
Confidence
Situational Awareness
Attitude
Time (or usually a lack of it)
Assumptions
Bias
Ethics
Morals
Beliefs
Illness (Physiological)
Training (good or bad)
Information
Emotions (a big player in the “Human Element”)

It’s Why We Are Different

We are all individuals and each of us will have a different mix of all the “Human Elements” contained within us. That’s the main reason that two people with exactly the same conditions and information or “raw data” will reach different decisions or conclusions.

An example of this is the perennial vexatious question of “What is a Suitable Airfield?” (which is usually disguised when your Trainer asks you “Where would you go now in the event of an engine failure/cargo fire?”). What is “suitable” for one person may be totally “unsuitable” for another.

Have you ever wondered why? Well, I suggest that the “Human Element” plays a major role.

One person may have prepared and studied the terrain, navaids, approaches and ATC facilities at a diversion airfield and equipped with this additional knowledge determines that his choice is a “suitable” airfield.

Another person may have lots of experience and be very confident in his ability to safely land at an unfamiliar airfield with an emergency situation.

And yet another may have been influenced by a peer who told him that this airfield is a “difficult” one and so have a preconceived image or bias that no matter what, that this airfield is “unsuitable”.

It is the same for Decisions. What is a “good” or “suitable” Decision for one person is a “bad” or “unsuitable” Decision for another. You both have exactly the same information, yet you both arrive at different Decisions.

So Who’s Right?

The crux to this question of who’s right and who’s wrong is what is “right” and what is “wrong”.

There are usually a number of different “correct” solutions to any problem (and by extension a number of different “correct” Decisions that can be implemented to solve that problem); all may be correct, some more correct than others, but that doesn’t mean that any of them are “wrong”. Just different.

So who determines what is right and what is wrong? Well that’s pretty easy – as the Captain you get to do what YOU consider as “right” and NOT do what YOU determine is “wrong”.

You may actually cock-up and what you thought was “right” was in reality “wrong”. Management usually likes to point out the error of your ways in these situations, but they do so with the benefit of hindsight (Hindsight Bias), with all the facts (that you may not have had at the time), with no time pressure, while sitting in their air conditioned office that’s not moving anywhere. If you can look these Management dudes in the eye and say “Well, I did the best that I could, with the information that I had at the time. I’ve learnt from it.” you will have become a better aviator.

But, we all make mistakes, right? It’s not ever really a mistake unless you don’t learn from that error.

Command “Human Elements”

You will need to take all these “Human Elements” into consideration when you are acting as the Captain of your flight(s). By factoring these elements into the human equation you may get an understanding of why your F/O or Cabin Crew are uncertain, wary or unsure of actions or Decisions that you make. You may have to modify your Leadership style to take into account these “Human Elements” so that you and your team can function optimally in that particular situation.

Remember – it’s not all about you. You have to consider all the other humans (and their “elements”) that form part of your extended team.

Only by doing that will you be the best Captain that you can be.

Judgement & Decision Making (Part 10 – Evaluation)

2009-02-05T16:52:00.005+10:00

This is the tenth of a series of articles which will look at Command Judgement and Decision Making (Part 9, Action, is here). It is a work in progress and will gradually be built up sequentially. So bear with me and be patient!

Each part needs to be read in the sequential order presented, as this is the way I believe you mentally go about using your judgement to make a decision. There is no point in reading Part 10 before Part 9 as the Part 9 info is required to understand Part 10.

Review & Evaluation – Closing The Circle

Every Decision Making Model (except the SOCS Model) that I’ve seen has, as its’ final step, an Evaluation or Review portion.

This Evaluation step is like a closed Feedback loop and its’ purpose is to ensure that the Decision that you put into Action is indeed achieving your desired goal or outcome.

There is no point in implementing and executing flawlessly a Decision, if that Decision does NOT solve your original problem. Problem Solving and Decision Making are intimately interwoven – the Problem drives the Decision and sometimes the Decision will change the Problem.

The only way to determine if your chosen Decision is satisfactory and is achieving your desired outcome is to review the eventual outcomes that come from the action that is taken after you make a Decision.

It’s Obvious...Isn’t It?

This should be blatantly obvious and you probably do this Evaluation (or Review or Feedback) step unconsciously. If your actions are not achieving your desired outcome then you re-do the Judgement & Decision Making process to put into place a revised and better Decision and Action(s).

This is how almost everyone does Decision Making in real life situations – they do a bit, observe the change, then do a bit more, observe etc. You use the feedback from your initial Actions to refine and modify your initial Decision to attain your eventual preferred outcome.

The problem occurs when your Decision and its’ Actions DO NOT achieve your preferred goal. If you do not incorporate this feedback Evaluation into your Decision making process you will never determine if you have either;

Tried to solve the wrong problem (a Problem Solving error), or

Your Actions, that come from your Decision, are not working (a Decision Making error).

Evidence Based Feedback

Don’t get caught out by ignoring or disregarding contrary evidence that your Problem is NOT getting solved because you assume that “I can’t be wrong” or “I fixed that problem”.

As humans we tend to disregard indications that don’t fit into our perceived model of the way we think the world should be (assumptions).

We see what we believe, instead of believing what we see.

Evidence Based Feedback (which is just a fancy way of saying, look at your instruments and take in what they are actually saying) is one way to counter this erroneous step in your Decision Making.

If you fly a Glass Cockpit aircraft a common example of this is blindly believing your FMS vertical deviation indication (which indicates whether you are high, on, or low on vertical profile). You see the Magenta doughnut (Airbus) telling you are on profile and believe that indication, instead of mentally computing your vertical profile by using the “raw data” indications on other instruments (e.g. altitude, V/S, Distance To Go, DME etc.)

Closing the loop by using Feedback to Review and Evaluate your Decision will result in you determining that you are achieving your desired outcome and if not will indicate that you will have to start the Judgement & Decision Making process again.

This is only MY attempt at analysing Judgement and Decision Making – I’m just a professional aviator, not a psychologist so my thoughts may not conform with academia, but it is based on a real pilot’s perspective. What would you rather have; a psychologist explaining aviation or an aviator explaining psychology?

I welcome any feedback about this article. Please add YOUR pilot input (or if any psychologists read this, your thoughts) by using the COMMENTS link below.

SKYbrary – A Good Resource

2009-02-05T12:13:00.006+10:00

I noticed a few months back an interesting web site called SKYbrary.

It’s primarily a EuroControl site with an emphasis on both ATC and aircraft operational matters.

It has three main sections – Operational Issues, Enhancing Safety Portal and Safety Regulations Portal.

Once you get into the site (which is in a Wiki format) you can access such things as;

Home Page

Operational Issues

Enhancing Safety

Safety Regulations

Accident & Serious Incident Reports

Aircraft Types

Book Reviews

Author’s Articles

Forum

Bookshelf

ICAO FSIX (a link to ICAO’s Flight Safety Information Exchange)

Its’ real strength is the depth and volume of relevant articles that you can either view or download. In the BOOKSHELF section there are hundreds of articles, which include a number of accident and incident reports from the AAIB (UK), AIBN (Norway), BEA (France), BFU (Germany & Switzerland), NTSB (US) and TSB (Canada) and others.

Articles can be viewed either on-line or as printable documents so that you can print out a hard copy if required.

New stuff is continually added so it’s probably best that you head on over there and just browse around.

You never know, you might find something useful that will help you as a Commander – you’ll definitely find something worthwhile to help you as a pilot.

Judgement & Decision Making (Part 9 – Taking Action)

2009-01-01T19:29:00.007+10:00

This is the ninth of a series of articles which will look at Command Judgement and Decision Making (Part 8, The Decision, is here). It is a work in progress and will gradually be built up sequentially. So bear with me and be patient!

Each part needs to be read in the sequential order presented, as this is the way I believe you mentally go about using your judgement to make a decision. There is no point in reading Part 9 before Part 8 as the Part 8 info is required to understand Part 9.

A Call To Arms – Action Stations!

This Action part of the whole Judgement & Decision Making process is relatively easy. It is very often what we pilots immediately jump to; perhaps too quickly without considering all the risks or options.

You’ve made your Decision. Now it is time to implement that Decision and Take Action.

You do this Action Initiation by “Communicating Your Intent” – telling the relevant members of your team what you hope to achieve and then allocating duties or resources to your team members to achieve that goal.

Often you will be required to delegate duties or tasks to your subordinate team members so that you can maintain your “Big Picture” overall view of the situation and to adequately manage your other Command tasks and the developing situation.

Inaction

To accomplish results we must couple our decision with the necessary action to attain results. The formula for achieving results is: Decision x Action = Results.

A decision without action is no more powerful than indecision or no decision. Decisions are powerless unless we follow through. Without action, you could make the greatest decision and have the greatest plan in the world and you would still fail. However a modest idea and an incomplete plan often produces success when accompanied by enough action.

Indecision is debilitating; it feeds upon itself; it is, one might almost say, habit-forming. Not only that, but it is contagious; it transmits itself to others. (H. A. Hopf)

Even if you are on the right track, you will get run over if you just sit there. (Will Rogers)

In any moment of decision the best thing you can do is the right thing, the next best thing is the wrong thing, and the worst thing you can do is nothing. (Theodore Roosevelt)

After all, if we do the wrong thing, at least we can learn something from our mistake. But inaction teaches us nothing, other than regret. Don’t become paralysed into inaction for fear of making a mistake. You will make mistakes, but each mistake is an opportunity for you to learn.

Be Clear, Decisive and Firm and implement into action your decision.

Part 10 “Evaluation” is here.

This is only MY attempt at analysing Judgement and Decision Making – I’m just a professional aviator, not a psychologist so my thoughts may not conform with academia, but it is based on a real pilot’s perspective. What would you rather have; a psychologist explaining aviation or an aviator explaining psychology?

I welcome any feedback about this article. Please add YOUR pilot input (or if any psychologists read this, your thoughts) by using the COMMENTS link below.

Judgement & Decision Making (Part 8 - The Decision)

2008-11-26T10:39:00.021+10:00

This is the eigth of a series of articles which will look at Command Judgement and Decision Making (Part 7, Risk, is here). It is a work in progress and will gradually be built up sequentially. So bear with me and be patient!

Each part needs to be read in the sequential order presented, as this is the way I believe you mentally go about using your judgement to make a decision. There is no point in reading Part 8 before Part 7 as the Part 7 info is required to understand Part 8.

Judgement

In the entire Judgement and Decision Making process there are essentially two parts to consider; the “hidden”, often unconscious and unobservable Judgement component, which then eventually leads into the “visible”, observable Decision Making element.

Everything that we have discussed so far; your senses, their limitations, your sense and perception filters, recognising the essential data from the multitude of information that bombards you so that you can accurately define what the actual problem is and the multi-layer aspect of Risk Assessment and Risk Management; comprises the Judgement facet or component of the Judgement and Decision Making Model.

This Judgement component is often the difficult, hidden and unseen feature of how you go about formulating and making a decision. It is often the most important, but most neglected part of the two stages of Judgement and Decision Making.

The eventual decision you make is the output result of a complex Judgement process that you (usually unknowingly and sub-consciously) go through. The decision you make is normally the only thing that others can “see” – they don’t get to “see” how you arrived at that final output decision.

Now we will look at the visible, readily observable part of the Model; the outcome and the part that you will be assessed and possibly evaluated on – the Decision Making part.

The Decision

(Click on the image for a larger view)

Your decision is the observable and eventual outcome of the entire Judgement and Decision Making process. This second phase of the Judgement and Decision Making Model is perhaps the easier part of the two phases (I can hear a great sigh of relief!).

You usually will have a number of options that you can choose from, which will result in a number of different possible decisions that you can choose from and it’s your job to choose the best one to suit the situation that you find yourself in. This process of choosing the “best” option normally takes place after you have completed the entire Judgement phase which culminates in you completing your Risk Assessment and doing your Risk Management of the situation.

As part of your Risk Management you will weigh up the positives and negatives (Balance The Risk) of the various options available to you.

Easy Decisions

Often it will be relatively easy – Option A is very much better (or safer) than Option B because of...

Often the decision will already have been made for you and incorporated into your SOPs/NPs, policy, procedures, checklists, QRH/ECL, manuals or other publications.

For you to be the most effective as the Commander and the primary Decision Maker obviously requires that you be knowledgeable and adequately prepared to take advantage of this. Ensure that you thoroughly know your stuff, as this will make your Decision Making far easier, quicker, more correct, less stressful and allow you to have more Spare Mental Capacity (SMC) so that you can then fulfil your Leadership and Command functions and manage the situation after you have made your decision.

Hard Decisions

Sometimes it will be hard. A lot of the time you will be operating in unclear, ambiguous and novel situations – the Grey Areas. The process of making a decision when operating in these Grey Areas takes longer, more brain power and you may be unsure if you’ve eventually made the correct decision. Can you see why it’s essential that you are knowledgeable and prepared? Why as the Captain you need much more refined and better developed SA, TEM and monitoring?

Go Ahead – Make My Day

As Dirty Harry advocated, often in the difficult decision making situations you will need to come up with A Decision, sometimes any decision. It doesn’t have to be perfect or optimal (sometimes you have to satisfice), but you can’t afford to be indecisive, waffle and faff-about. This does not project a good image of you as the Leader and Captain.

If your initial decision is incorrect, imperfect or can be refined to a better outcome, then the final part of the Decision Making phase, Evaluation, can be used to improve that initial decision. But don’t just sit there being hesitant, uncertain and indecisive.

Never, ever forget that this is a team game. YOUR decisions potentially can affect hundreds of people. More specifically your immediate crew and team members (F/O, S/O and Cabin Crew) will be looking to you for guidance and direction in these difficult situations. Sometimes it may be appropriate to initially make a decision (any decision), get your team focussed on what you require from them and then revisit the whole Judgment and Decision Making process to amend or refine your initial decision to provide a better outcome.

You have to be flexible and adaptable, while at the same time being CDF – Clear, Decisive and Firm.

When Doing Nothing Is A Decision

Occasionally you may find yourself in the situation where after completing your Risk Management in the Judgement phase you decide that doing nothing is the best option.

This is fine, but make sure that you communicate your Mental Model of your perception of the circumstances and your intention to do nothing to the rest of your team. Otherwise they might think that you’ve gone to sleep or haven’t made a decision at all!

NOTE: This “do nothing” option is only valid if you have made a conscious decision to do nothing and communicate that intent to your other team members. This is OK.

If you do nothing for any other reason it is because you were ignorant of the situation because you did not recognise the developing signs or indications or did not have the knowledge or skills to formulate a decision. This is definitely NOT OK.

Communicate Your Intent

Now that you have made up your mind and made your decision, you need to communicate your decision, intentions and requirements to the rest of your team. This may also include not only your F/O, S/O and Cabin Crew, but also your “extended team” members such as your passengers (by PA), ATC, Operations and Engineering, Traffic and Cargo Loading Ground Staff etc.

You may need to inform your team as to why you have decided on this particular course of action. You have to convince them that this is the right thing to do. You need to get them to “come on board” with you and to take “ownership” of your decision. It may require you to “sell” the decision to others to convince them that this is the best possible decision, in the current circumstances, so that they willingly follow you.

It’s all about team work. If you can get your followers striving towards a commonly understood and accepted goal as a functional team then they will perform better than a bunch of unconvinced individuals pulling in different directions.

As the Leader you can delegate tasks to various individuals in your team. Ensure that you tell these people their required tasks, what you expect from them, to what standard and how much time they have to complete the task.

Now all you’ve got to do is get your team to implement your decision – and that’s the subject of the next article “Action”.

Part 9 “Action” is here.

This is only MY attempt at analysing Judgement and Decision Making – I’m just a professional aviator, not a psychologist so my thoughts may not conform with academia, but it is based on a real pilot’s perspective. What would you rather have; a psychologist explaining aviation or an aviator explaining psychology?

I welcome any feedback about this article. Please add YOUR pilot input (or if any psychologists read this, your thoughts) by using the COMMENTS link below.

The Grey Areas

2008-11-21T09:52:00.007+10:00

I’m lucky enough that I get to “facilitate” Command Training workshops for candidates that will very shortly begin their Command Course.

Black & White

One of the common themes that often comes out of these free-flowing “discussions” when tossing about possible Command scenarios is that some of the potential Commanders want a definite answer to a particular problem. It is usually phrased something like...”What does the Company want us to do in this situation?”...or...”What does the Training Captain want me to do?”

There are two issues that this response raises;

Command candidates who persist in this type of “First Officer” type of thinking have completely missed the point about BE THE CAPTAIN. It’s not about what THEY want to see, it’s all about what YOU, as the Captain, are happy to do.

The other issue, and the one that this article will be focussing on, is that often there is no definitive, perfect, unambiguous, explicit, distinct Black and White answer.

Various Shades Of Grey

Sometimes you will be fortunate and be presented with a problem that has a clearly defined answer. The answer is usually contained within your FCOMs, NPs/SOPs, Company Policy and Procedures or some other publication (easy – do it the way the publication prescribes) or the answer is so obvious that you don’t even need to think about it (e.g. multiple micro burst and predictive windshear warnings just prior to take off on a wet and slippery runway with 30 Knots of crosswind). The decision making process is relatively easy in these cases – there is a Black and White answer.

However, it has been my experience that these types of clear-cut Black and White decisions/outcomes are quite rare in aviation. For the vast majority of your aviation time you will actually be operating in the “Grey Areas” between the extremes of the Black and White. Sometimes you will be in the almost Black or almost White areas and coming up with the correct decision shouldn’t be too hard. But often you will be stuck in the “Middle Grey” area where the situation is not Black, but also not White.

Get used to operating in this Middle Grey Area, as you will spend much of your time as a Commander coping in this zone. In this Grey Area, you will often be faced with VUCA situations (Volatile, Uncertain, Complex, Ambiguous). Often you will have to deal with a situation that is not catered for in any of your publications or that you or anyone in your team have ever experienced before.

In this Grey Area you often have to “make it up as you go”. You have to measure and combine equal parts of Leadership, common sense, airmanship and rat cunning, mix thoroughly and serve promptly while still warm and fresh.

Be Yourself – BE THE CAPTAIN

Often for a complex situation there are several correct answers; some more correct than others, but that doesn’t mean that any of them are wrong.

In these Grey Areas YOU as the Captain have to make a considered decision and that decision has to be one that YOU are happy with – not what your Company or your Training Captain is happy with (although if you are prepared, knowledgeable and use appropriate Leadership, Command and CRM skills it will be extremely likely that all three opinions, yours, your Company’s and your Training Captain’s will be the same or very similar). Be yourself - not someone who you are not.

So be prepared for these Grey Areas. Be prepared for the VUCA situations. And make correct and considered decisions while you BE THE CAPTAIN.

Risk Management (or Managing The Risk)

2008-10-29T10:09:00.022+10:00

This a series of articles about Risk, which are a part of Command Judgement and Decision Making (Risk Introduction - Part 7 is here)

Once you have assessed the risk involved you have to do something about it. What you eventually do or what decision you ultimately make takes place after you consider and complete the final part of the Risk Management process – actually managing the risk.

Definition(s)

Risk Management can be defined as;

Risk management is the human activity which integrates recognition of risk, risk assessment, developing strategies to manage it, and mitigation of risk using managerial resources. (Wiki)

Risk management is the process of identifying risks, assessing their implications, deciding on a course of action, and evaluating the results. (Transport Canada)

These definitions cover the entire risk process that we have been looking at over several risk articles. For the purposes of this particular article we will confine ourselves to what we do to manage the risk after we make our risk assessment.

What Is It?

Risk Management is used to decide what to do about each threat or hazard and its’ risk, and to formulate and implement those decisions. It is based on the notion that the probability of an adverse event occurring can be reduced or its’ consequences minimised. Effective risk management seeks to maximise the benefits of a risk (risk versus reward) while minimising the risk itself (balancing the risk).

Effective risk management requires effective risk assessment.

“Perceived” Risk

People do NOT react to “real” risk; they react to “perceived” risk.

“Real” risk is almost impossible to quantify in the dynamic and ever changing aviation environment and you will almost never have all the relevant data or information that affects the risk of a particular situation.

Your personal perception of what is or is not risky will often be very different to someone else. In particular your risk perception may be very different from your F/O or your Cabin Crew. As the Captain (and decision maker) you will be required to use good communication skills to clarify and either “sell” your point of view to the rest of the crew (or ATC or any other member of your extended team) or be convinced that your crew or other team member has a better perception of risk than you. Never forget that aviation is a team game and you want everyone striving to willingly achieve the same goal.

TEAM

What you actually do to manage those risks you have assessed can easily be recalled by using the TEAM acronym. For each threat or hazard that presents a risk to your flight, consider whether you should;

(Click on the table for a larger view)

Like anything to do with aviation (or indeed Command) you will have to practise this TEAM structure of managing risk. Use it in real life, in situations that you will experience on the Line as an F/O. Use it in scenarios that you or your peer study group pose.

Remember that preparation is the price of admission to a Command Course. Don’t waste your apprenticeship – and start practising this TEAM management of risk now as an F/O so that it is routine, effortless and entirely natural for when you have to use it in a Command situation.

Read more about the TEAM method of managing risk in this FAA Tips For Teaching Practical Risk Management article and here in this FAA Aviation News article.

The Three Tests

2008-10-17T10:46:00.008+10:00

Most of your decisions will have to made under stress and pressure, with incomplete information and with little time available. They will quite often NOT be clear-cut and obvious. You need to get used to the fact that your life as a Captain will not be black and white – you will have to frequently operate in the grey areas. And those grey areas might be more black than white or more white than black or just a middle grey.

Often there will be more than one correct answer. Some might be more correct than others, but that doesn’t mean that it is wrong. Often you will need to choose the “correct” decision based on the particular circumstances that you find yourself under, your previous experience and basic, bog standard airmanship and common sense.

Sometimes you will face situations that no one has experienced before and for which there are no guidelines, rules or regulations. You will have to make it up as you go along.

It can be difficult to formulate a decision in these “grey areas”. If all else fails subject yourself to the “Three Tests”.

Test 1 – Responsible Person

The first Test is to ask yourself “Am I being a responsible person?”

It may surprise you to learn that the general population consistently rates airline pilots as very trustworthy people (along with doctors). Used car salesmen and politicians score quite low in this department!

So people, and society in general, have high expectations that you know what you’re doing and if something does go wrong that you can successfully and safely get their backsides on the ground in one piece. They do NOT expect you to be irresponsible, negligent, untrustworthy, shoddy and to gamble with their lives.

If you can answer this question with “Yes, I know the possible risks, I have assessed them and I believe that I am being responsible in the conduct of my duties” then it’s probably the correct decision.

Test 2 – Duty Of Care

The second Test is closely related to the first. Ask yourself “Am I carrying out my Duty Of Care?”

(If you don't know what Duty Of Care is, read a bit about it here.)

You have the lives of possibly several hundred people and a multi-million dollar piece of aviation equipment in your hands. People (and society) expect you to complete your job with an appropriate level of care. You have got to look after those people who have trusted their lives to you and that expensive bit of aerospace technology that your company has entrusted to you.

If you answer this question with “Yes, I am behaving responsibly, I am avoiding possible harm, incidents and accidents and I am flying safely” then it’s probably the correct decision.

Test 3 – Newspaper Test

The third and final Test is the “Newspaper Test”

Ask yourself "Will I pass the Newspaper Test?"

If you make that decision (and the outcome goes badly due to the risks involved) what would tomorrow’s frontline headline in the local newspaper say if a reporter found out? Would it be favourable or unfavourable? (Note: newspapers rarely report “good news”, so anything that makes it to the papers will likely be “bad news”.)

E.g. “Cowboy Captain Takes Unnecessary Risk”, “Airline Captain Takes Off In Defective Aircraft And Crashes” or “Fatigued Captain Gambles With Passengers Lives”.

If you answer this question with “Yes, I did the best I could possibly do and I think if I had to give an interview to a newspaper reporter, then they would acknowledge that effort” then it’s probably the correct decision.

Summary

When you’re faced with a difficult, rarely experienced situation and are struggling with which one of several possible decisions you should take, ask yourself some tough questions and take the Three Tests;

“Am I being a responsible person?”

“Am I carrying out my Duty Of Care?”

“Will I pass the Newspaper Test?”

Whether you like it or not, the systemic “organizational” or “corporate” issues will rarely be blamed – it will be you, the Captain, the final goalkeeper in the aviation defence network.

So make safe, considered and correct decisions.

TEM (Part 3 - Putting It All Together)

2008-09-30T19:28:00.022+10:00

In Part 2 of TEM we looked at the different "Layers" of the TEM Model.

TEM – Putting It All Together

In the TEM philosophy, threat or error situations fall into three recognised outcomes;

A threat or error that is detected and effectively managed has no adverse impact on the flight. This should be your goal.

A threat or error that is not detected cannot be managed (this may or may not adversely affect the flight or reduce safety margins).

A mismanaged threat or error reduces safety margins by linking to or inducing additional errors or an UAS (Undesired Aircraft State).

We cannot avoid or trap everything (even though this should be your ultimate TEM goal), but what you can do is to try and construct thick AVOID and TRAP layers and if it is required carry out good error recovery in the MITIGATE Layer. Work on these “Manage” Layers as a Captain, in conjunction with your crew, to make them thick and robust.

This effective management of Threats, Errors and UASs is the primary difference between good Captains and bad Captains.

While “hard” (Resist) and “soft” (Resolve) safeguards help support pilots to best anticipate, recognise and recover from threats, errors and UASs, there is arguably no better way to manage these events in multi-crew cockpits than through effective crew coordination and CRM.

Many of the best practises advocated by CRM can be considered as operational TEM counter-measures.

Initial research in the LOSA Archive has supported links between TEM and CRM. For example, crews that develop contingency management plans, such as proactively discussing strategies for anticipated threats, tend to have fewer mismanaged threats; crews that exhibit good monitoring and cross-checking usually commit fewer errors and have fewer mismanaged errors; and finally crews that display strong Leadership, inquiry and workload management are typically observed to have fewer mismanaged errors and UASs than other crews.

Time “Compression”

A further constraint that is affecting the identification of threats and the recognition of errors in the TEM Model is Time “Compression”.

Time is a vital factor and as the TEM diagram indicates, the further down or deeper into the TEM triangle that you get, the thinner the time window to detect and deal with the threat or error also gets.

You will need to manage not only your time but also your team’s time and except for those rare emergency time critical situations, you should have control over the time available and dictate the pace and tempo of you crew’s workload.

The TEM diagram recognises that the deeper into the triangle that you get, the less time is available to you and the decreasing time available is taking you closer to the bottom apex of the triangle, reducing your available resources and options and increasing your chances of defeating all layers of protection and resulting in an Outcome.

By expanding or “buying time”, you can either thicken the current Layer you are in or move back up the triangle away from an Outcome or UAS and therefore towards a safer flight.

Monitoring & Cross-Checking

One of the best tools available to crews to help identify any threats or errors is MONITORING and CROSS-CHECKING.

Many airline’s safety events are directly related to poor monitoring and cross-checking skills. Examples are altitude deviations, incidents of stick shaker and approach path deviations (all are UASs).

What do we need for effective monitoring to take place?

Prioritising Workload. It is very easy to overload the PM during a critical phase of flight. This may involve delaying certain tasks to a more appropriate time, (Aviate, Navigate, Communicate, Manage) but by prioritising your team’s workload around the busy phases of flight, more effective monitoring takes place. The PM must mentally fly the aircraft (Actively Monitor) to be able to anticipate the needs of the PF. There is no need for the PM to communicate with ATC that they are busy with a MAP when the priority is to monitor the MAP itself.

Communication. In its’ simplest form, communication of intent is achieved through conducting adequate departure and arrival briefings. It is essential that you not only identify the threats, but that you also discuss the strategies that you will employ to manage those threats (build your AVOID Layer).

If you do not share your mental model or communicate your intent, how can you expect the other crew members to be able to monitor you? For example, letting the crew know your intentions and limits when making an approach to an airfield that is renowned for runway changes. Let the crew know at what altitude a runway change is acceptable, and if you do change runways, what actions are needed to be carried out.

Appropriate Cockpit Gradient. As the Captain you need to use your Leadership skills to foster an environment where the most junior crew member can speak up when they see a threat or an error appears to have gone unnoticed. An appropriate (not too steep, not too shallow) cockpit gradient allows this to occur. This is a team game and your followers may “save the day” – but only if you let them.

Adherence to NPs/SOPs. NPs/SOPs have been developed to provide a standardised technique for dealing with certain specific threats. NPs/SOPs are often amended or modified after an UAS or Outcome (sometimes written with the blood of unfortunate crews). By following NPs/SOPs everyone knows what to expect and is sharing the same mental model.

Effective monitoring and cross-checking can literally be the last line of defence in your TRAP layer.

Good CRM is what ties everything in TEM together.

TEM & LOSA

It is educational to review the overall LOSA results that some airlines have conducted to date. The mistakes of others and their subsequent lessons can provide you with areas to focus your Command preparation so that you can avoid threats, trap errors, mitigate UASs and therefore minimise risk to increase safety.

Monitoring and cross-checking was Poor or Marginal in 23% of flights.
Monitoring is a primary responsibility of all pilots.
To increase Monitoring, decrease Workload.

An average of 4-6 threats per flight will be encountered.
You will operate in a high threat environment and you will encounter threats on almost every flight.
Be prepared and formulate strategies to manage those threats – create a thick AVOID Layer.

About 50% of errors went undetected or were not responded to by the crew.
A threat that is not identified or an error that is not recognised cannot be managed.

30% of UASs were linked to mismanaged threats or mismanaged crew error.
Develop thick AVOID and TRAP layers.
Error Recovery is an essential Command skill.

Crews that brief late or during descent are 5 times more likely to commit a significant error than crews that briefed early.
Brief and discuss TEM strategies at times of low workload, when you have high capacity.
Use times of low workload to plan ahead.

LOSA results also highlighted what outstanding crews do;

Briefings that include explicit contingency management as part of threat anticipation in pre-departure, descent, approach and landing phases (they identified threats and used strategies to form a thick AVOID layer).

Monitoring and cross-checking as part of workload management during the busiest phases of flight (allows you to recognise and TRAP errors).

An Example

After a long multi-sector day your crew is fatigued (Threat). The destination airfield has two parallel runways (Threat).

Your crew notes on the ATIS and is informed by ATC that 07L is the runway in use for arrivals. The PF intends to enter an approach to runway 07L into the FMS; however he mistakenly enters the data for 07R (Error). Furthermore, the error is not detected by the flight crew on a SOP/NP required cross-verification (Error).

The flight crew executes the incorrect FMS entry to 07R and the aircraft starts flying on a profile to the wrong parallel runway (UAS).

At this point, if the crew recognise the error/UAS, they can either analyse what’s wrong with the automation and fix the problem or save valuable time by simply disconnecting the autopilot and hand-flying the approach to the correct runway (or going around if not enough time or spare brain power is available and doing the approach again – safely).
The latter option is more effective from the TEM perspective because it focuses effort on recovering from the UAS rather than analysing it’s causes.

If the various Errors and the resultant UAS is not picked up by either the crew or ATC the aircraft will land on the wrong runway (Outcome).

TEM Summary

TEM is defensive flying for pilots.

TEM can be seen as a set of counter-measures with multiple “layers of defence”.

Many of the best practises advocated by CRM can be considered as operational TEM counter-measures.

Work as a crew on creating thick and robust “Manage” Layers (AVOID, TRAP and MITIGATE). This is the most important part of the whole TEM Model and you will need to develop this skill.

The deeper into the TEM triangle you get;

The less time, resources and options are available to you.

Safety decreases and risk increases.

Workload increases and monitoring decreases.

SA decreases.

I'm interested in your thoughts on TEM and this series of articles. Was it worthwhile, did you understand it or was it all "black magic" and a load of cr@p?

Just hit the Comments link below and add your input - you never know, we all might learn something!

TEM (Part 2 - The Layers)

2008-09-30T16:56:00.041+10:00

In Part 1 of TEM we looked at an overview of the TEM Model. TEM (Part 1) is here.

The TEM Model looks like this;

Now we'll look more closely at each individual layer of the TEM Model. So read on.

THREAT Layer

The upper-most “State” Layer of the TEM Model is the THREAT layer.

A threat is defined as;

An event or another’s error that;

Occurs outside the influence of the flight crew (i.e. not caused by the crew),

Increases the operational complexity of a flight, and

Requires crew attention and management if safety margins are to be maintained.
A threat can be high terrain, icing conditions, an aircraft malfunction (e.g. a thrust reverser inoperative or an ECAM/EICAS), an incorrectly coded navigation database, a late runway change, other people’s errors (e.g. an inaccurate recording of a fuel load by the refueller or an incorrect altitude assignment by ATC), an unfamiliar airfield, crew fatigue or congested airspace with high traffic loads.

Threats occur independently of the flight crew.

This means that threats come “at” the crew from external sources, which add to the crew’s workload and need to be managed. Threats have the potential to or may actually increase risk and decrease safety.

Threats may be;

Expected. Known or expected threats can be anticipated and projected to influence the operation (e.g. you hear on the ATIS during pre-flight preparation that the runway in use has changed or a thrust reverser is deactivated and the aircraft is dispatched within the MEL).

You want to be operating in this Expected Threat area as much as possible.

Unexpected. No forewarning is available (e.g. an ECAM/EICAS with no prior indications). Once the threat has been recognised you must apply skills and knowledge acquired through training and operational experience to counter that threat (e.g. it may be more prudent to “Standby” on an ECAM/EICAS until above MSA and your workload decreases).

Latent. Not directly obvious to or observable by you or your crew (e.g. equipment design faults, optical illusion, Database errors or software anomalies). Deal with Latent Threats in the same manner as Unexpected Threats.

Regardless of whether threats are Expected, Unexpected or Latent, one measure of the effectiveness of your ability to manage those threats is whether the threats are recognised and detected with the necessary anticipation to enable your crew to respond to and avoid them through the use of an effective counter-measure – i.e. do you effectively manage those threats.

Managing Threats – AVOID Layer

The corresponding “Manage” Layer to the Threat “State” is the AVOID Layer.

Here you must identify potential threats in advance (if an Expected Threat) or react to the potential consequences of a threat when it occurs (if an Unexpected or Latent Threat).

Threats are things that can possibly happen to you; things that may happen in the future. This requires you to be projecting and planning for the future – Thinking Ahead, i.e. have adequate Level 3 SA.

Once threats have been identified, Strategies need to be formulated to avoid those threats. Identifying a threat and having no strategy to avoid it is useless. You will need to work together as a team to develop threat management strategies to build a thick AVOID layer.

Threat management is being proactive by looking ahead into the future to anticipate problems that you may encounter. Operating in the AVOID Layer normally results in you having Level 3 SA (Think Ahead) and low workload/high monitoring.

Some of the common tools and techniques used in the AVOID Layer are preparation, thorough pre-flight planning, making reference to your Company’s Airfield information, briefings (which allow you to share your mental model and communicate your intent), knowledge of NPs/SOPs, regulations, policy and procedures and contingency scenarios (What if...?).

One effective method to counter Expected Threats is to divide a page into two columns. On the left side list all the threats that you can think of and on the corresponding right side list all the strategies to counter (avoid) those threats. Do the same for any potential Unexpected or Latent threats that you have either actually experienced in the past, are common in your operation or you think may affect you. This is essentially Preparation – you have a pre-thought out plan to deal with unusual events such as ECAM/EICAS etc.

Threats are effectively managed by crews who;

Anticipate and consider the threats.

Are vigilant for threats (a healthy scepticism and suspicion) coupled with good monitoring and cross-checking.

When uncomfortable acknowledge and respond to their own internal “Master Caution” and identify the cause of their concern.

Work together as a team to develop threat management strategies to avoid those threats.

You may not be able to identify all possible threats, but by using preparation, vigilance, monitoring, briefings, communication, workload management, SA and Leadership you will minimise the possible effects of an unanticipated threat.

Strategies to deal with identified THREATS that potentially will come “at” you (in the future) can be thought of as a proactive AVOID layer of defence.

Unrecognised, unmanaged or mismanaged threats significantly increase the potential for error(s).

Errors

The middle “State” Layer of the TEM Model is the ERROR layer.

An error is defined as;

Flight crew actions or inactions that;

Lead to a deviation from crew or organisational intentions or expectations,

Reduces safety margins, and

Increases the probability of adverse operational events on the ground or during flight.

An error can be the result of a momentary slip or lapse, or induced by an anticipated or unexpected threat that is poorly managed (e.g. a late runway change might induce a procedural shortcut that results in a crew error).

Unrecognised, unmanaged or mismanaged threats often directly result in an error(s). However errors can also occur "Spontaneously" (i.e. without direct linkage to specific, obvious threats and this is an error type that causes you to enter the TEM Model directly at the Error Layer, bypassing the Threat and Avoid Layers) or as part of an error chain (one error leads to another).

Errors occur as a direct result of the flight crew’s actions or inactions.

Errors can be seen as coming internally “from” the crew. Errors actually increase risk and decrease safety.

In addition, Errors are categorised as;

Procedural. These include slips, lapses or mistakes in the execution of regulations or procedures. The intention is correct but the execution flawed.

Communication. These occur when information is incorrectly transmitted or interpreted within the cockpit or between the cockpit crew and external sources such as cabin crew or ATC or when there is no communication of intent or sharing of the mental model within the crew.

Aircraft Handling. Indicates a lack of technical knowledge or “stick and rudder” skills. Examples include poor or incorrect flare technique, incorrect configuration management, inappropriate use of automation or an incorrect mode selection.

Managing Errors – TRAP Layer

The corresponding “Manage” Layer to the Error “State” is the TRAP Layer.

Here you must recognise errors and if required complete error recovery to a safe situation.

Once errors are recognised they can be managed in the TRAP Layer by using two interactive sub-layers of defence between the error and the potential UAS.

Resist. These are the “hard” safeguards – from system defences provided by hardware and formal procedures (e.g. TCAS, Reactive or Predictive Windshear, EGPWS, NPs or checklists). Even with the best designed equipment these “hard” safeguards may not be enough to ensure that all errors are trapped, so then it will be necessary for...

Resolve. These are the “soft” safeguards – through crew technical and non-technical skills, airmanship, common sense, knowledge, preparation, core Command competencies (SA, Decision Making, Communication, Workload Management and Leadership), CRM and training.

This TRAP layer is often the final layer between a “safe” flight and the consequences of an “unsafe” UAS. Again you and your crew will need to work together as a team to create a thick TRAP layer.

Error management is always recovering from things that have already happened – in the past and as such you are being reactive. Operating in the TRAP Layer normally results in you having Level 2 SA (Understand) and medium workload/medium monitoring. Therefore you need to initially act in the present to minimise or mitigate the past error effects by monitoring and evaluating crew actions or inactions. Once you’ve trapped the error you then need to plan and think ahead (Level 3 SA) to minimise or mitigate the error (error recovery).

With the hard and soft TRAP safeguards in place, the last line of defence against threats and errors is still ultimately, the flight crew.

YOU are often the final layer of defence.

For all this to work the crew has to use their “core CRM” skills. The TEM philosophy stresses three basic concepts: anticipation, recognition and recovery. Anticipation builds vigilance and vigilance with SA and effective monitoring is the key to recognising adverse events and errors. Logically, recognition leads to recovery. Recover first; analyse the causes later. All these things can only occur with sound and effective CRM.

Resist and Resolve functions for the recognised errors that have come "from" you (in the past) can be thought of as a reactive TRAP layer of defence.

If you fail to recognise the error or mismanage that error then an UAS may arise.

UAS (Undesired Aircraft State)

The final “State” Layer of the TEM Model is the UAS (Undesired Aircraft State) Layer.

An Undesired Aircraft State (UAS) is defined as;

An error induced aircraft deviation or incorrect configuration associated with a clear reduction in safety margins.

Examples of UASs are unstable approaches, lateral or vertical deviations, overspeeds, incorrect configuration (flaps/slats etc.) management, altitude busts, long or short landings and taxiway or runway incursions.

UAS are an extension of Errors. As can be seen from the UAS definition, an UAS results directly from the crew’s error(s).

As with errors, UAS’s can be seen as coming internally “from” the crew and significantly increase risk and decrease safety.

Managing UAS – MITIGATE Layer

The corresponding “Manage” Layer to the UAS “State” is the MITIGATE Layer.

When you get this deep into the TEM Model you must recognise errors and the resultant UAS and will often have to mitigate the effects of the UAS and complete error recovery to a safe situation.

UAS management is an essential component of the TEM Model, as important as the threat and error management part.

UAS management largely represents the last opportunity to avoid an unsafe “Outcome” and thus maintain safety margins in flight operations.

UASs are normally (but not always) the end consequence of failing to avoid threats and trap errors. They are also the result of poor SA. When managing UASs you are being totally reactionary and probably operating at Level 1 SA (Notice). Your crew will have high workload/low monitoring.

You obviously want to circumvent UASs. To do this generate thick AVOID (identify threats) and TRAP (recognise – resist and resolve errors) layers of defence by the proper use of equipment, skills and knowledge.

In most cases UASs can be effectively managed through mitigating the UAS effects and the aircraft recovered to safe flight.

Recovery from an UAS that has resulted from your previous error(s) (in the past) can be thought of a reactive MITIGATE layer of defence.

However, there may be occasions when they lead to additional errors which may then precipitate an “Outcome” of an Incident or an Accident.

Outcomes

An Outcome is what occurs when an event, which has its’ final conclusion as an UAS, is not adequately managed and defeats all the protective layers in the TEM Model. It is analogous to all the holes lining up in the “Swiss Cheese” Error Model.

An Outcome usually manifests itself as an Accident or Incident (probably a certain way of failing your Command Course!). For example an unstable approach (hot and high) on a short, slippery runway may result in a runway over-run; or, landing downwind of the centreline in a raging crosswind, using the incorrect crosswind landing technique may end with the aircraft bogged off the side of the runway; or, you land on the wrong parallel runway.

If you get all the way through the TEM Model and end up with an Outcome – well there’s not too much you can do except start composing either your Board of Inquiry statement or your letter of resignation.

While UASs are undesirable (pardon the pun), they are better than an Outcome – at least with an UAS you get a chance to “manage” the situation. If you are hot and high in an unstable approach, you can Mitigate the UAS by going around and completing the next approach satisfactorily and safely.

TEM (Part 3) is here.

TEM (Part 1 - Overview)

2008-09-30T14:36:00.034+10:00

What is Threat and Error Management (TEM)? Is it just another of those TLAs (Three Letter Acronyms), fancy pants CRM thingies? Do you actually use TEM during your day-to-day operations – and more importantly, if you use it, how do you use it?

These are very, very common questions that most professional aviators have extreme difficulty in answering. I will admit I used to be one of them.

Stop reading right now and take a moment and see if you can satisfactorily answer these questions before reading on. Go on, I dare you!

I was always a little fuzzy about what TEM was and how to apply it. To remedy my TEM deficiency I sought out the answers and by doing so increased my aviation knowledge. Through researching TEM I came to realise how easy and effective it was to practically use. And this practical application of TEM is something you want to develop and use as a Command Trainee and Captain.

This explanation of TEM is in my words (so any mistakes are mine) and has been written in pilot-speak for Line pilots. Don’t blindly take my word for this explanation of the TEM Model as gospel. YOU still need to take individual responsibility for how you eventually use TEM. You can read some further TEM articles here (a Word Document) and here (PDF) (good background stuff).

If you find this explanation helpful or confusing or would like something clarified then leave a Comment at the end of this post and I’ll do my best to further educate you (and all the others).

TEM Model Overview

Don’t worry about the definitions of things that may be unfamiliar to you as they will come later when we look more closely at the various individual aspects of the TEM Model.

To explain what TEM is we will use a diagram – the TEM Model. (Click on any of the images for a larger view.)

In that diagram are a series of two different types of “layers” depicted in the shape of an inverted triangle. The different Layers form a kind of overlapping defensive shield.

“STATE” Layers

One of the basic types of layers of the TEM Model are what I call “STATE” Layers – they are the three different “States” or modes that can exist in TEM.

The three ”State” Layers are: THREATS, ERRORS and UAS (Undesirable Aircraft States).

“MANAGE” Layers

The other basic type of layer is what I call “MANAGE” Layers – for each “State” Layer there is a corresponding “Manage” Layer.

The three “Manage Layers” are: AVOID, TRAP and MITIGATE.

The “Manage” Layers are the heart of the TEM Model. They are the most important part of the Model as it is here that you get to influence the eventual result of the whole process. In other words, the TE part of TEM leads to the most important M part – the effective Management of the Treats and Errors.

The “Manage” Layers and the implementation of actions within them is what separates good Captains from bad ones.

The ”Manage” Layers are the areas that you should focus the vast majority of your attention.
Layer Thickness

Each independent and individual layer can be either thick or thin.

A thin “State” Layer would represent few threats, errors or UASs – an easy day at the office. A thick “State” Layer would represent numerous, multiple threats, errors or UAS’s – where you really need to be on top of your game.

A thin “Manage” Layer would characterize little planning or limited strategies to counter the threats, errors or UAS that are affecting you – usually resulting in decreased safety and increased risk. A thick “Manage” Layer would signify that you have adequately catered for the various threats, errors and UAS’s – safety is increased and risk minimised.

Creating thick and robust “Manage” Layers should be your Command goal.
TEM & Situational Awareness (SA)

TEM and Situational Awareness (SA) are intimately and inexorably linked. You cannot have any semblance of TEM without a reasonable level of SA. The three different TEM “States” are very closely related to the three SA Levels. (If you’re not familiar with these SA Levels, then read about it here.)

“OUTCOME”

If you allow yourself to get so deep into the TEM Model triangle that you bypass all the “State” and “Manage” Layers then an “OUTCOME” will result.

This “Outcome” is usually in the form of an Accident or Incident and is normally very visible to everyone both within the cockpit and without. “Outcomes” usually result in formal investigations and you could see your name on the front page of tomorrow’s newspaper. Not a good look for someone undergoing a Command Course!

The Inverted Triangle Shape

The inverted triangle shape of the TEM Model is most appropriate, as the deeper into the triangle you get, the less time, resources and options are available for you to use – and if you eventually reach an “Outcome” it’s too late. The deeper into the TEM Model you allow yourself to get will result in safety decreasing and risk increasing. In addition your workload will be increasing and your monitoring decreasing.

Getting really deep into the TEM triangle is not a good thing!

The Entry Point

The most usual point of entry into the TEM Model is via the Threat Layer and then depending on how you manage (or mismanage) those threats will dictate how deep into the TEM triangle you get.

However you can also enter the TEM Model directly via the Error Layer – here you make a mistake or error in the absence of any threats. These are “Spontaneous Errors”. Some days you just screw up.

Summary

The following TEM Table summarises the main points of the TEM Model. I recommend that you print a copy of both the main TEM Model (the first diagram) and also this TEM Table for easy reference in the other TEM articles that follow.

So that’s the overview, now let’s look at each individual layer in greater depth in TEM Part 2.

Risk Assessment

2008-08-30T21:33:00.006+10:00

This a series of articles about Risk, which are a part of Command Judgement and Decision Making (Risk Introduction - Part 7 is here)

Risk Assessment is the detection and identification of potential threats (hazards) and the application of “measurement” of the level of risk (magnitude) that they potentially represent. It requires an adequate level of Situational Awareness.

Unlike many corporate decision-makers, who allow risks to be accepted and are usually quite removed from the resultant risk bearers (hey, it’s not my neck...), you are the combined decision-maker and the bearer of that resultant risk. There is no accountability gap. So it is in your best interests to get it right!

Real-time inflight Risk Assessment is subjective. It is based on your reckoning of the “Perceived Risk”; not the Real (actual) Risk. It will be highly unlikely that you will have the luxury of time, resources or spare brain power to accurately quantify the level of Real Risk that you face when in an aircraft. It just doesn’t happen that way for real.

Risk Formula

So how can you assess the level of risk for any situation that you actually face?

One way is to use the Risk Formula.

The Risk Formula is a guide for you to “estimate” or assess the magnitude of risk for a particular situation, with the limited information available to you, the lack of resources and the time constraints imposed on you in-flight.

RISK = SEVERITY x PROBABILITY x EXPOSURE
Severity is the extent of a possible loss. The severity lies in a range from a negligible, minor loss to a catastrophic, total loss.

Probability is the likelihood that a threat could potentially cause a loss.

Exposure is the amount of times an event (usually a repeated event) occurs, or the length of time an event is experienced.

Risk Assessment Matrix

The Risk Assessment Matrix can be used to determine the magnitude of the Risk (as best as you can), by estimating the perceived level of the Severity of the risk and the Probability of that risk occurring.

Severity

Catastrophic; Death or serious injury, or hull loss/serious damage to aircraft (aircraft accident).

Critical; Serious injury, or damage to aircraft/systems (aircraft incident).

Marginal; Flight can be accomplished, although there may be adverse effects on the flight efficiency (extra cost, delays, diversion etc.).

Negligible; No or little effect on the flight.

Probability

Frequent; May be continuous or encountered often during each flight.

Probable; May be encountered several times during the course of many flights.

Occasional; May be encountered sporadically during the course of many flights.

Remote; May be encountered infrequently; chances are possible but remote.

Improbable; May be encountered only rarely; chances are possible but improbable.

Assess the threats. Captains must estimate what the risk severity will be (catastrophic, critical, marginal or negligible) and what is the probability of the threat occurring (frequent, probable, occasional, remote or improbable). The goal of this step is to categorize the risk into the following categories: Extreme, High, Medium or Low.

Just try and fit the situation that you face somewhere in the Matrix and you will get your best “guess” as to the magnitude of risk that you face; Severe, High, Moderate or Low. Any situation that you assess the risk is Severe or High requires careful scrutiny and monitoring of the situation and for you to proactively manage the risk. Moderate risk requires careful consideration and Low risk is what we all would like our flights to be like.

How you personally categorise your risk magnitude will have a major impact on the Judgement you use to manage that risk and the eventual decision that you make. A High risk level situation will be judged differently to a Low risk one and very different decisions may be made to cope with either of these situations.

Factors Affecting Risk Perception

You will likely never be able to accurately measure the real, actual level of risk that you face in any flight that you undertake. You have to rely on your Perceived magnitude of risk.

Your perception of risk may be influenced by factors other than its magnitude. The following factors may have more affect on the acceptability of risk than the estimated magnitude of;

Risks perceived to be voluntary are more acceptable than risks perceived to be imposed.

Risks perceived to be under an individual's control are more accepted than risks perceived to be controlled by others.

Risks perceived to have clear benefits are more accepted than risks perceived to have little or no benefit.

Risks perceived to be fairly distributed are more accepted than risks perceived to be unfairly distributed.

Risks perceived to be natural are more accepted than risks perceived to be manmade.

Risks perceived to be statistical are more accepted than risks perceived to be catastrophic.

Risks perceived to be generated by a trusted source are more accepted than risks perceived to be generated by an untrusted source.

Risks perceived to be familiar are more accepted than risks perceived to exotic.

Risks perceived to affect adults are more accepted than risks perceived to affect children.

(Fischhoff B, Lichtenstein S, Slovic P, Keeney D. 1981)

When risks are perceived to be dreadful, unfamiliar, uncontrollable by the individual, unfair, involuntary, and potentially catastrophic, they are typically of great public concern, or high outrage. When risks are perceived as voluntary, controllable by the individual, familiar, equitable, easily reducible, decreasing, and non-catastrophic, they tend to be minimized by the public, or low outrage. (Dr. Robert Scheuplien)

Our natural tendency to think in the manner described by Dr. Scheuplien leads us to be overly concerned about risks for which we feel little control and to feel little concern for risks where we can exercise significant control. So be aware of your personal “Risk Tolerance” level.

So How Do I Do This?

As you can see Risk Assessment for Captains is more of an acquired Art than a Science. Hopefully you have been studying your previous Captains and absorbing their collective wisdom on Risk Assessment and incorporating it into your “way of doing business”.

Policy, Procedures and NPs/SOPs are a good framework to base your Risk Assessment on. In fact some risks may have already been identified, assessed and a decision made for you. For example, your airline might have mandated that when Microburst Alerts are in force (a possible Extreme risk level) that no take offs or landings are to be done at that airfield. Another example may be Unstable Approaches (a possible High Risk event and a leading cause of runway excursions) – if certain flight parameters are exceeded (e.g. airspeed too high, or not on the glidepath by a certain minimum altitude) that a Go Around is mandatory.

Ultimately it will be up to you. Often your experience will be all that you have to determine the Risk magnitude. This is why inexperienced and novice Captains are generally more risk aversive (they avoid risk) as they do not have the experience to judge accurately the risk magnitude a particular situation presents.

When all else fails remember the “Rules Of Risk”;

Do not accept unnecessary risk.

Accept risk when the benefits outweigh the costs.

Finally, when in doubt, take the safest option.

Workload Management (Part 2)

2008-08-16T08:47:00.008+10:00

Workload Management (Part 1) is here.

High Workload

Every flight has periods of high workload. You need to be aware of when these high workload periods will occur and you need to plan ahead and organize tasks around the low workload periods.

A major element of workload management is shifting the workload from busy times to quiet times. Mismanagement of workload will degrade your team’s performance. Plan for the future and identify when high workload periods will occur during low workload periods; when you have time and are not overloaded. Then you can formulate plans and brief your team to mitigate the perceived threats, pace their activities, prioritise and effectively manage their workload to ensure that everything gets done correctly and nobody gets bogged down and left behind when things get busy.

Plan during low workload periods for the high workload periods.
Effective CRM pays dividends any time the workload increases to intensive levels such as during an emergency or when activities conspire in a manner that are typically beyond one pilot’s abilities. You need to ensure that your team acts cohesively together.

High workload situations are sometimes unavoidable. During these situations you need to;

Give clear, concise commands (provide Leadership and direction for your team).

Monitor each individual’s workload to identify times of overload. If you recognise overload in yourself or others, you will need to prioritise, delegate, defer or redistribute the workload.

Communicate task saturation to other crewmembers. This individual overload recognition is difficult to see in yourself, easier to spot in others and requires crew to monitor each other.

How To Cope

Why do some Captains cope efficiently with difficult and high workload situations and yet for others nothing seems to go right?

A 2004 conference sponsored by Boeing looked at what qualities successful crews used as countermeasures in TEM. There were four particular groupings of CRM skills:

Team building and climate. Of particular importance were good communications and effective Leadership.

Planning. Crews that excelled performed good briefings, anticipated threats, stated plans, assigned workload, and developed contingency plans for known threats (plan during low workload for high workload).

Execution. These crews had solid monitoring and cross-checking, workload management, and vigilance skills. They also showed a mastery of automation management.

Review/Modify. High performing crews reviewed plans frequently against the stated goals, modified plans when necessary, asked questions, and stated critical information with persistence.

As you can see, workload management is important in ensuring that the flight is completed efficiently and safely and is intimately tied to SA, monitoring and communication.

Effects Of Increasing Workload

Increasing workload results in decreasing SA and poor monitoring. All too often flight crews tend to do too many concurrent things and not adequately monitor the aircraft.

The common key periods in which you are most likely to commit the most errors due to poor workload management on routine flights are;

Preflight preparation with an “unusual” situation (e.g. passenger handling issues, difficult MEL item or equipment malfunction possibly requiring engineering assistance),

During taxi for departure and after arrival,

Within 1,000 feet of level-off (“One to go”), and

During descent and making an approach or landing. Avoid briefing during descent – complete your arrival brief early and omit PAs if pushed for time.

You will need to pay more attention to workload management so that at least one pilot is always monitoring during low workload periods and both pilots are monitoring as much as possible when things get busy.

Distractions

Distractions are really just misallocated priorities – you focus on the wrong thing rather than the most important task at the time. You will be required to avoid distractions during critical flight phases.

Distraction can led to workload management failures and no one flying the aircraft. Common distractions are;

The traffic staff, ISM or ATC interrupting you during a preflight briefing.

PAs after commencing descent.

FMS/ECAM/EICAS. Sometimes the automation can cause you to focus on it rather than the higher priority Aviate, Navigate, Communicate, Manage functions.

Unusual, novel, complex or ambiguous events. See the FMS/ECAM/EICAS discussion above.

Robust Work Routines

To cope with these distractions and interruptions you will need to formulate and continually practise robust work routines – especially during the preflight phase or during novel, complex and unusual situations, both of which have the potential to be high workload periods.

Work routines are just easy to use ways that you do your normal business, within the framework of SOPs/NPs. They may take the form of pneumonics, brief personal checklists that you cross off (either physically or mentally) when you complete actions or methods that link one task with the next if tasks are required to be done sequentially.

Whatever method you chose, it needs to be strong and robust. It needs to be able to be effective and usable when the pressure starts to increase and it needs to be well practised and ingrained.

On most “normal” flights the preflight phase will be a higher workload environment with the additional pressure of keeping the scheduled departure time. You need to have a sound understanding of the time-line associated with the pre-departure phase and you will need to manage the tasks in this busy period effectively. This is where a well practised robust work routine can assist you.

Automation

The introduction of the glass cockpit redistributed, rather than reduced flight crews’ workloads. Pilots now spend more resources managing the various systems in the cockpit. (Baxter and Besnard 2004)

LOSA audit data indicates that about 30 percent of crew errors occurred when the flight crew was programming the FMS.
The FMS and ECAM/EICAS have been likened to a vacuum cleaner; it sucks heads, eyes, fingers and attention straight into it.

Management of Automation

Automation is both a curse and a blessing. It depends very much on how you utilise the various automation systems and the particular situation that you find yourself in. Automation requires sound management and monitoring techniques.

Do not place a blind faith in automation; have a healthy level of scepticism. But do not disregard or overlook the automation features as they can reduce your workload immensely when used correctly.

Consider the automation to be another member of your team – tasks can be delegated to it, but you also need to monitor it and if it does not do what you desire be prepared to take manual control, reverting to Basic Modes if required.

Ensure that you and your team avoid the automation “Vacuum Cleaner”.

Automation is another aspect of your Command operation that you will be required to utilise correctly to effectively manage your team’s workload.

So, start to practise effective workload management – it definitely makes your future job as the Captain much, much easier.

Workload Management (Part 1)

2008-08-15T17:36:00.018+10:00

Observations during a Line Operational Safety Audit (LOSA) at several major airlines revealed over one-third of the monitoring errors occurred due to poor workload management. A significant number of pilots simply weren't planning ahead to accomplish as many tasks during low workload periods as possible. (Patrick R. Veillette)

Command Workload Management

One of your “new” roles as Captain will be to ensure that your team’s workload is managed to ensure things get done safely, SA and monitoring remains at a high level, tasks are distributed fairly and equally (usually within the framework of SOPs/NPs) and to ensure that YOU never get so overloaded that your Command SA, decision making, risk assessment and management and overall Leadership are not compromised.

Workload Management is the process of evenly distributing activities by planning, prioritizing and assigning tasks to individual crewmembers within your team (and this may also include “outside agencies” such as Operations, Engineering, ATC etc.). It is avoiding Underload and Overload and striving to operate in an Optimum workload environment to maximize your team’s performance.

Workload Management is concerned with;

The proper allocation or delegation of tasks and duties to individuals to distribute the workload,

Avoidance of work overload (and to a lesser extent, work underload) in yourself and in members of your team,

Prioritization of tasks, especially during periods of high workload,

Preventing nonessential factors from distracting attention from adherence to effective monitoring, SA and NPs, particularly those relating to critical tasks, and

Ensuring that you have enough spare mental capacity to cope with and manage unexpected events.

At the very core of workload management are the essential concepts of prioritisation and delegation, which in turn results in you having spare mental capacity.

Prioritise

As the Captain you must be able to prioritise tasks – for both your team and yourself.

To prioritize is to identify those tasks that are most important and need to be done first and those that are less important and can be deferred to a later time. In addition to determining the relative importance of tasks you need to be able to sequence the accomplishment of those tasks and allocate the workload between team members effectively.

During periods of high workload, prioritization is extremely important to ensure that the essential fundamental tasks are accomplished first.

How you choose to allocate priority to the various required tasks in any situation will be up to you and is heavily influenced by your perception of the situation, the current phase of flight, previous experience, preparation and planning. Aviate, Navigate, Communicate, Manage (or Plane, Path, People, Parts) is a sound framework to begin prioritisation of tasks.

Prioritisation is useless unless your team is aware of what your perceived priorities are. Sound SA is required to plan ahead, as is good communication skills to share your mental model and communicate your intent to the others in your team.

Delegate

To effectively accomplish your prioritised tasks, you must assign duties and responsibilities within your team. You must delegate tasks where appropriate to allocate or share the workload and to reduce individual crew member’s workloads when they start to get behind; especially your own Command workload.

Delegation is also an essential element of Leadership. You do not have to do everything yourself; something that often escapes new Commanders. By delegating tasks within the team you manage the individual’s and also the team’s overall workload. As an additional bonus, if your team’s workload is equitably distributed, you, in your Command role, will function better.

Often when you are faced with new, novel, ambiguous, difficult or complex situations (e.g. an emergency or a tricky MEL item), it can sometimes be best to delegate some of your duties or tasks to others within your team so that you can free up extra mental capacity and take a step back to look at the “Big Picture” and focus on your Command management and Leadership functions. This allows you to effectively regulate and achieve your desired outcome. Delegate so that you can regulate.

Be sure those you delegate tasks to are capable to perform the task. You must monitor their progress and subsequent workload as well as the progress of the assigned task.

Work Smarter, Not Harder

Command is not normally about physical handling skill (although it is important) – it’s about Leadership and a component of that is workload management. Use your time and energy wisely and reduce your team’s workload whenever possible.

Use your available resources effectively to get the job efficiently done. Strive for the most output for least input. Whenever possible;

Avoid unnecessary work and shift the work you have to do from busy periods to less busy periods. This requires good SA and results from future projection, anticipation and planning. This is an important element of workload management.

Do not unnecessarily over-complicate issues. Use the KISS principle and aim to simplify whenever possible. You will not impress anyone by making the job harder than it actually needs to be.

Do not micro-manage your team. Assign or delegate tasks and then let them get on with doing it. You will still need to monitor them, but don’t interfere if the task is being accomplished – you can be doing something else of a high priority simultaneously.

Consider using appropriate automation to reduce your physical and mental workload and to increase your spare mental capacity so that you can utilise and maximise your Leadership and Command management skills.

Good Captains are relaxed, appear to being doing little work and have spare mental capacity, yet they still have everything under control. You should focus on working smarter, not harder.

Spare Mental Capacity

To fulfil the required Command duties of adequate SA, CRM, TEM, Leadership, risk assessment, decision making and safe operation of the flight you need to ensure that you have sufficient Spare Mental Capacity. You cannot allow yourself to be working so hard that all you are able to achieve is mediocre SA (and only functioning in the Present).

During periods of high workload you will tend to become fixated and develop “tunnel vision” to cope with the increased workload. Monitoring and SA will decrease and you will likely have zero spare mental capacity to plan ahead.

You As PF or PM?

Studies have shown that your F/O when acting as PM typically is able to cope with technical knowledge or skill problems, but may be unable to accurately assess a situation's risk and time available, and have limited ability to manage workload effectively.

In addition, NTSB analysis of accidents has noted that the error type observed most often for Captains while acting as PF was the tactical decision error. Tactical decision errors include improper decision making, failure to change course of action in response to signals to do so, and failing to heed warnings or alerts that suggest a change in course of action. The NTSB attributed these errors in part to the additional cognitive and manipulative skill workload of aircraft control.

Depending on the situation, consider letting your F/O act as PF, in conjunction with appropriate use of automation, while you review the Big Picture, update SA, monitor and fulfil your management and supervisory roles while acting as PM. You may find that this lets you think more and as a result arrive at higher quality decisions and outcomes. However, you still need to monitor the aircraft, what your F/O is doing and his workload as well.

Keep Spare Mental Capacity

Ensure you guard against losing this valuable Command asset and if you recognise that you are losing it, reduce your workload and slow the tempo of the flight to increase it.

Methods to ease your workload and increase your spare mental capacity are;

Appropriate use of automation (AP, A/THR, FMS etc.).

Preparation. By properly preparing (either through suitable study before flight or while inflight) you can identify potential problem areas and implement solutions to mitigate their effect before you encounter them.

Delegate and allocate tasks or duties to your team members.

“Buy” time. Slow the tempo and pace of the flight by requesting extra track miles, entering a holding pattern, reducing to minimum manoeuvring speed, going around or delaying take off.

Prioritise. Do the important tasks first and defer the less urgent or non-essential tasks.

Be flexible. Don’t rigidly pursue one course of action and totally disregard alternatives. Your way may not be the best way.

Communicate. Share ideas and tell your crew when you are becoming bogged down or that you simply don’t know the answer or solution. Often your team members may have a ready-made solution (they may have experienced something similar before) or can assist you.

You will require spare mental capacity to cope with the unexpected, unusual or novel events that will eventually happen to you and your team.

Workload Management (Part 2) is here.

Aviate, Navigate, Communicate & Manage

2008-07-31T15:55:00.005+10:00

ANC – Aviate, Navigate, Communicate

Like the concept of Airmanship, at a very early stage of your aviation training you were probably taught to Aviate, Navigate, Communicate. Another way to consider these three aspects is Plane, Path, People.

The Aviate part was to make certain that someone was always flying the aircraft, controlling the Power + Attitude to ensure the Performance was correct. Control the Plane.

The Navigate part was to point the aircraft in the correct way to enable you to get successfully from A to B (both vertically and horizontally). Control the Path.

The Communicate part was to share your Mental Model with your crew and ATC to give and receive information. Control the People.

Pretty routine so far – although a lot of pilots would do well to revisit and incorporate these basics back into their day-to-day flying operations.

M – Manage

However, in the Airlines and current Corporate environment (and increasingly the GA world) there is another element that needs to be addressed, especially in Glass cockpits. That is the Management aspects of the flight. And if you are the Captain, this Management role will become extremely important.

To round off our “P” discussion, this Manage function can be thought of as the Parts – you have to Manage the various Parts of the aviation system that you are in charge of. Control the Parts.

The introduction of the glass cockpit redistributed, rather than reduced flight crews’ workloads. Pilots now spend more resources managing the various systems in the cockpit.

...some of the burden for handling of safety and efficiency has been passed to the automation, but the pilots instead have to spend extra time and effort on learning how to manage these systems. Indeed, the introduction of technology has changed the nature of training such that pilots are now taught to aviate, navigate, communicate and manage systems. (Baxter and Besnard 2004)

Sometimes, after you have satisfied yourself that the Aviate, Navigate, Communicate areas are satisfactory, you will have to Manage your systems, both automatic and biological (the carbon based life forms). Often the best way to Manage the situation is, if you can, give control of the aircraft to your F/O and take a “Mental” step back and take on an overseeing, supervisory role.

This Management function has always been there, but it is becoming more and more important in today’s modern aviation environment.

So whenever you think of Aviate, Navigate, Communicate – add on Manage.

Situational Awareness (SA) Part 2

2008-07-31T08:42:00.014+10:00

In SA Part 1 we looked at what SA is and the three Levels of SA. Now we’ll look at degraded SA, how to recognise it and prevent poor SA and what constitutes good SA. So read on...

Degraded SA

It is important that you are able to recognise when you or your team are losing or have lost SA. This SA degradation highlights three points;

It can be eroded or degraded gradually (poor SA) or all at once (lost SA),

Seriously degrades the ability to achieve efficiency and flight safety (it is often a prime factor in aircraft accidents).

There are nearly always sufficient cues for individual crew members to recognise and recover from lost SA. (from Redefining Airmanship)

Don’t paint yourself into a corner and then have to do everything exactly right to recover. Maintain a healthy level of scepticism and be slightly conservative to maintain the flexibility of multiple options.

Recognising Poor Or Lost SA

“Red Flags” or indicators that indicate possible degrading, poor or lost SA in yourself or within your team are;

Ambiguity or confusion (unresolved discrepancies and what you expect to happen doesn’t).

Loss of spatial (where you are in three dimensions) and temporal (time) awareness.

“Gut” feeling (if something doesn’t look or “feel” right, then it probably isn’t).

Both pilots “heads down” (remember Aviate is the first priority).

Fixation, “tunnel vision” or a narrowing of attention (this may be caused by an unusual, novel or stressful situation).

Running out of time to execute or complete tasks.

Expectation, assumption and bias – reality doesn’t always happen as you think it should.

Distractions – a major loss of SA cause.

Malfunctions (especially ECAM/EICAS) or novel, abnormal or unusual occurrences.

Overload (busy) or underload (bored).

Fatigue or stress.

Over reliance on automation (Automation Dependency, Automation Complacency and Automation Bias).

Poor communication (vague or incomplete statements) or reduced frequency of communication (hesitancy or withdrawal from the situation).

Failure to meet targets (e.g. altitude constraints, stabilised approach criteria).

Getting behind the aircraft (no Level 3 SA or thinking ahead of the aircraft).

Use of an undocumented procedure, non NP or violation of a minimum (usually unintentionally, which creates confusion in your team).

Attempting to operate the aircraft outside of know limitations (e.g. lowering flaps above their limit speed).

Recovering SA

You must recognise that you have lost SA before you can begin to recover it. You also need to admit and accept that your SA may have been lost or degraded – only then can you go about recovering it. Do this by;

Getting away from dirt, rocks, trees and metal – avoid terrain, traffic and weather.

Stabilising the aircraft – minimise changes until you regain your spatial awareness.

Buying time – slow the tempo, hold, reduce speed, request extra track miles.

Seeking information – listen and update your team’s shared mental model.

Learning from experience – if you have experienced a similar situation before, you are more likely to recognise and resolve that situation before poor SA develops.

Also check out SA Enhancement - Quick & Dirty.

Prevention

Two of the main enemies of good SA are distractions and a high workload.

Both have the effect of reducing the monitoring and scanning of the operation. You need to minimise distractions and control the tempo and pace of operations such that your team’s workload is kept to an appropriate and manageable level.

To develop an understanding of effective SA you need to know about the following factors that enable you to prevent a loss of SA;

Manage distractions.

Reduce workload and avoid overload.

Prioritise.

Define roles, follow NPs and delegate duties.

Preparation and planning (you don’t get caught out).

Avoid complacency.

Test assumptions, confirm expectations and suspend bias.

Intervene.

Actively monitor.

Actively direct attention and scan.

Use all available sources to obtain information. You also need to communicate and share your mental model.

Ensure you don’t end up with too much information and not enough SA.

Be aware of your own and your crew’s limitations.

Good SA

Good Crew SA

Four major actions that are important for enhancing team or crew SA;

Identifying problems or potential problems (Threats).

Demonstrating knowledge of the actions of others.

Keeping up with flight details, and

Verbalizing actions and intentions. (Prince and Salas 1998)

If you and your team can do these things you will be able to solve problems quicker and be able to recognise problem areas developing sooner.

Good SA Elements

Good SA requires you to engender and promote the following elements within your team:

Building a composite image of the entire situation in three dimensions (the Big Picture).

Assimilation of information from multiple sources (communication and prioritising is critical).

Knowing spatial position and geometric relationships (where am I, where is the other traffic, where is my nearest suitable airfield?).

Periodically updating the current dynamic situation (update your shared mental model).

Prioritizing information and actions (do the important stuff first and defer the others).

Making quality and timely decisions (a major quality required for Command).

Projecting the current situation into the future (be proactive, not reactive).

Situational Awareness (SA) Part 1

2008-07-30T19:19:00.018+10:00

SA is a pilot’s (or aircrew’s) continuous perception of self and aircraft in relation to the dynamic environment of flight, threats, and mission, and the ability to forecast, then execute tasks based on that perception.

It is problem solving in a three-dimensional spatial relationship complicated by the fourth dimension of time compression, where there are too few givens and too many variables. It encompasses the individual’s experience and capabilities, which affect the ability to forecast, decide and then execute. SA represents the cumulative effects of everything an individual is and does as applied to mission accomplishment. (Carol, L. A. 1992)

Command SA

Situational Awareness (SA) is vital in our aviation domain as the information flow can be very high, variable in quantity and quality and the effects of poor decisions can result in safety being compromised and serious consequences. If you can accurately perceive the environment you are operating in, your level of risk will be low.

It requires a high degree of spatial (where you are in the three dimensions) and temporal (how much, or little, time is available) awareness and knowledge.

You no doubt have been using and applying SA throughout your aviation career. Now that you are taking on a Command role, SA assumes a far more important role. Good SA is what will ensure that you and your team conduct a safe and efficient flight.

SA is intimately interwoven with Leadership, Monitoring, Workload Management, Communication, Risk Management and ultimately affects Judgement & Decision making. Each segment influences the others and directly affects the operation as a whole.

Situational Awareness is when perception matches reality and you are able to act upon it in a timely and rational manner. (Refining Airmanship).

Good SA allows you to maximise opportunities and to avoid undesirable situations.
It’s Not Just About You

In your new Command role, you not only have to manage yourself, but now you will be required to Lead and manage your team and more specifically your Crew.

You will have to include and monitor what the rest of your team is doing. This includes being situationally aware of what your F/O is doing, his workload, capabilities and skill, in addition to his strengths and weaknesses. This crew and team awareness applies also to your Cabin Crew, ground and operational staff you may come into contact with and your interaction with ATC.

At times you will have to intentionally slow the tempo of operations so that the other team members can keep pace with the situation and not overload them.

Good individual SA is achieved by having an accurate mental model.

Good shared crew SA is achieved by having an accurate shared mental model.

3 Levels of SA (NUTA)

SA is “the perception of elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future.” (Endsley 1988)

From this SA definition, three Levels of SA can be inferred;

Level 1 SA. Perception – you Notice.

Level 2 SA. Comprehension – you Understand.

Level 3 SA. Projection – you Think Ahead.

These three SA Levels can be distilled into NUTA (Notice, Understand, Think Ahead).

Level 1 – Perception (Notice)

In this first Level of SA you are required to Perceive or Notice and then recognise a relevant cue, status or attribute (e.g. a caution light or flight parameter). This is enhanced by being aware of the various procedures, policy, technical and operational factors affecting the operation.

Well developed Monitoring skills and an effective scanning technique are required at this Notice stage. This occurs in the Present time – it is what you need to do right now.

Low experienced and overloaded crew members often only operate in this SA Level. They have either not learnt the required skills and techniques or are so overwhelmed or task saturated that they cannot progress to the higher SA Levels.

This initial starting point of SA is commonly where the most numerous number of missed threats, mistakes and errors occurs. Generally if you notice something you will respond correctly to it. Ignorance is NOT bliss. You need to be actively and continually scanning all aspects of the current operation.

Working at Level 1 SA means you are probably behind the aircraft.
Level 2 – Comprehension (Understand)

The next step in SA formation is where the various separate disjointed pieces of Level 1 SA information that you notice are linked together so that patterns are recognised to form a Comprehension and Understanding of what is happening. It requires a holistic view of events – nothing ever operates in isolation.

In this Understanding stage you will need to interpret and Evaluate what is happening around you. This stage occurs also in the Present time.

A large number of crew will often stop at this Level of SA due to high workload, poor CRM or a lack of communication skills.

If you just operate in this area of Level 2 SA you are being reactive.

To be able to operate at this SA Level requires that you have the necessary airmanship, technical and operational knowledge to understand the inter-relationship and implications of such factors.

Functioning at Level 2 SA means you are probably just keeping up with the aircraft.
Level 3 – Projection (Think Ahead)

In this highest Level of SA you should Project the elements and dynamics of Level 1 & 2 SA information into the Future – Think Ahead of the aircraft.

You need to Anticipate and Consider events likely to affect the operation and convey your assessment and thoughts to your crew and team.

Once you reach Level 3 SA you are being proactive.

Never let an airplane take you somewhere you brain didn't get to five minutes earlier.

Usually in this Level of SA you will have anticipated or considered multiple paths to achieve your goal, so that if one option becomes unavailable you change flexibly to another suitable option. This contingency planning is a highlight of good Captains and good crews which starts at the pre-flight phase and continues throughout the entire flight.

Operating at Level 3 SA should be your goal and results in you being ahead of the aircraft.
Shared or Crew SA

These three levels of SA occur at an individual level, but you really want a shared team or crew SA. An SA aware Captain and an SA aware F/O don’t necessarily add up to an SA aware crew. Your crew needs to have an accurate shared mental model of what is occurring.

This aspect of sharing information within the crew requires good communication skills. You need to ask yourself:

What do they know that I need to know?

What do I know that they need to know?

What do none of us know that we need to know?

The SA of your team as a whole depends on both;

A high level of individual SA for the aspects of the situation necessary for their own tasks, and

A high level of shared crew SA between members of your team that are common to the needs of the team.

An SA aware crew has a much greater chance of not losing their individual or crew SA in the first place, or if it is lost, rapidly recognising that loss and then swiftly recovering their SA. That’s good teamwork and something that you need to promote as the Leader and Captain.

An Example Of Shared Crew SA

You are the Captain (PM/PNF) coming around the base leg under ATC vectors for an ILS approach with ATC speed control.

This simple example can be applied to any situation that you find yourself in. Good communication skills and effective CRM is crucial to optimising not only your own SA but also your crew’s.

Good SA is one of the hallmarks of good Captains. Work on improving your Command SA and use the three Levels of SA to provide a framework for your development.

SA Part 2 is here.

Expectancy & Bias

2008-06-07T00:34:00.009+10:00

This article is complementary to Command Judgement and Decision Making Part 6 - Define The Problem.

Taking The Wrong Path

There is no point in “solving” your PERCEIVED problem if in fact it is not the REAL problem. You will still have the original problem unresolved.

You may lead your crew up the wrong path with your Expectation and Bias as the Captain. (See the Lumberjacks & The Wrong Forest).

Checking the outcome of your decision (which will be discussed in a later article) is important to make sure that you have not latched onto the wrong problem.

It is far better to make an incorrect decision, recognise later that it was wrong, admit your “mistake” and then revisit the Judgement and Decision Making process to ultimately identify the correct problem and revise your decision, than it is to blunder blissfully on along the wrong path with the original REAL problem still unsettled.

A man must be big enough to admit his mistakes, smart enough to profit from them, and strong enough to correct them. (John C. Maxwell)

A man who has committed a mistake and doesn't correct it is committing another mistake. (Confucius)

Expectancy

You may “think” you have solved your problem, but the incoming raw data suggests that something is not quite right.

It is difficult to realise that you did not actually solve the original problem and that you need to recomplete the Judgement and Decision Making process from the start again. “That can’t be right (I’m not wrong). I fixed that problem!”

This expectancy may inhibit you from recompleting the whole Judgement and Decision Making process and thus defining the REAL problem. If you get into this situation you may be so fixated on your PERCEIVED problem that it will be extremely hard for you to change your mind and outlook on the REAL problem.

It may be best if you acknowledge that you can’t work out what is wrong (but at least you recognise that something is wrong!) and let another crew or team member state what THEY think is the problem. This might precipitate an “Of course!”, forehead slapping moment when you finally open your eyes (and more importantly open your mind) to the REAL problem that was probably staring you in the face all the time.

We see what we believe, instead of believing what we see.

Bias

As the Captain you have to be careful you don’t unduly influence your crew with your preference or Bias. In other words YOUR Perceived Problem is THE Real Problem.

If you do introduce your Bias you risk influencing your crew’s thoughts and Judgement. Your crew may think “The Captain must be right and I’m wrong.”

That’s OK if your Bias is correct, but you may lead them up the wrong path if it is incorrect – and that’s not OK. This is a subtle form of Groupthink in which everyone will acquiesce and comply to YOUR way of doing things and suppress their individual creativity and thoughts so as to conform to YOUR Bias and Expectations.

You might be correct and what you think is the problem is the real problem, but then again you are human and you therefore make mistakes.

Involve your crew in defining what the problem is and possible solutions.

Use open questions to gather their thoughts and perception of the situation (What do you think...?).

Get them to paraphrase in their own words and state what they think the problem is.

If they agree with your internal mental assessment you can be reasonably sure that that you are on the right path (but not 100% sure as they are subject to Expectations and Bias as well). If their assessment is different from yours then you may have to either restart the Judgement & Decision Making process again to seek more information so that you can accurately define the problem in your own mind, or if you are sure that you’re right, you will have to explain what you think is the correct interpretation and “Sell” it to them.

YOU have to be reasonably certain in your own mind that your crew is solving the correct, Real problem as YOU are the Captain and YOU are ultimately responsible for not only your decisions and actions but also your crew’s decisions and actions.

An Example

You get an indication that one of your Hydraulic (HYD) systems is not producing pressure (on the ECAM/EICAS/gauge), but there are also conflicting indications and information displayed on a separate instrument/gauge.

CN: It looks like the HYD system has failed. (You state YOUR perceived idea of the problem, which as it turns out is incorrect)

F/O: OK. What now?

CN: Let’s secure that HYD system. (You state YOUR solution to what you “think” is the problem)

F/O: OK.

You have possibly Biased your F/O to accept your stated problem and solution and not involved him in the Judgement and Decision Making process. You may have lead your crew up the wrong path. Autocratic Captains favour this type of approach.

OR

CN: It looks like we have a HYD system problem, but there is conflicting information (you state what you see). What do you think? (an open question)

F/O: It looks like we might have a false indication here and this other indication is telling us the HYD system is operating normally and there are no other secondary indications.

CN: I agree. What should we do?

F/O: Let’s keep the HYD system running and see if we can confirm if it is just an indication problem.

CN: Excellent – just what I was thinking (this is good CRM and Leadership – you have praised your F/O for a good decision).

You have involved your F/O in the assessment of the problem and the solution and he has confirmed your initial diagnosis. Participative or Delegative Captains favour this method.

OR

CN: It looks like we have a HYD system problem, but there is conflicting information. What do you think?

F/O: It looks like the HYD system has failed.

CN: I disagree. Look at that other indication – it shows the HYD system operating normally. And there are no secondary indications of the HYD system malfunctioning. (“Sell” the new information to the problem to your F/O.)

F/O: Oh yeah! I didn’t see that. You’re right, it’s most likely an indication problem.

You have involved your F/O and “Sold” the conflicting indications to him and he agrees with your initial diagnosis. If you are a good Leader you can turn this into a valuable learning experience. This is a Participative Captaincy style.

Involve Your Team

You can avoid leading your crew up the wrong path (with your possibly incorrect Expectancy and Bias) by actively involving them in the Judgement and Decision Making.

You should encourage them to provide additional information and encourage input to Define The Problem and assist in formulating a solution to the agreed problem. They are “Sold” on the problem/solution and since they have been involved, they have a personal “Ownership” of the problem/solution.

A crew with this agreement and concurrence will be far more effective, motivated and willing to assist you than a crew that has the problem and solution “imposed” on them, with little personal input.

So be careful not to introduce YOUR Expectations and YOUR Bias and integrate your crew and team in your Judgement and Decision Making process. It will make your job easier.

Judgement & Decision Making (Part 6 - Define The Problem)

2008-06-06T22:50:00.009+10:00

This is the sixth of a series of articles which will look at Command Judgement and Decision Making. Part 5 - Recognition is here.

Each part needs to be read in the sequential order presented, as this is the way I believe you mentally go about using your judgement to make a decision. There is no point in reading Part 6 before Part 5.

Define The Problem
Your senses will have gathered the “raw data” and that will get condensed by your sensory filters. It will then penetrate your consciousness and you will recognise that information. This recognised data will then be further filtered by your perception of the situation.

(Click on the image).

Now you must ensure that your perception of the problem is in fact correct. You need to Define The Problem.

A problem well defined frequently suggests its’ own solution.

If you don’t know where you are going, every road leads you to there. (Lewis Caroll)

A problem well stated is a problem half solved. (John Dewey)

You do this by gathering and seeking extra information or raw data to either confirm your initial diagnosis or for you to realise that your initial perceived problem was incorrect. This extra information/data may come from your internal senses or from external sources such as your F/O, other Crew members, Company publications or policy, ATC, Engineers, Operational staff, other aircraft etc. (i.e. your “extended team” members).

Gathering further supporting information to assist in Defining The Problem is one of the very first steps in the CLEAR, DODAR, GRADE, SOCS and DECIDE, decision making Models.

Selling & Ownership

Once you have Defined The Problem you have to “Sell” it to your crew (involve them, get them to agree that this is in fact the problem) and engender a feeling of “Ownership” of the problem (they feel that they have been concerned with the assessment of the problem and so have some control over their actions and destiny). If you can “Sell” the problem and your crew has this feeling of “Ownership” they will willingly be active at solving the problem and highly motivated. Contrast this with a crew who has had the problem and solution “imposed” upon them by an Autocratic Captain. This crew will be less co-operative, less motivated and less willing and helpful – a less effective team.

A function of your Leadership is to involve your team members, build support and enable contribution from your team members. It makes your overall job easier, more proficient and less stressful.

Symptom Vs Problem

What appears to be a problem may be just a symptom of a larger underlying problem. There is no point in curing the “surface” symptom and then leaving the underlying “deeper” problem unresolved.

Since all problems have solutions, it’s critical that you define your problems correctly. If you don’t, you might solve the wrong problem. (Jack Foster)

An example: If you are unlucky enough to get a Cargo Fire/Smoke warning indication inflight, is the real problem the fire/smoke or is it getting on the ground ASAP? If you punch in the fire extinguisher and complete the checklist actions have you actually solved your problem or just fixed the symptom?

Ask yourself “Is this “surface problem” masking a “deeper” more important problem?”

How You Define The Problem

How you Define The Problem will quite often influence how you arrive at the solution.

The solution to a problem changes the nature of the problem. (John Peers)

For example: If the weather at your destination is poor and deteriorating, is the problem “The weather is poor” or is it “We may not have enough fuel to hold and do the approach”? How you define this problem will dictate your solution. Solution 1 may be “We will do a Cat 2/3 approach and Autoland”. Solution 2 may be “We will hold and attempt an approach until this time or this amount of fuel remaining, then we will divert.”

If you get stuck Defining The Problem you may have to start the Judgement and Decision Making process from the start again. Your definition of the problem can either make it CLEAR to your team or will CONFUSE them.

If a problem has no solution, it may not be a problem, but a fact, not to be solved, but to be coped with over time.

To solve the problem, you may have to redefine it. (Jeff Chase)

It isn't that they can't see the solution. It's that they can't see the problem. (G. K. Chesterton)

Be careful that you as the Captain don’t define the problem in such a way that the decision and solution is implied.

For example: “The HYD system has failed.” This implies that the solution is to turn off the affected HYD system. But, what if it is an indication problem and the HYD system is in fact operating normally? You have missed the opportunity to correctly diagnose the problem by utilising the co-operation and expertise of your other crew members. You will probably get it right most of the time – but is this good enough? Why not increase your chances of getting it right by using your entire team.

Those Really Tricky Problems

If it is a novel, unusual, complex and ambiguous problem you might have extreme difficulty in Defining The Problem. It may be beyond your team’s resources, time available, workload, stress and brain power.

You might be reduced to generalising and defining the problem as “I don’t know what is causing this (...insert unusual problem indications here...), but we need to get on the ground ASAP”. While you don’t define the actual problem, you do eventually formulate an acceptable solution to not solve it, but eliminate or mitigate it (“Let’s land and run away!)

There will never be the ONE RIGHT, PERFECT solution. Don’t become paralysed by trying to Define The Problem to such an extent that you do nothing. Often you will have to Satisfice – take the closest, best option. You may not know the true problem and it may not be the optimal solution... but it’s good enough.

Sometimes getting your arse on the ground AND then worrying about the Problem is a good option.

Remain Problem Centred

Focus initially on being Problem Centred and not being Solution Centred.

Gain extra information to accurately Define The Problem. If you are Solution Centred you will often entirely skip this step and jump straight to the Decision and Action stage.

When the only tool you own is a hammer, every problem begins to resemble a nail. (Abraham Maslow)

Skipping this vital step of correctly Defining The Problem by remaining Problem Centred, often results in failing to identify the real problem. As a result you will solve the wrong problem (or just solve a symptom of the real problem) and leave the real problem festering waiting to catch you out.

You may even have to disengage yourself from the Problem/Solution process and take a “Mental Step Back” to look at the Big Picture and update your SA. You might then notice or take in some other more important information which may help you to more correctly Define The Problem.

Summary

Involve your crew and team and get them contributing (after all that’s what CRM is all about). “Sell” the problem to them and enable them to take “Ownership” of the problem.

There is no point in defining the incorrect problem and them making a decision and solving that wrong problem. It is essential that you take the time and effort to correctly Define The Problem.

See also Expectancy & Bias as these two factors can influence how you Define The Problem.

Judgement & Decision Making (Part 7 - Risk) is here.

This is only MY attempt at analysing Judgement and Decision Making – I’m just a professional aviator, not a psychologist so my thoughts may not conform with academia, but it is based on a real pilot’s perspective. What would you rather have; a psychologist explaining aviation or an aviator explaining psychology?

I welcome any feedback about this article. Please add YOUR pilot input (or if any psychologists read this, your thoughts) by using the COMMENTS link below.

Balancing The Risk

2008-05-27T15:21:00.013+10:00

This a series of articles about Risk, which are a part of Command Judgement and Decision Making (Risk Introduction - Part 7 is here)

First reckon, then risk. (Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke)

One way to envisage your role as the primary Risk Manager is to use the analogy of weighing the risks and the opportunities on a set of balance scales. You’ve probably heard of “Balancing The Risk” and this discussion will explore what is meant by that phrase.

(Click on the diagrams for a larger view).

No Risk

On one side of the balance scales is the No Risk option.

This can also be characterized by potential Safety (benefits – desirable) and Low Opportunity (costs – undesirable).

In this region there is little gain, but also little risk. You may be missing some valuable opportunities on this side of the equation and a less efficient operation normally results.

If you are a Risk Aversive person (i.e. you personally avoid risk whenever possible) you will heavily weigh this side of the scales.

Whenever the Balance Of Risk is tipped to this side you will be in a Risk Aversive situation.

High Risk

On the other side of the balance scales is the High Risk option.

This can also be characterized by potential Danger (costs – undesirable) and High Opportunity (benefits – desirable).

In this region you can achieve big gains, but at the possible expense of elevated risk. You might obtain significant, valuable opportunities but you also face the threat of “crashing and burning” if it does not turn out correctly.

If you are a Risk Taker type of person (i.e. you readily accept risk if possible) you will heavily weigh down this opposite side of the scales.

Whenever the Balance Of Risk is tipped to this opposite side you will be in a High Risk, possibly Gambling situation.

Risk Neutral

When the scales are “balanced” you have weighed the benefits against the costs – No Risk against High Risk, Safety against Danger and Low Opportunity against High Opportunity.

We accept risk on an “assumed risk” basis because there is a potential benefit or opportunity to be gained. The rewards are now worth the risk.

You are now “Balancing The Risk” and the scales are centred on the Risk Neutral region.

Balancing The Risk

Weighing up the options or calculating your Risk Assessment and getting the scales centred on the Risk Neutral region is the main aim of Risk Management. You will be required to assess risk and determine the possible negative costs and balance them against the potential positive benefits.

Notice that both the No Risk and the High Risk sides both have simultaneous positive (benefits) and negative (costs) characteristics. On the No Risk side there is Safety (positive, a benefit), but also Low Opportunity (negative, a cost). On the High Risk side there is Danger (negative, a cost) and also High Opportunity (positive, a benefit).

This Risk Neutral region is where opportunity and risk interconnect and engage. It is where the risk being accepted meets the requirements. The positive benefits are balanced with the negative costs. If you can manage this you are “Balancing The Risk”.

Risk Neutral can at times be a fine balancing act; just enough risk – but not too little or not too much.

The Individual’s Risk Neutral Position

Different People

Each different individual person will have their own singular personal “risk thresholds” depending on their self-confidence, experience, knowledge and personality. Some people may tend to be more Risk Aversive and others will be Risk Takers.

If you are a Risk Aversive person your individual, personal perceived Risk Neutral region will tend towards the No Risk, Safety, Low Opportunity side. If you are more of a Risk Taker then your individual, personal perceived Risk Neutral region will tend towards the High Risk, Danger, High Opportunity side. Have an awareness of your personal “risk threshold” so that you can factor this into your Risk Assessment and Management.

You Personally

Your individual Risk Neutral region may alter and vary depending on your personal physical and emotional state.

If you are fatigued (and you recognise this state) you may elect to be a little more conservative and Risk Aversive to counter that fatigued state. If you get pissed off and angry you may tend to be more aggressive and become more of a Risk Taker (“I’ll show them...”).

Your own personal individual Risk Neutral region may tend towards No Risk or High Risk and is constantly changing (usually within a narrow “risk comfort” band).

Summary

Use the “balance scale” analogy to envisage how you will manage the risk of your flights. Allow for the different "risk thresholds" which will result in different Risk Neutral positions (the "risk comfort level") of the members of your crew. Recognise that your own Risk Neutral position will vary depending on the circumstances and your emotional state.

When you do your Risk Management and Balance the Risk into the Risk Neutral area you should always try to keep it on an even keel.

Risk & Your Command Course

2008-05-26T07:24:00.007+10:00

During your training you will not only have to Balance The Risk as a part of your normal role as the Captain but you’ll also have to balance your own “Command Training” Risk.

Your Risk “Attitude”

Some Command Trainee’s attitudes towards risk while undergoing a Command Course is to be extremely Risk Aversive for fear of “failing”, or making a cock-up, or because they lack confidence. They become constrained by conservatism and as a result sink to become the “lowest common denominator”.

By doing this they remain well and truly within their Comfort Zone. They are fearful of taking a calculated risk and pushing themselves into their Learning Zone.

As a general rule you will probably be a little conservative and Risk Aversive during your Command Course and during the first 12 months after successfully completing the Command Course.

As your confidence, experience and expertise grows, you will naturally tend to tolerate greater risk. Your Risk Neutral region will tend towards the High Risk, High Opportunity side. You probably have much greater self-confidence and are more aware of the true nature of your abilities and skills and so can confidently handle more difficult, higher risk (and higher opportunity) situations. This doesn’t mean that you are all of a sudden more risky – it just means that you are balancing the higher risk, higher opportunity with increased and improved skills and confidence.

A better way to look at it may be that instead of becoming more of a Risk Taker, you are becoming less of a Risk Aversive Commander.

Take A Risk

This taking a calculated and balanced Risk while on your Command Course is part of the “teaching” and learning process. I personally encourage my Trainees to “take a risk”; to try something new, novel or unusual or something rarely encountered during Line flying.

I also point out to my Trainees that if they make a mistake to treat it as a powerful learning experience, not as a failure. It is only ever a failure if you don’t learn from the experience. Besides, it is better to make a mistake during Training rather than on a Check.

You must accept that you might fail; then, if you do your best and still don't win, at least you can be satisfied that you've tried. If you don't accept failure as a possibility, you don't set high goals, and you don't branch out, you don't try – you don't take the risk. (Rosalynn Carter)

You've got to take the initiative and play your game...confidence makes the difference. (Chris Evert)

One of the reasons people stop learning is that they become less and less willing to risk failure. John W. Gardner

Discuss this with your Trainer as each individual Trainer will have different views on this.

Push Yourself

After all you want to get the best possible training and push yourself towards high opportunity, but not unduly stuff up or be overly conservative by retreating backwards to low opportunity.

Life isn't worth living unless you're willing to take some big chances and go for broke. (Eliot Wiggington)

During your training you also will have to do some Command Course Risk Assessment and Management and so Balance The “Command Training” Risk. (Maybe walking a tightrope over a huge chasm is a better analogy!?)

Nobody said it would be easy!

The Four Essential “Rules Of Risk”

2008-05-24T07:12:00.014+10:00

This a series of articles about Risk, which are a part of Command Judgement and Decision Making (Risk Introduction - Part 7 is here)

If you apply the following Four Essential “Rules Of Risk” you will become a far more effective Risk Manager and Captain.

In addition, these “Rules” will assist, guide and help you to exercise good judgment and formulate sound decisions.

1. Do not accept unnecessary risk.

The key word in this rule is “unnecessary”. An unnecessary risk is any risk that if taken, will not contribute meaningfully to your flights’ accomplishment. Captains who take unnecessary risk are probably gambling with crew and passenger lives.

Aviation is by its’ very nature an inherently risky business. You face and accept risk all the time, whether you realize it or not.

You need to be constantly Balancing The Risk – achieving the “Risk Neutral” state, which is not overly “safe” (low opportunities) and not overly “dangerous” (high opportunities).

There is no advantage to accepting a course of action that results in a new, increased or unjustifiable risk if there are no meaningful benefits to be derived.

Risk should not be greater than the undertaking.

If it is not worth doing safely, then it is probably not worth doing at all.

Risk properly managed is acceptable.
2. Accept risk when the benefits outweigh the costs.

Nothing in aviation is risk free and we choose certain options that contain an element of risk because there is an opportunity or benefit to be gained. This needs to be balanced against the probability of the occurrence and the possible costs or severity of the risk.

Again you need to be Balancing The Risk. You walk the fine line of being either too risk aversive (low opportunity, but possibly overly safe) or being too risky (high opportunity, but possibly dangerous).

If you are faced with a difficult decision, ask yourself “When is the success of the task not worth the risk?”

3. Make Risk Decisions At The Appropriate Level.

What is the right level? It is the level where the decision maker has the experience and maturity to make a good decision.

Normally, this is the Captain’s job as most times you cannot defer or transfer your risk management duties due to time constraints or a lack of resources.

However, you don’t need to make all the hard decisions solely yourself. You can involve other external agencies (e.g. Aircraft Engineering Specialists, Dispatchers, Fleet Managers, Operations Managers or whoever has Operational Control of your Airlines’ aircraft). The real trick is to assign the risk accountability at the lowest possible level i.e. to the person closest to the action with the best SA, knowledge of the situation and experience.

Remember that ultimately the buck stops with you. As the Captain you are the final authority and are responsible for the safe operation and conduct of the flight.

4. Integrate Risk Management Into Planning And Execution At All Levels.

Risk management is an integral part of the planning and execution of flight operations.

You need to constantly be assessing, managing and balancing risk during all phases of flight. This includes pre-flight, in-flight and post-flight.

Risk management is an important part of the Captain’s role and you need to involve your entire team at all levels – both on the ground and in the air. This entire “team” includes not only your flight and cabin crew, but ground engineers, dispatchers, operations personnel, ATC, airline management and cargo loading, passenger handling and traffic ground staff.

The Nature Of Risk

2008-05-20T17:41:00.010+10:00

This a series of articles about Risk, which are a part of Command Judgement and Decision Making (Risk Introduction - Part 7 is here)

Is aviation a risky business?

Definitely – but that doesn’t stop us from going flying.

Consider the following statements;

Everything we do has some sort of risk (high, low or neutral) associated with it.

Life is risk.

The only people without risk are six feet under.

Risk is required to get things done.

We accept risk on an “assumed risk” basis because there is a potential benefit or opportunity to be gained.

Where there is no risk there is usually no opportunity.

Success at a risk-free endeavour is impossible.

He who risks nothing, gets nothing. (French Proverb)

Risk & Safety

You may have heard the phase “safety is paramount” (i.e. safety comes above and before all else). If that were truly the case we would be out of a job, as we would never go flying. There will always be an element of risk in anything we do (including aviation), but just because there is some form of risk does not mean that we will not attempt it. We obviously want to minimise risk or even eliminate it if possible. Our usual strategy in the aviation game is to be as safe as possible.

Being safe usually does not eliminate risk – it only reduces it.
That is where you, the Captain, come in. One of your primary goals, tasks and jobs is to constantly be a Risk Assessor and Risk Manager and to Balance The Risk that you have elected to take on, to maximise the safe, legal and efficient outcome of your flight. This Risk Management role will often dictate the decisions that you make. You will be required to decide if you, or your crew, engage in risky behaviour or activities and when, where and how much assumed risk you take on. This will have to be assessed based on your desired goals and plans.

Pilots can be “Dangerously Safe”. This is another way of saying they are extremely Risk Aversive and do not willing accept risk or will avoid risk no matter how minor. These dangerously safe pilots usually miss out on the benefits and opportunities associated with taking a considered and calculated Risk Assessment. They usually frustrate the hell out of their other crew members, as the other person cannot understand why they are not accepting some risk to achieve a better outcome.

Safety in our aviation system depends, to a great extent, upon the amount of control we exercise over our choices to take risks. (Richard S. Jensen).

Human Centred Risk

Most pilots associate risk with external factors; the weather, environment, aircraft serviceability, ATC, terrain, traffic etc.

However, risk can also be associated with internal, “human” factors. Risk is very often human centred – it is YOU!

Do you ever look at yourself as a “risk”? Poor Decision Making, lack of judgement, uncurrent, ill-disciplined, not prepared, fatigued, frustrated, lack of knowledge, emotional (both positive and negative emotions).

Often it is these “humanity” aspects that are risky. You can also gain or lose in the humanity stakes.

You may be worried about being late, not being promoted, being embarrassed, getting reprimanded. You may need to, satisfy your need to be valued, feed your ego, fulfil other’s expectations, be seen as competent, to achieve a personal convenient outcome or be accepted by your peers and/or superiors. You may want to get home, gain or avoid a financial advantage/disadvantage, seek enjoyment or thrills. You may be personally, over/under confident, happy, sad, frustrated, angry or be Risk Aversive or a Risk Taker.

These human factors also have positive and negative opportunities and outcomes and these are the human motivators that may affect what types of risk you accept. These “human” factor risks could be seen as illogical and irrational and have no place in aviation Risk Assessment and Management. But you (and your crew) ARE human and therefore you WILL be affected by these humanity risk factors.

The Weakest & Strongest Link

Accident and incident reports have time and again shown that pilots are very often the weakest link in the accident or incident chain (or in other words, the highest risk factor) and could be considered to be the weakest link in the chain of events. So you and your team are a risk factor that you will have to consider.

But accidents or incidents are the negative outcomes of possibly poor or inadequate Judgement and Decision Making. They are also an extremely tiny minority of the millions of flights that are undertaken.

The vast majority of flights will have a successful outcome. And one of the reasons for this overwhelmingly successful rate is the complex and correct (not always optimal, but nevertheless correct and safe) Judgement and Decision making that the human element (you) of aviation makes continually on every flight. We pilots are irreplaceable (at least at the moment!), as computers and machines cannot match our flexibility, deductive, analytical and decision making abilities in rapidly changing, complex, volatile and ambiguous situations. So you could also be considered to be the strongest link in the chain of events.

As the Captain you are the Leader, the primary Decision Maker and Risk Assessor and Manager. You will most likely determine if you and your team are the weakest or the strongest link on any particular flight. Hopefully you will favour your strengths and work on improving your weaknesses.

The Bottom Line

At the end of the day we all just want to go home, see our significant other and ankle biters and have a beer (BBQ optional). A smoking hole is not a good option.

Be the best Risk Assessor and Manager that you can be and Balance The Risk so that you can have that beer.

Risk Definitions

2008-05-20T16:50:00.010+10:00

This a series of articles about Risk, which are a part of Command Judgement and Decision Making (Risk Introduction - Part 7 is here)

The following are definitions that will be used throughout the other Risk articles.

Hazard

Any current real or potential condition that can overtly or covertly lead to or contribute to an unplanned or undesired event.

A hazard is the SOURCE of risk.

A hazard is always a PRESENT event – it is what is happening or affecting you right now.

Risk

The probability and severity of a loss linked to a hazard that is not adequately controlled or eliminated.

Risk is always a FUTURE event – the hazard has yet to occur or be experienced. Risk is a potential hazard.

Risk Formula

You will never be able to accurately quantify the product of the various risk factors (at least not in flight when you will definitely lack the time, resources and brain power).

The Risk Formula is a guide for you to “estimate” or assess the risk of a particular situation when you do your Risk Assessment, with the limited information available to you, the lack of resources and the time constraints imposed on you in-flight.

RISK = SEVERITY x PROBABILITY x EXPOSURE
Severity is the extent of a possible loss. The severity lies in a range from a slight, minor loss to a catastrophic, total loss.

Probability is the likelihood that a hazard will or could potentially cause a loss.

Exposure is the amount of times an event (usually a repeated event) occurs, or the length of time an event is experienced.

Risk Assessment

The detection of hazards and the application of “measurement” to the level of risk that they represent (see Risk Formula).

Risk Management

The process of defining and controlling risk.

A major function of your role as the Captain.

Risk Neutral

Where the risk being accepted meets the requirements of the desired action.

Low Risk is low opportunity and may be overly “safe”.

High Risk is high opportunity and may be overly “dangerous”.

Risk Neutral is somewhere between these two extremes and is dependant on the actual situation and your perception of the risk involved.

Balancing The Risk

Risk Assessment and Management such that a Risk Neutral situation is obtained for the current situation. Read about Balancing The Risk here.

Gambling

Proceeding with little or no Risk Management process.

Usually associated with taking unnecessary chances as a result of poor or no judgement and unnecessary risk. Safety is usually degraded.

Judgement & Decision Making (Part 7 - Risk)

2008-05-20T16:38:00.013+10:00

This is the seventh of a series of articles which will look at Command Judgement and Decision Making. (Part 6 - Define The Problem) is here.

Each part needs to be read in the sequential order presented, as this is the way I believe you mentally go about using your judgement to make a decision. There is no point in reading Part 7 before Part 6.

Risk
Risk is a big subject.

A big, complicated subject that, whether you like it or not, YOU as the Captain have to have a “firm, slippery grip” on. One of your prime jobs as the Captain is to be a Risk Assessor and a Risk Manager and you have to be adept at Balancing The Risk.

(Click over on the image for a larger view).

Risk Management is an essential step in the Judgement and Decision Making model being explained here. Risk and your perception of it is a major factor in applying your Judgement to reach a sound and safe decision.

To make this big dry and, at times tedious, subject a little more palatable I’ll break it down into smaller risk components. Just follow the links below to get to the indicated subjects.

Ensure you read Risk Definitions first as all the other articles will use these basic definitions.

It is probably best if you read all of the subjects and not just the ones that interest you, as the separate individual risk subjects are part of a whole – like a jigsaw puzzle. The whole is definitely more than the sum of the individual components.

Risk Definitions

The Nature Of Risk

The Four Essential "Rules Of Risk"

Balancing The Risk

Risk assessment

Part 8 - The Decision is here.

This is only MY attempt at analysing Judgement and Decision Making – I’m just a professional aviator, not a psychologist so my thoughts may not conform with academia, but it is based on a real pilot’s perspective. What would you rather have; a psychologist explaining aviation or an aviator explaining psychology?

I welcome any feedback about this article. Please add YOUR pilot input (or if any psychologists read this, your thoughts) by using the COMMENTS link below.

Judgement & Decision Making (Part 4 - Perception)

2008-05-20T02:03:00.016+10:00

This is the fourth of a series of articles which will look at Command Judgement and Decision Making. (Part 3 – Sense Filters) is here.

Each part needs to be read in the sequential order presented, as this is the way I believe you mentally go about using your Judgement to make a decision. There is no point in reading Part 5 before Part 4

Perception

We receive vast amounts of information via our senses and a large portion of this information is physiologically filtered so that we can digest, process and make sense of that information and not be over-whelmed once it gets to our brain.

(Click on the image for a bigger view).

That’s the physiological filtering process. Once that relatively “raw data” (reality) gets to our brain it goes through another cognitive filtering process of perception. This perception is very important in this discussion on Judgement and Decision Making as in this step of the Judgement model the potential for errors is greatly increased. This “perception filtered”, modified information is your unique, individual “perceived reality” and this is what you use to make sense of the world and what is happening to you. This perceived reality is what you use in your Judgement and Decision Making process.

Definitions

While there are many different definitions of Reality and Perception, for the purposes of this discussion we’ll simplify both of them to suit our aviation environment.

Reality

Reality is what is really, actually happening.

You determine reality by sensing the “raw data” that is detected by your human sense organs. We will consider that the incoming raw data is identical for everyone (this is not strictly true as the raw data gets filtered slightly by each individual’s physiological sense filters and so the data that eventually ends up being sensed is slightly different for each person).

Perceived Reality

Your individual perceived reality is what you “think” is happening.

You determine your individual perceived reality by sensing the raw data and then “interpreting” this raw data. This perceived reality may be correct or incorrect depending on your interpretation. This is your understanding of “reality” and this is what is “real” and unique for you.

Most of the time one person’s perceived reality will be very similar (sometimes almost identical) to another person’s who is receiving that same raw data – but not always.

Perceived Reality is your unique, individual understanding of what is happening to you in the world.

Filling In The “Blanks”

One of the reasons for the difference between reality and perceived reality is that a major function of your human sensory system is to reduce and order the vast amount of data that your sense organs receive (physiological filter) so that you can process this information, “understand” it and react accordingly.

Sometimes this raw data is not understood correctly or doesn’t make sense (in your own mind). There are often “blank” areas in the information and you tend to try and “fill in the blanks”. The blanks are filled with what you “think” (correctly or incorrectly) is required so that your perceived reality agrees with how you “think” the world should be. There is often a discrepancy between what you perceive to be true (your perceived reality) and actual reality.

This discrepancy and the filling in of the blanks is potentially (and usually) where a major number of errors can be introduced into the Judgement and Decision Making system.

These blanks are filled in based on your previous experience, expectancy, assumption and bias. Your individual perception is heavily influenced by mood, emotions, personality, mental state (e.g. rested or fatigued), beliefs, values, culture (both organizational and national), knowledge, preparation, morals, social norms, “facts” (as you understand them), attitude and motivation.

Most of your created perceived reality occurs unconsciously, without thought. However, if you recognize that you are doing this, you can consciously alter your thought pattern and possibly introduce more “rational” and “logical” thinking. This is probably the first step in the Judgement and Decision Making model that you can pause and confirm if your expectations, assumptions and/or thought processes are “correct” and “agree” with reality (as you understand it).

These individual influences are why two people who receive identical raw data each reach different conclusions, act on that information differently or come up with dissimilar decisions. Their perceived reality is different even though the received raw data was identical.

Sensory Illusions

Most of the senses we have looked at in previous chapters are also subject to certain illusions (or an erroneous perception of reality). Our human senses have evolved and adapted to an earth-based frame of reference and they can be very dangerous if we rely exclusively upon then in our 3 dimensional, multi “G” aviation environment.

You’re probably familiar with most of the common aviation sensory illusions. If not have a look at Sensory Illusions In Aviation for a more comprehensive description.

If you rely upon these false illusions detected by your sensors then you will ultimately reach or formulate false or incorrect decisions based on those false perceptions of reality (garbage in – garbage out).

Individual “Reality”

This perception filter and trying to make the world fit in to your way of thinking (your perceived reality) is why two pilots sitting side by side, receiving the exact same raw data from the PFD, ND, instruments, radios, inter-personal interaction etc. can sometimes perceive two very different situations. The same raw data (reality) is received but different perceived realities are individually experienced.

One pilot may perceive that you are high on descent profile and the other low. One safe and the other dangerous, good/bad, Go/No Go, fast/slow, early/late, acceptable/unacceptable.

Your training in your particular Airline and your Airline’s SOPs or NPs go a long way to keep the crew’s perceived reality as similar as possible. That’s one of the main functions of our very standardized professional lives – to minimize misconceptions and misunderstandings and have very similar perceived realities between crew. The same raw data means the same thing to each of us and so our perceived realities are usually extremely similar.

Summary

Judgement and Decision Making is driven entirely by your perceived reality NOT actual reality.
We tend to fill in the blanks to compensate for missing information after our sense organs relay the raw data to our brain. This difference in perceived reality is why two different pilots will come up with two different answers or a dissimilar decision when faced with exactly the same raw data. This perceptual filter is where potential errors are often introduced.

As we shall see later Judgement is fuelled by perceived risk and NOT real risk. But more on risk after looking at the next chapter – Recognition.

Judgement and Decision Making (Part 5 – Recognition).

This is only MY attempt at analysing Judgement and Decision Making – I’m just a professional aviator, not a psychologist so my thoughts may not conform with academia, but it is based on a real pilot’s perspective. What would you rather have; a psychologist explaining aviation or an aviator explaining psychology?

I welcome any feedback about this article. Please add YOUR pilot input (or if any psychologists read this, your thoughts) by using the COMMENTS link below.

The Lighter Side Of Command

2008-04-29T20:51:00.008+10:00

You need to relax and chill out sometimes – especially if you’re suffering the grind of the training sausage machine. So here are a few funny videos and web pages.

John Cleese and Graham Chapman displaying exemplary aviation Command Presence, Leadership, CRM and PA etiquette.

How your cabin safety PAs should be given.

Helicopters impersonating jets - a funny 3 SQN RNZAF "music" video clip.

A peaceful day's fishing on the lake

Aviation Humour by Pilotfriend.

When Pilots Get Bored

If you know of any others, add the web page or link in the COMMENTS below.

Why Did You Get Into Aviation In The First Place?

2008-04-24T18:10:00.004+10:00

NOTE: This diatribe is a little off topic – but I think every aviator should revisit the thoughts expressed here every so often to have a much needed reality check - especially TRAINERS!

Why did you get into aviation in first place?

Was it for the sheer joy and thrill of flying? Did you make model aircraft as a kid, join the Air Cadets, do any crappy job on your school holidays just so you could scrape together the “astronomical fortune” to afford a few flying lessons? Did you hang out at airfields just so you could watch airplanes take off and land?

Did you have your head well and truly in the clouds?

Almost everyone I know of in this fickle aviation game initially got into it because they WANTED to. There were no other options. Flying was their motivation, their goal, their burning desire.

Can you remember what it was like when you first soloed? Your first cross country navigation exercise? Your first aviation job (well maybe that one is not a pleasant memory – but it was a stepping stone towards your future goal(s), right)?

Unfortunately, a lot of pilots in today’s business, economic driven Aviation Industry have forgotten why they got into aviation in the first place. Airline Aviation especially can become “sterile”, passionless, boring, tedious – it can become just another job, just another pay check to pay the bills and keep the family in the luxury (or poverty) they are accustomed to.

This way of thinking is entirely up to you. You do have a choice about whether you feel good about your job (or more correctly, your profession) or not.

I choose to enjoy every flight I go aloft on. I still look forward to going flying, the challenges and skills, the joy of aviation. I still smile, I still feel good about myself and I take pride in being a professional, safe and proficient aviator.

So if you find yourself getting stressed out, pissed off, hassled, just RELAX, SMILE, ENJOY yourself. You’ll be less stressed out and will learn better.

TRAINERS TAKE NOTE!!!
As a further reminder of how much fun flying can be check out The Inner Art Of Airmanship and Great Aviation Quotes (both by Dave English).

You really do need to have a reality check every once in a while.

Judgement & Decision Making (Part 5 - Recognition)

2008-04-24T17:20:00.010+10:00

This is the fifth of a series of articles which will look at Command Judgement and Decision Making. (Part 4 – Perception) is here.

Each part needs to be read in the sequential order presented, as this is the way I believe you mentally go about using your judgement to make a decision. There is no point in reading Part 5 before Part 4.

Recognition
The story so far…

We sense a massive amount of a variety of inputs using both our near and far senses. These sensory inputs are “filtered” by our brains, usually entirely unconsciously, to prevent sensory overload. This filtering process goes through two stages. The first is our “physiological sensory filter” where the raw data is filtered by our sensory system. The second (and possibly more important due to the potential to introduce errors into the Judgement and Decision Making process) is our “perception filter” where we view the world as we think it is (perceived reality) and not as it actually is (reality).

(Click on...you know what to do).

The next step in the Judgment chain is to RECOGNISE, have an awareness of, or a realisation, that this sensed information is relevant, important and something that we should or need to take notice of. Sounds a bit like Situational Awareness doesn’t it?

As we discussed in Recognise & React, without recognition there can be no reaction. If you do not recognise that the incoming sensory information is relevant, then the Judgement and Decision Making process ends right there, and you are usually quite oblivious that you have missed an important fact or significant sign.

Remember that you can only make accurate and correct decisions with accurate and correct information. Garbage In – Garbage Out. This “perceived” information is what you use your Judgement on to arrive at a decision.

Improving Recognition

That’s all well and good – but how do you improve your recognition skills?

Recognise & React has some pointers on how to increase and improve your situational recognition skills. So have a read of that article.

Experience is also a big factor in being able to recognise pointers that a particular situation is developing. Experience is one of the biggest differences between Experts and Novices. Experts have a much larger and more richly developed “knowledge bank” of past experiences and situations (both personal and through discussing things with others) to draw upon and so are normally able to spot impending problems or situations well before a Novice. Usually Experts are able to say to themselves “I’ve seen this before…and this is what I need to do to deal with it”. If it is a problem situation they may even be able to think “I’ve seen these signs developing before…before it gets any worse I’m going to do this…” The really good Experts are…well expert…at recognising developing situations and being proactive to sort any problems out early before they increase in scope to major hassles.

You are most likely in the category of “Novice Captain” and you may miss recognising things that your Training Captain will easily spot while under training. To build up your individual “knowledge bank” and vicariously increase your personal experience, talk now with your current Captains, discuss scenarios with your peers and play out “what if…” scenarios to their logical conclusion. Try to focus on the first warning signs that you can recognise that something is occurring.

Like they say “forewarned is forearmed”. The earlier that you are able to recognise a situation, the more likely and more successfully you will react to and resolve it.

Recognition of signs or a situation is probably the second conscious step in the whole Judgement and Decision Making process (after Perception). What you do after you have recognised a developing situation is the subject of further riveting articles – so stay tuned (we’ll get there eventually!)

Judgement and Decision Making (Part 6 – Define The Problem)

This is only MY attempt at analysing Judgement and Decision Making – I’m just a professional aviator, not a psychologist so my thoughts may not conform with academia, but it is based on a real pilot’s perspective. What would you rather have; a psychologist explaining aviation or an aviator explaining psychology?

I welcome any feedback about this article. Please add YOUR pilot input (or if any psychologists read this, your thoughts) by using the COMMENTS link below.

Command “Experience”

2008-04-24T12:38:00.006+10:00

Wouldn’t it be great if you could just transfer all your First Officer experience straight into the Left Seat and then you wouldn’t need any Command Training?

Nice thought, but it doesn’t happen that way!

Command requires a different skill set from those that you are currently employing as a First Officer. Some skills are directly transferable (e.g. flying the aircraft) and others will have to be learnt or refined to suit the new requirements of Command (e.g. Leadership).

So how can you build up your Command “Experience” while you are serving your apprenticeship in the Right Seat?

It’s pretty easy(?). You’ve got to learn to teach yourself or, in other words, conduct Self Directed Learning. You can gain a lot of experience through learning from others, and more specifically the Captains you are currently flying with. If you are really lucky you can get yourself a mentor to guide you as you learn the ropes.

It has been said that "experience is the best teacher". Sometimes, the price of experience is too dear. It is seldom sufficient and it always takes too long to accumulate. Experience can be gained much faster and more efficiently if it is gleaned deliberately through training. Experience is a very valuable and important asset that can form a vital component of a thorough knowledge base. Whether acquired personally or vicariously from others, it can be a powerful weapon in the arsenal of wisdom. (Richard S. Jensen - Pilot Judgement and Crew Resource Management)

To add to that quote:

Learn from the mistakes of others - you won't live long enough to make them all yourself.

Experience is something you get just after you actually need it.

Start building your Command “Experience” early in your career as an F/O. Then when you come to do your Command Course for real it will seem “easy”.

Judgement & Decision Making (Part 3 - Sense Filters)

2008-04-10T01:20:00.010+10:00

This is the third of a series of articles which will look at Command Judgement and Decision Making. (Part 2 - Senses is here).

Each part needs to be read in the sequential order presented, as this is the way I believe you mentally go about using your judgement to make a decision. There is no point in reading Part 3 before Part 2.

Sense Filters
Our senses (both the “Far Senses” and the “Near Senses”) continually bombard our brain with massive quantities of sensory information.

Vision provides about 80% of our sensory input and our eyes are capable of sending to the brain about 1,000,000,000 messages every second. Add to this the auditory information that you receive from hearing and taste, smells, tactile information, inputs from your vestibular system and the other senses. It all adds up to a vast amount of information that you are capable of receiving. This is occurring all the time, every second of your life.

(Click on the image for a larger view.)

So how do we as pilot’s (and humans) process this massive amount of sensory information? The short answer is that we don’t. Your brain can only handle a finite amount of informational processing and it does this by “filtering” out some of the sensory inputs.

What Do You Sense?

I’m guessing that you’re sitting at home reading this on a computer screen. Are you aware of how much pressure is being sensed by your butt as you sit there reading, the position of your left elbow joint, the touch on your skin of your clothes, the temperature and breeze from the air conditioner, your wife asking you to mow the lawn (well, this one is probably best described as selective hearing), traffic noise from outside your study, the rise and fall of your chest as you breathe, the beating of your heart? All of these things are being sensed but you don’t notice them until you force yourself to pay attention to them. How many things in your room can you “see” while you are focussed on reading this blog? You are most likely using your acute central vision to read individual or groups of words in the text and disregarding or “filtering” out your peripheral vision as you concentrate your attention on the reading and comprehension task of this particularly intellectually stimulating diatribe.

The same thing happens whenever you strap your bum to an aircraft and go flying. How often do you consciously register the airflow noise going over the cockpit or smell the individual odour of your particular aircraft’s cockpit? Do you consciously detect the changes in G whenever you do a turn or notice how much pressure is being applied by your right foot? Do you hear the avionics fan(s) whirring in the background or the air flow noise of the air conditioning system? All these things are occurring around you and you are sensing them, but your brain is “filtering” much of these sensory inputs so that you don’t become over-stimulated and overwhelmed.

How It Works

At this “pre-attentive”, filtering stage of sensory data gathering, the raw data is coarsely processed. It is normally very rapid, automatic and occurs without conscious thought. The information is only retained for a fraction of a second and is then lost if the information is not determined to be important – it gets rapidly replaced by other raw data sensory inputs. The raw data is only very basically and coarsely analysed (your vision sense might be unconsciously aware of a small, relatively stationary, white blob out of the corner of your eye, in the periphery of vision – but the meaning of that white blob is unknown). The raw data sensory input has a very large capacity, for example, it can process the entire visual field simultaneously. So if your vision sense “detects” the white blob, but you determine unconsciously and automatically that it is not important (and this occurs rapidly) and thus do not process the information further (and this occurs at a far slower rate and requires conscious thought) you will in effect “forget” about the white blob. The raw data white blob sensory information will be replaced by other raw data and be filtered out of your system.

Filter Effects

What you eventually filter out is to a certain extent learned or gained through experience. You are able to detect your flight’s call sign in amongst the ATC radio chatter while simultaneously conducting a conversation with the other pilot. This is relatively simple for an experienced aviator as you have learned to do this over many years, but for someone else not familiar with aviation radio calls, all the chatter might just be total gibberish and they would be unable to isolate the important stuff (your call sign and the associated message). When the airflow noise over the cockpit is at a “normal” level you don’t even register the sound, but if it became louder (increasing IAS) or quieter (decreasing IAS) you might then start paying attention to it – it has become “unfiltered” and something that you should pay attention to.

What is eventually filtered out is also affected by your emotional (mental) and physical state. Obviously if you are affected by drugs (and these may be normal over the counter drugs if you’re self medicating for a cold or a headache for instance), this can affect your cognitive processing and alter how much sensory information is detected and then subsequently “filtered”. Your emotional state can also influence this filtration. If you are happy, angry, sad, bored or depressed, what gets filtered can be different from other emotional states. The same can occur if you are physically fatigued or tired or are suffering from sleep loss (does this seem familiar to those of you doing Long Haul flights?!).

This sensory “filtering” process is a very individual thing and varies between different pilots, even though they may receive exactly the same “raw data”.

Summary

To exercise good judgement and arrive at a good decision requires good information. We get that information from our senses (both Far and Near), but the raw data is heavily, automatically and unconsciously “filtered” so that we do not suffer from sensory over-load. It is only retained for a fraction of a second and if not important is rapidly replaced by other sensory raw data.

What you do with this sensory raw data is the subject of further articles – so stay tuned.

Judgement & Decision Making (Part 4 - Perception).

This is only MY attempt at analysing Judgement and Decision Making – I’m just a professional aviator, not a psychologist so my thoughts may not conform with academia, but it is based on a real pilot’s perspective. What would you rather have; a psychologist explaining aviation or an aviator explaining psychology?

I welcome any feedback about this article. Please add YOUR pilot input (or if any psychologists read this, your thoughts) by using the COMMENTS link below.

Basic Communication Model

2008-04-03T20:33:00.007+10:00

To be an effective Captain you need to be able to communicate effectively. You have to be able to transfer your thoughts, ideas, plans, decisions and requirements to the other members of your team. You will also have to absorb and understand thoughts, ideas, plans, decisions and requirements from other people. Communication is a two way thing.

To help understand how to effectively communicate we’ll look at a basic model of the communication process.

Message Preparation takes place. This message contains the idea, knowledge, goal, decision, information, intention or opinion. If the message sender is unable to formulate a sensible, coherent and understandable message the remainder of the communication process is useless (GIGO – Garbage In, Garbage Out).

A Transmitter sends the message. This transmitter may be you or another person, a document or publication, an ATC radio message, electronic (ACARS or FMS via a keyboard or MCP/FCU) or a visual marshalling signal.

The transmitter Encodes the message and then sends it. The encoding may take the form of the English language (verbal), it might be an accepted visual signal, PFD word or symbol, correct radio phraseology or written words, usually in a very specific technical aviation jargon in our particular Command case.

The Message Transmission occurs via some sort of Medium. This may be via sound if you are talking face to face with someone, electrical and sound if receiving a radio call via a headset or speaker, purely electrical if using the FMS or visual if looking at a PFD, person or book.

A Receiver intercepts the message. This receiver, like the transmitter, can be another person (the usual case) or may be electronic (e.g. ACARS, a computer or the FMS).

The receiver then Decodes the message. The decoding is the opposite of encoding. Effective decoding relies on the transmitter and receiver using the same encode/decode methodology, language and conventions.

After decoding the receiver carries out Message Interpretation. This is NOT the same as understanding the Transmitter’s intended message; Interpretation is the individual receiver’s perception of the received message (which may or may not be correct).

Effective communication only takes place if after decoding and interpreting, the receiver actually Understands the transmitter’s message. Ineffective communication can take place from the transmitter’s message preparation, through any other part of the Basic Communication Model to the receiver’s message interpretation.

(Click on the images for a larger view).
This is the very basic Communication Model that all forms of communication follow. But, as we have seen communication is a dialogue, a two way process.

Both the transmitter and the receiver are actually combined Transmitter/Receivers and messages are being sent simultaneously in both directions providing Feedback to both the primary transmitter and the primary receiver. This feedback is very important as it one way for the transmitter to ensure that the message has been received, decoded correctly, interpreted correctly and so understood effectively. The intention of the message has been properly conveyed from the transmitter to the receiver.

If you cannot get your message understood effectively you have failed at the communication process. That failure can occur at any stage from the message preparation, transmit, encode, message transmission via the medium, reception, decode and message understanding. The feedback mechanism provides one method for the transmitter to ensure that the message is received and correctly understood.

The communication process is further complicated by Noise. Noise is anything that distorts the message. It can distort or interfere with the transfer of information at any stage from Message Preparation to Message Interpretation and during Feedback. Noise is usually thought of when considering sound, but for the purposes of our discussion it is the interference with any of the different Mediums of communication. For instance, you may not be able to adequately read the PFD or a document if it is bathed in bright sunlight or the display or words are printed incorrectly or illegibly.

By understanding the Basic Communication Model you will be more aware of where the act of communication can potentially breakdown or be degraded. Communication is an essential skill that you require as the Captain.

So practice being the best communicator you can be.

Good Captains and good Leaders are good communicators.

Judgement & Decision Making (Part 2 - Senses)

2008-02-15T15:09:00.016+10:00

This is the second of a series of articles which will look at Command Judgement and Decision Making. (Part 1 - Introduction) is here.

Each part needs to be read in the sequential order presented as this is the way I believe you mentally go about using your Judgement to make a decision. There is no point in reading Part 2 before Part 1.

Senses

Senses are the physiological methods of perception, or how our bodies receive the “raw data” information and then transmit it to our brain.

Why is this important in a discussion on Judgement and Decision Making? Well, to use good Judgement and arrive at a sound decision requires information. To react requires recognition. The senses provide the relatively “unfiltered” raw data at the very beginning of the Judgement process.

We are literally bombarded with sensory inputs throughout our lives and these are detected by a number of different types of human senses (the number varies depending on who you believe and how they define “sense”). For our purposes we will briefly discuss the 5 “Far Senses” that most people are familiar with and 5 “Near Senses” that you may not be totally aware of.

(Click on the image for a larger view. This diagram will build with each additional Part).

Far Senses

The conventional or “classical” five senses are sight, hearing, touch, smell and taste. These are the senses that most people are familiar with and provide most of our sensory information. They are called the “Far Senses” as the information inputs are received from outside the body (external sources).

Sight (Vision)

Sight is the most important sensory input we have as humans and as pilots (it provides about 80% of our sensory information input). Some scientists argue that vision is actually two different senses as we use different receptors to detect colour (frequency) and brightness (amplitude). Also we have two eyeballs, slightly separated, that provide us with stereopsis (the perception of depth). Vision gathers far more information in far less time than any of our other senses (“a picture is worth a thousand words”). Each eye is capable of sending to the brain about 1,000,000,000 bits of information every second.

Hearing (Audition)

Hearing is probably the second most important sense for us. This is an extremely important sense for us to communicate with (other crew members, ATC etc.) and communication is one of your required core skills as a Captain.

Touch (Tactition)

Touch is used to manipulate switches, knobs or dials and to “feel” your control inputs (and their feedback) into the flight control system. You will also be able to detect strange or unusual vibrations through the airframe. It is useful to get your F/O’s attention (when you punch him in the arm, however, this is considered to be poor CRM. Depending on the cockpit gradient you establish and your projection of authority and power you risk getting a tactile response back from him!).

Smell (Olfaction)

Not utilised very much normally, but smell will rapidly get your attention if you detect the “brown smell” of defective electrical equipment, raw Jet A1 or any burning smell. A nice smelling(?) crew meal may also jolt you awake.

Taste (Gustation)

Probably the least important sense for us as pilots (depends on the importance you place on your crew meals and/or what you choose to place in your mouth).

Near Senses

These senses may not be as familiar to you as the Far Senses. These senses are called the “Near Senses” as the information inputs are received from within the body (internal sources).

Balance and Acceleration (Equilibrioception)

The Vestibular sense, is the perception of balance or acceleration (inner ear). It is easy to produce illusions from this sense in our three dimensional and multi “G” aviation world.

Body Awareness (Proprioception)

The Kinaesthetic sense, is the perception of body awareness and is the "unconscious" awareness of the relationship between positions of the body (e.g. you can close your eyes and touch your finger to your nose). This sense also enables you to reach out “automatically” for a switch without looking for it and to pull back “just this much” on the control column or side stick to produce the required change in attitude.

Temperature (Thermoception)

The sense of heat and the absence of heat (cold) by the skin.

Pain (Nociception)

This sense is physiological pain of near-damage or damage to tissue (see the Touch section about getting your F/O’s attention).

Internal Organs (Interoception)

The sensory system of your internal organs (e.g., heart rate, hunger, digestion, state of arousal, mood, etc.). You know when you need to “visit the little boy’s room” or, if you’ve undertaken a hypobaric chamber hypoxia simulation, what your individual hypoxia symptoms are.

Sense Limitations

Each of these senses has certain very specific limitations. The sensor or detector can only sense inputs of a certain kind and usually within a narrow physical or physiological band.

For example you can only “see” with your eyes. You can’t see with your ears as your auditory system is not designed to detect light. Visible light has to enter and be detected by the eye (you can’t see through the back of your head). That “visible light” has to be of a very specific frequency. A typical human eye will respond to electromagnetic frequencies in air from about 400-790 terahertz – red to violet colours. The light that does eventually enter your eye has further limitations. Acute vision is only possible within a narrow cone of central vision, the rest of the detected light is your peripheral vision.

So you do not receive visual information if you’ve got your eyes closed, if the light is coming from outside of your visual field of view or if it is in the infra-red or ultra-violet frequency range (i.e. not in the visible spectrum of light).

You will also not be able to receive certain visual information when the visual system reaches its physical limitations. You can’t see an aircraft coming out of the sun as the sun’s brightness is too great for the human eye to accommodate and the contrast between the aircraft and the sun is entirely swamped (also you can’t see black cats in black coal cellars). You can only see objects of a certain finite size; your eye’s resolving power (I bet you have a hard time seeing an aircraft during the day at 40 nm, but just because you can’t see it doesn’t mean that it’s not there).

Your own personal sensor may also be defective in some way. You may require corrective glasses for your defective vision (within certain aviation medicine limitations) or your higher frequency hearing may be damaged (you should have worn those ear defenders/plugs on all those external preflights!).

Your personal sensor is also affected by your physical state. If you’re tired and fatigued you may not be able to focus your eyes as quickly or be more light sensitive than when you are rested.

All of your other senses suffer from some form of different limitations and these restrictions affect the amount, type and quality of the “raw data” that your physical senses actually detect and send to your brain.

And it is these eventual raw data sensory signals that get sent to your brain for you to use to execute your Judgement and arrive at a decision. So if you have restrictions of raw data information going in you may not have the entire Big Picture and so could quite possibly rely on that “degraded” or “incomplete” information to use in your Judgement process and so reach a less than optimal decision.

Sensory Conclusion

Each of your human sensory systems has its’ own particular physical and/or physiological limitations. If you are at least aware of these sense limitations and/or illusions and errors, then you can take this into account throughout the Judgement process.

This sensory information input stuff all might seem completely unrelated to judgment and decision making, but it is where it all begins. To react requires recognition. You have to detect or sense a change in your environment or situation (recognise) before you can start to cognitively process that sensed information to eventually arrive at an output decision (react).

Being aware of what information you receive (and what senses are involved and their possible limitations and weaknesses) can help you in formulating a sound decision from the entire Judgement process.

Judgement and Decision Making (Part 3 – Perception).

This is only MY attempt at analysing Judgement and Decision Making – I’m just a professional aviator, not a psychologist so my thoughts may not conform with academia, but it is based on a real pilot’s perspective. What would you rather have; a psychologist explaining aviation or an aviator explaining psychology?

I welcome any feedback about this article. Please add YOUR pilot input (or if any psychologists read this, your thoughts) by using the COMMENTS link below.

Leader/Follower Interacting Skills

2008-02-14T10:06:00.000+10:00

Dr. Maureen Pettitt and Mr. Joseph Dunlap of Western Michigan University have identified several "interacting skills" that both effective Leaders and followers applied as necessary to ensure task accomplishment.

A description of each skill and behaviour representative of the skill is described below:

Initiative – begins an action, without external direction, to overcome a perceived deficiency

Influence – obtains commitment from others to ideas or actions using effective interpersonal skills, styles and methods

Adaptability – adjusts to changing environments, ambiguity, and abnormal situations

Receptiveness – encourages, pays attention to, and conveys understanding of another's ideas, comments or questions

Modelling – exhibits behaviour consistent with the company's highest technical and ethical standards

Envisioning – creates and articulates a picture of the future or a desired state

If you, as the Captain, foster these “interacting skills” by displaying them yourself and encouraging and allowing your First Officer and other followers in your team to utilise them, then you have displayed good Leadership. In doing so you have reduced the risks involved and as a result, have increased safety and efficiency.

These interacting skills are especially critical in our airline operations because of the constantly changing composition of Cockpit (and Cabin) crews and the shifting cockpit roles due to the rotation of PF/PM (and with the addition of Releif First Officers and Second Officers on Long Haul flights).

So encourage and display these 6 Interacting skills.

Followers

2008-02-11T17:33:00.004+10:00

Good Leadership enhances followers, just as good followership enhances Leaders. (Heller and Van Til)

Leadership is not possible without followers. You have just spent a number of years as a First Officer – a follower. Don't forget what it was like to be a follower - that will make you a better Leader.

A superior and successful Leader will promote and foster good followership in the team by developing and nurturing essential follower skills. An effective follower;

Works effectively as a team member

Treats the Captain with the respect that is earned and is mindful of a positive Command Gradient

Accepts all assigned tasks willingly and executes them to the best of their ability

Maintains a positive attitude, especially when the situation is confused and changing

Offers suggestions and uses assertion as appropriate, but without usurping the Captain’s authority

Supports the chain of command, especially under stress

Voices differences of opinion, but executes with vigour the eventual decision

Demonstrates loyalty to the Company and its Leaders

Places the task, team and Company interests above personal interests

Remember what it was like to be a First Officer and a follower. Recall the instances of good Captains letting you function efficiently and do your job and resolve not to emulate the poor Captains who suppressed their followers.

One of the essential qualities of good Leaders is that they look after their followers. Never forget to include your followers (First Officer, Cabin Crew etc.) in your sphere of Leadership.

It is your followers who determine if you are a good Leader, NOT you the Leader, or your superiors.

Good Leadership

2008-02-07T14:52:00.000+10:00

Good leadership consists of motivating people to their highest levels by offering them opportunities, not obligations. (Lao Tzu)

Leadership is in the eye of the follower. (Simon Caulkin)

You should strive for excellence in Leadership – this will make you an excellent Captain.

While it is difficult to continuously project all of the following good Leadership qualities you should endeavour to display the majority of them at most times – otherwise you will lose the respect of your followers and team members. Poor Leaders are poor Captains.

Outlined below is a comprehensive list of characteristics, traits and values that good Leaders, and therefore good Captains, should possess and display:

Leads by example

Aviates, Navigates, Communicates and Manages – in that priority order

Is an influential, credible, consistent role model with integrity and is aware that their every move is examined, judged, scrutinised and often copied by their followers

Delegates when appropriate, regulates the tempo and pace when possible, spreads the workload, prioritises tasks and utilises available team members expertise so that spare mental capacity is available to allow management, planning, risk assessment, decision making and implementation of action

Is highly driven, intrinsically motivated and innovative, but also fosters that same enthusiasm in their followers

Sets a high personal standard, is a disciplined and skilled performer who readily and openly admits own mistakes

Well organised, well prepared and as a result, rarely caught off guard

Communicates well, but matches words with actions

Has a sense of humour and promotes fun with excellence, along with a passion and joy for the job and task at hand

Is calm in a crisis, tolerates ambiguity, applies common sense, simplifies complex situations and operates optimally, intelligently and flexibly when under pressure and is able to direct the team in difficult situations

Establishes and maintains an appropriate positive Command gradient, leaves no doubt as to who is the Leader and is firm but fair

Is approachable and establishes and maintains an open, respectful, sincere and supportive team atmosphere, being mindful of each team member’s welfare

Is confident, proactive and readily and promptly takes command if the situation dictates and uses the correct and appropriate level of authority

Involves other team members in the planning and decision making process and explains the rationale behind the final decision

Relates well with other people and has good Interpersonal and CRM skills

Able to modify and change Leadership styles to suit the particular situation

Takes into account each individual’s needs and abilities, builds their self esteem and self satisfaction and provides opportunities for the individual to perform and gain experience

Is aware of their followers’ workload, tasks, duties and abilities

Builds, moulds, and engenders a sound team spirit and morale to maintain good team work, clearly states performance standards and objectives and monitors and guides the team’s performance

Do you have what it takes to be a good Leader?

My Command Course In Retrospect - Captain Jay

2008-02-04T22:04:00.000+10:00

What follows is one particular successful Captain’s notes about his Command Course in one particular Airline – the good, the bad and the ugly.

We’ll call him Agent Jay (“…the difference between you and me is, I make this look good!”) to preserve his anonymity and de-identify the specifics. This will be a generalised account of what any Command Trainee could expect, in any Airline, flying any aircraft type. I have very slightly edited the text, to protect the innocent, but it is 97.5% straight from Captain Jay, in his own words.

Captain Jay emerged triumphant (a little battered and bruised) from the Command Training sausage machine about 10 months ago. This is real life Command stuff and contains some very pertinent points – read on if you dare!

It goes without saying that preparation is essential, but just reading the books isn’t enough. You need friends and colleagues to discuss scenarios with. You need to make your own decisions based on the information available to you and have your friends critique your answers. They may suggest other courses of action or pick holes in your answers. You need to get into the books to find certain things but not to memorise them, just to find them and maybe just to see if that word was “should, shall, must or may”!

When people tell you not to let your guard down, they really mean it. When you feel comfortable and confident, that’s when you relax and miss small things. They may seem insignificant but they are all noticed and written in the training reports. Once you get up to the standard required for, say, the Command Line Check to become a Captain, you must work just as hard to maintain that standard in the flights leading up to it. That requires a surprising amount of effort.

Every small error or omission during training may be written up, even though your Trainer may now seem like a friend. These small things will add up and be looked at unfavourably during a review of your training reports. Your aim is to get perfect reports. If your Checker is sitting on the fence about something during the debrief, push him onto the favourable side! Ask him if he considers you suitable to carry on with the training or to stop the Course, then he should agree that you should continue with the Course and write a report to mirror that.

Formulate a method of dealing with problems.

With passenger problems, make sure you get as much info as you can. That may involve speaking to the passenger yourself, especially if safety is the issue and you need to do a character assessment. Otherwise use the ISM (Inflight Service Manager) and ground staff to get information for you. Remember that their opinion may be different to yours.

With technical problems, try to fix it. If you cannot, call an engineer to try and fix it ASAP (on the ground). While waiting, get as much info as you can. Use the QRH, FCOM 3 (Abnormal, Normal and Supplementary Procedures) and MEL to find out all you can, including if you can go without it. Engineers and the airline's engineering department are a tool for you to use but you must not trust them completely as they are human too. There are countless stories of engineers instructing pilots to do something contrary to an OEB (Operational Engineering Bulletin – takes precedence over FCOM 3 procedures) or even bare faced lying about a problem, particularly at some of our outports. Some engineers may need your input to help solve a problem. Make sure you get engineers to explain the problem well enough for you to understand exactly what is wrong and what the implications are.

On the subject of not trusting anyone, items written in as an ADD (Acceptable Deferred Defect – in the Aircraft maintenance Logbook) are sometimes wrong, despite having been written up days prior. Perhaps some Line Captains don’t check the small print regularly, or just missed it, but on your Command Course, when you look at an ADD in the MEL, make sure it’s right because your Checker or Trainer will be looking at it right after you. Use any available engineering sources before your flight to give you a heads up about ADDs and the procedures involved.

Don’t guess. Don’t formulate a strategy without all the info. Look it up. It’s not a memory test. You are allowed to look at the books. There may have been an amendment yesterday. This is why a good working knowledge of the books is required, or at least a good (updated) index of our manuals so that you can find things quickly.

While you may feel you want to back up your ISM on something, make sure it is the right decision. (S)he may have jumped to a conclusion without all the info. Think of the ramifications. One of my ISMs wanted to offload a female passenger for popping 20 pills. It turns out it was only about 5 pills and the passenger was a movie star. That wouldn’t have been good advertising for the airline if she’d complained to the newspapers the next day for being offloaded for taking Vitamin E!

ECAM/EICAS cautions require you to sit on your hands and think. They may go away. If there are no ECAM/EICAS actions you have hit a dead end straight away. Think resets (of computers and equipment), use the QRH for that, always. Cautions in busy phases of flight should be assessed and left until later (flaps retracted for example) if possible.

When you fly with a F/O, the biggest challenge is that you are no longer sitting next to an STC (Senior Training Captain), you are with a normal F/O who may be nervous about the STC sitting on the jump seat. At least now you can act more like a Captain, but ensure that you keep a ‘command gradient’ from left to right. With confident senior F/Os this may be difficult but there are tricks to keeping a tangible gradient, such as delegating ND range changes, frequency changes, FM page changes. The best way is to be one step ahead of him. Don’t give him the chance to prompt you for engine anti-ice, radio calls, TCAS traffic or anything at all.

A new challenge for you is to analyse his personality from the moment you meet him at dispatch. Is he a JF/O (Junior First Officer)? What are his limits? Which sector do you want him to fly? You may find, like me, that some JF/Os may appear under-confident but are some of the best operators we have. Similarly, some senior F/Os can appear confident so you trust them more, then they lose the plot and make a big mistake.You are constantly analysing the guy next to you, and hopefully monitoring him despite tiredness and complacency.

Gut instinct is one of your best tools. Before a Command Course we think that there is a special formula needed to make Command decisions, or that you may not have developed a Command decision process yet, but this is wrong. Whenever you are presented with a problem, as an F/O or a Command Trainee, you have always formulated a solution or plan of action. The only difference now is that you have to volunteer your thoughts first rather than wait for the Captain to voice his (as YOU are now the Captain). Over the years you have hopefully gained enough experience to now trust your gut instinct and to not doubt your ability to reach sensible decisions. I surprised myself through my Command Course at how many decisions were based on gut instinct rather than theoretical analysis, and were right!

The rest of it is down to luck…and your personality! If you are relaxed, confident and on top of everything, you will look good and fly through the Course. A day full of technical and weather challenges can either make you look superb or hopeless, that’s all down to you!

Some further thoughts about being the Captain:

Big picture stuff. Command Presence. Assertiveness. Awareness. Spare capacity. Intervention. Run the show. Set the tone. Professional. Businesslike. Be in control. Think ahead.

The standard operation should be second nature by now, leaving spare capacity for awareness and planning. That includes standard triggers, which must not be overlooked.

Direct the F/O, but don’t ride him. He doesn’t need to be your friend, he needs to do what you say when you say it. Don’t say “Can you…would you…please.” Say “Give me this…Activate the Approach Phase…Before Start Checklist”. No flippant remarks. Be serious.

Get the F/O to fly the aircraft the way you want it flown. I don’t care what you think, I want it, just do it! (but use appropriate CRM). Even with a friendly crew, do not let your guard down. Don’t accept everything the F/O says verbatim.

The flight must be safe, legal and efficient.

Delegate, direct, no need for please, it’s a big operation.

Anticipate and verbalise threats and strategies (to mitigate those threats). E.g. – Plan A is to regain the ILS before 1500’ with self vectoring and descent to 1600’. Plan B is to go around which will be non-standard towards an MSA of xxxx. (Communication of Intent and your plan).

Aim for zero error. If an error occurs try to get back to the zero error position ASAP. (If you fly into a thunderstorm, get out. If you have a tech problem, try to fix it. If you get high, get down.)

What’s next? Think ahead. (Packs to come on. Engine Anti-Ice on for take-off. Call Departures after flap retraction. Speed control required while in selected speed)

Eager F/O? Beat him to it. Out-eager him. Verbalise everything!

If the command gradient feels just right, increase it! (don’t over do it though.)

Give reminders to the PF. Direct his FM page selection if necessary. Direct his choice of runway exit if necessary. (He stomps on brakes for a nearby exit, tell him to take the next one.)

In quiet moments, say something relevant. Look ahead, amend something, check something. However, never miss an opportunity to keep your mouth shut! Some comment you make may prompt a difficult question.

Volunteer information on events that occur. If there’s the possibility of a missed approach, consider TCAS ALL or ABOVE.

Any ‘gut reaction’ is probably correct; act on it.

Aim to impress, not to be average. Sell yourself to your Trainer or Checker.

Think ahead of the aircraft even when PM and ask him to clarify his plan. (“Weather ahead, do you want a heading?”)

Look for problems before they arise and have a plan to counter them.

Confirm ATC desired speed even when under positive speed control.

Monitor aircraft in front (and behind) on TCAS very closely and listen to instructions given to him by ATC.

No-one knows what I’m thinking. The Checker needs to know my thought process so verbalise them.

Think through briefs to yourself first, then brief the PM.

You are the last line of defence. It must be right!

Thanks Captain Jay for that sage advice.

What do you think? Is he right, wrong or you haven’t got a clue? Add your comments by clicking on the COMMENTS button below.

Cockpit Gradient

2008-02-04T02:08:00.000+10:00

Make sure that you read the Leadership Styles article before you go any further as that will explain the types or styles of Leadership discussed later in this article.

At all times you should maintain a positive cockpit gradient, that is to say, YOU as the Captain should be the one running the show. Normally you will the one with the most experience and knowledge, otherwise you would not be in a position of Command.

A positive cockpit gradient is essential to maintain an effective Leadership role. If you end up with a negative cockpit gradient your First Officer is running the show and you have given up your Leadership role and adopted or allowed yourself to transform into a follower. The cockpit gradient can be either steep or shallow, but should always remain positive.

Experience

The relative cockpit “levels” of the LHS and RHS vary depending on the experience levels of the Captain and First Officer and the situation encountered.

For most of the time you will encounter normal experience levels between you and your First Officer and you will face routine situations.

This results in a moderate and “normal” cockpit gradient which facilitates the usual use of the Participative style of Leadership.

An experienced Captain (a high cockpit level) and an inexperienced First Officer (a low cockpit level) will have a steep cockpit gradient.

An inexperienced Captain and an experienced First Officer will have a shallow cockpit gradient, but it still should be positive.

Situation

A time critical situation will require the Captain to “increase” his cockpit level as you take on more of the decision making, risk assessment and more actively Lead your team. This has the effect of steepening the overall cockpit gradient.

A routine flight will not place any great demands on either cockpit crew and so the cockpit levels will be low and the cockpit gradient may be normal to quite flat.

Changing Leadership Styles

If a routine flight is coupled with a new and inexperienced Captain (a low cockpit level) and an experienced First Officer (a high cockpit level), a very shallow cockpit gradient would result.

A shallow cockpit gradient lends itself to a Delegative style of Leadership. Ensure that the cockpit gradient remains positive. You must still retain the overall Leadership role.

In a complex, difficult, time critical situation the Captain will be required to rapidly elevate his cockpit level. If this occurs with a new and inexperienced Junior First Officer, the cockpit gradient will steepen quickly.

A steep cockpit gradient lends itself to an Authoritarian style of Leadership.

Between these two extremes lie many different angles of cockpit gradient, from steep to shallow. The often varying cockpit gradient will influence to some extent what Leadership style you employ to react to the given crew composition, crew experience and the conditions and situation that you find your team in. Remember that good Leaders vary their Leadership style to suit the situation.

Which Leadership style you eventually choose to use will result from the experience levels within the cockpit, the situation and how demanding it is and, of course, your knowledge of Leadership, coupled with common sense and effective CRM.

Situational Leadership

2008-02-03T14:30:00.000+10:00

Although good leaders use all three Leadership styles (Authoritarian, Participative or Delegative), with one style normally dominant, bad Leaders tend to stick with only one style.

There is no one right Leadership style that will suit all situations. Your Leadership style needs to subtlety change and shift between the various different Leadship styles to suit the particular situation that you and your team experience.

The style of Leadership that you use with a very senior and experienced First Officer (likely Participative or Delegative) will be inappropriate for use with an inexperienced Junior First Officer (Authoritarian may be appropriate, gradually merging into Participative when trust and competence has been gained).

In time critical situations where safety is involved an extremely Autocratic style may be required. You do not have the time to discuss the situation as the risk is too great.

In other situations you may be so involved with the other responsibilities of Command that you have little choice but to be extremely Delegative to manage your workload.

The Delegative style is also effective when your followers know more about the situation than you do (e.g. you have never operated into a new Port, but your First Officer has operated into there numerous times or a member of your crew has experienced an unusual situation or emergency before).

All three styles can be used for complex and unusual situations. For example, you may determine that the present course of action is not working and so direct a new plan (Authoritarian). In implementing this new plan you may ask for your team’s information, input and ideas to refine your plan (Participative). Finally you may delegate tasks to implement action to effect the plan (Delegative).

Remember that you are always ultimately responsible for the conduct of the flight and are accountable for not only your decisions and actions but also for your followers decisions and actions (right or wrong).

As a general rule, the members of your team are all adequately trained and skilled, with the requisite level of knowledge and will normally prefer a Participative style of Leadership – they desire and want to be involved. This style is the best to promote CRM.

So be prepared to alter your Leadership style to best suit the particular situation you and your team find yourself facing.

Leadership Styles

2008-02-03T09:25:00.000+10:00

Leadership style is the manner and approach of providing direction, implementing plans, and motivating people. Leadership style is very individual and how you incorporate those characteristics into your own individual Leadership style is entirely up to you. There is just no way that Leadership can be reduced to a "cookie cutter", simplistic, "do it this way" type of approach.

There are a number of different Leadership styles. Head on over to Don Clark's "The Art & Science Of Leadership" for a more comprehensive discussion on Leadership. For our Command purposes we will look at the following three:

Authoritarian or Autocratic

This is a direct and dominant style of Leadership characterised by strong and individualistic people. This type of Leader does not involve subordinates, likes to maintain as much control as possible, make decisions independently and is very task orientated. Exercises authority rather than Leadership. Most followers resent this type of Leadership in normal circumstances. The focus is firmly on the Leader.

Participative or Democratic

This is a shared Leadership style with the Leader including and involving their followers to make the most of the team’s strengths and minimise their weaknesses. However the Leader maintains the final decision making authority. The focus is on the team.

Delegative or Free Reign

In this style the Leader allows his followers to get on with their tasks relatively unsupervised and make their own decisions. This may be because the followers have the required skills or information or because the Leader delegates to competent and suitably skilled followers (good) or because the Leader abrogates his responsibility due to laziness or incompetence or defers to others (bad). The focus is on the followers.

There is no right or wrong way. But more importantly, YOU will have to "discover" what works for you and how you will adopt and adapt these Leadership characteristics and traits into YOUR way of doing things as the Captain (see Situational Leadership).

It's all about learning and educating yourself about Leadership.